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Execution Upon Causes Of Action Remains Appropriate Under Utah
Law Following The Repeal Of Rule 69
The Trial Court Was Not Required To Hold An Evidentiary Hearing
Prior To Granting The Motion To Substitute; The Validity Of
Plaintiffs Purported Transfer Was Not At Issue
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Granting The
Motion To Substitute; For The Court To Have Refused To Substitute
After Determining That Black Diamond Was The Real Party In
Interest Owning Plaintiffs Claims Would Have Been An Abuse Of
Discretion
The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Lamoreaux's Actions
Seeking To Undermine The Effectiveness Of The Writ Procedure
Constituted An Impermissible Collateral Attack
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In The Timing Of Its
Decision-Making
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Dismissing The Case Following The
Grant Of The Motion To Substitute, Thereby Precluding Mr, Park
From Potentially Obtaining A Contingency Fee
Defendant Should Be Awarded Its Reasonable Attorneys' Fees
Directly Against Plaintiffs Counsel, For Fees Incurred In Defending
Against Mr. Park's Contingency-Fee Claim
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

-1-

Although David Lee Lamoreaux was no longer a party to the case as of the time
of thefinalorder dismissing the action below, and Black Diamond had been substituted
in as party plaintiff, for convenience Black Diamond uses the term "Plaintiff" in
describing Mr. Lamoreaux herein.

for both questions of fact and law, on this issue there is no decision by the trial court for

counsel to preserve his contingency-fee argument involve questions of fact. However,

(citation omitted). As for the question of preservation, the actions taken by Plaintiffs

2012 UT 4,117,700 Utah Adv. Rep. 89 ("interpretation of a statute is a question of law")

2-7 and 78B-5-825. See, e.g., Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake Bd. ofEqualization^

This issue raises questions of law, including the interpretation of Utah Code Ann, §§ 38-

standing to appeal nor has appropriately preserved the contingency-fee issue for appeal?

to a contingency fee (Issue No, 6, Opening Brief at 8) in a matter where he neither has

Plaintiffs counsel when Plaintiffs counsel has raised an issue regarding his entitlement

Issue 7: Is Defendant entitled to an attorney's fee award directed against

following addition.

Plaintiff-Appellant David Lee Lamoreaux ("Plaintiff"1 or "Lamoreaux"), with the

Diamond") accepts the Statement of Issues Presented for Review in the Opening Brief of

Defendant-Appellee Black Diamond Holdings, LLC ("Defendant" or "Black

DL

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2)(j).

Ann. § 78A-3-102 (3)(j). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter

The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code

L
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

Plaintiffs claims against Black Diamond sounded in contract, and were based on a

Nature of the Case

STATEMENT OF CASE

-2-

Prudential Cedar City and made no mention of fees to be paid to Lamoreaux as an

2006. SeeR. 000006. Although the Contract was between Black Diamond and

"Contract"), entered between Black Diamond and Prudential Cedar City on April 3,

document titled an Exclusive Right to Sell Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure (the

A.

IV.

23-5,78B-5-505 (2008), 78B-5-825 (2008), 78B-5-826 (2008).

64E (2008) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-2-7 (2008), 78-

appeal are as follows, and are attached as Addendum Exhib. 1: Rules 69 (2003), 64 and

Statutes or rules that are or may be determinative or of central importance to this

HI.

copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 3.

Submit for Decision ("Objection") (Sept. 13,2011), R. 000635-36, a true and correct

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. See Objection to Motion to Dismiss and Request to

Plaintiffs counsel failed to raise the contingency-fee argument in response to

correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 2. Despite this invitation,

("Memorandum Decision") (Aug. 11,2011) at 7-8, Record ("R.") 000618-26, a true and

and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Substitute in as Party Plaintiff

such issues in response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. See Memorandum Decision

of Mr. Park's contingency fee was the invitation by the court for counsel to further raise

this Court to review. Rather, the only relevant decision by the trial court on the question

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lamoreaux's Complaint against Black Diamond wasfiledin 2008 and the matter

Course of Proceedings

-3-

Personal service on Mr. Lamoreaux was accomplished on February 16,2011, which (as

was mailed, personally served, publicly posted and published in a local newspaper.

The Fishers' notice of execution on Lamoreaux's claims against Black Diamond

"BlackDiamondLawsuit"). See R. 000517-18.

080500885 (the case below against Defendant that is now at issue in this appeal—the

the Fisher Lawsuit, in order to execute upon David Lamoreaux's interests in Civil Action

to that judgment, on or about January 19,2011 the Fishers obtained a writ of execution in

$16,484.96, in Civil Action 080502955 (the "Fisher Lawsuit"). See R. 000515. Pursuant

judgment against David Lamoreaux and his then-wife Diane Lamoreaux, in the amount of

and trial, on or about February 1,2010 Darwin and Cheryl Fisher (the "Fishers") obtained a

came to trial on February 16,2011. See R. 000488. Between thefilingof the Complaint

B.

claims against itself in the instant action.

which claims were purchased at the public sale by Black Diamond in order to dismiss the

creditor's execution on and public sale of Lamoreaux's claims against Black Diamond,

concern Plaintiffs original claims. Instead, the issues on appeal deal with a judgment

As set forth below in the Course of Proceedings, the issues now on appeal do not

listed property sold. See, e.g., Complaint at f 3, R. 000002.

personally entitled to the entire 8% brokerage fee identified in the Contract once the

individual, Plaintiff claimed that he, as the principal broker of Prudential Cedar City, was

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court will then take this matter under advisement and render a written

-4-

Such documents, consisting of Defendant's Motion to Substitute and supporting
exhibits, are unfortunately out of order in the Record; but to the best of undersigned
counsel's ability the record numbers cited herein cover the range of relevant documents.

2

(Apr. 12,2011) at ff 3-6, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as

Mr. Park either could not or would not answer. See Declaration of R, Daren Barney

When asked when the alleged transfer had occurred and to whom the transfer was made,

Lawsuit, and, therefore, there was nothing left for the Fishers to sell. See R. 000558.

asserting that Lamoreaux had already transferred his interests in the Black Diamond

Lamoreaux and his counsel appeared at the sale and attempted to stop the proceedings by

2011, the Fishers held their public sale of Lamoreaux's claims against Black Diamond.

take the matter under advisement and render a judgment on the merits), on March 21,

fact and conclusions of law (and, therefore, prior to the time when the trial court was to

However, prior to the April 1 deadline for the submission of proposed findings of

of which is attached as Addendum Exhibit 4.

decision." See Minutes, Bench Trial (Feb. 17,2011); R. 000490, a true and correct copy

2011]

their proposed findings and orders, and any case law, to the Court by 3 p.m. on [April 1,

and at the conclusion of the second day the trial judge directed "counsel to each submit

The trial in the Black Diamond Lawsuit took place over the course of two days

000520; see generally R. 000493-546.2

noted above) was the first day of trial in the Black Diamond Lawsuit. See R. 000504,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Addendum Exhibit 5 contains a true and correct copy of Defendant's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Substitute in as Party Plaintiff, with
accompanying exhibits. Undersigned counsel was unable to locate this Reply
Memorandum in the Record prepared by the trial clerk. However, the trial court's date
stamp shows that the Reply was filed one minute after Defendant's Ex Parte Motion for
Permission to File Over-Length Memorandum in Support of Motion to Substitute in as
Party Plaintiff (Apr. 12,2011), which is included in the Record at R. 000596.

3

Lawsuit to his son, Jake Austin Lamoreaux. See R. 000554-55. Notwithstanding the

March 21,2011 public sale he had already transferred his interests in the Black Diamond

which included an affidavit from Mr. Lamoreaux stating that prior to the time of the

On March 24,2011, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Request for Ex Parte Order,

for Enlargement at 1-2; R. 000547-48.

parties to undergo the time and expense of preparing proposed judgments. See Motion

Substitute was decided, Defendant argued that it would be inefficient to require the

this action, and will be able to obtain dismissal of this matter." Thus, until the Motion to

to Substitute], Black Diamond will take the place of Mr. Lamoreaux as the plaintiff in

currently scheduled for April 1,2001," on the basis that "if successful with the [Motion

parties of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entry of judgment,

("Motion for Enlargement"), seeking an "enlargement of time for the submission by the

Enlargement Pending Court's Order on Motion to Substitute in as Party Plaintiff

The next day, March 22,2011, Defendant filed an Ex Parte Motion for

Substitute in as Party Plaintiff ("Motion to Substitute"). See R. 000505.

on its purchase at the public sale, on that same day Black Diamond filed its Motion to

sale proceeded and Black Diamond was the successful bidder. See R. 000543-44. Based

Addendum Exhibit 5, at Exhib. 1.3 Notwithstanding Lamoreaux's attempt to halt it, the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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denied) or was stayed indefinitely (in the event the Motion to Substitute was granted).

issued its decision on the Motion to Substitute (in the event the Motion to Substitute was

conclusions of law, and judgments was either enlarged until 14 days after the trial court

000562. According to that order, the time for submitting proposed findings of fact,

On March 31,2011, Defendant's Motion for Enlargement was granted. See R.

consequences of the Fishers' public sale.

than a month after trial as part of Lamoreaux's creative attempts to evade the

Lawsuit {see R. 000620; Addend. Exhib. 2 (Memorandum Decision) at 3), until more

Lamoreaux was allegedly no longer the real party in interest in the Black Diamond

even before trial. No notice was ever given to the trial court or to Defendant that

counsel Lamoreaux had allegedly transferred his interests in the Black Diamond Lawsuit

the Black Diamond Lawsuit), according to his own allegations and the arguments of his

service on Lamoreaux was accomplished on February 16,2011 (the first day of trial in

See Opposition to Substitution (Apr. 4,2011) at fl 20-21; R. 000567. Since the Fishers'

place even before Lamoreaux was served with the notice of writ in the Fisher Lawsuit.

further clarified that in fact Lamoreaux's secret, alleged transfer to his son had taken

Substitute in as Party Plaintiff ("Opposition to Substitution"), Lamoreaux's counsel

Later, in submitting Lamoreaux's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to

the creditors if he ever receives any fundsfromthis lawsuit." See id. at 17.

because "if he is fortunate enough to get a judgment in his favor... he will address all

Mr. Lamoreaux also swore that he had not made the alleged transfer to defraud creditors

alleged fact that he no longer owned the claims in the Black Diamond Lawsuit, however,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the interim before the June 17,2011 hearing, the parties also briefed a Motion
to Rescind Order of Judge John Walton, filed by Plaintiff on April 5,2011. See, e.g.,
R. 000592 (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Rescind Order of Judge
John Walton). It was Judge Walton who actually granted the Motion for Enlargement,
following oral argument. Upon learningfromcourt staff that Judge Ludlow was out of
town for a week at a funeral, counsel for Defendant sought out Judge Walton to hear the
Motion for Enlargement in late-March in order to have the Motion heard in time to be of
effect prior to the April 1,2011 deadline for the submission of proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law.

4

Procedure ("Motion to Dismiss") on August 23,2011. See R. 000627-28. On August 30,

motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(aX2)(ii) of the Utah Rules of Civil

on August 11,2011. SeeR. 000618; Addend. Exhib. 2. As a result, Defendant filed a

The trial court issued its Memorandum Decision granting the Motion to Substitute

with the Motion to Substitute. See id., Addend. Exhib. 6 at 32, In. 12 through 33, In. 2.

submission of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgments) after dealing

deal with other deadlines (the only outstanding additional deadline at that time being the

proposed orders on the Motion to Substitute by July 1,2011, and indicated that it would

Addendum Exhibit 6.4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court requested

000655, et seq), a true and correct copy of the transcript of which is attached as

A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Substitute was held on June 17,2011 (see R.

take the merits of the case under advisement.

Defendants' Motion for Enlargement also effectively stayed the time for the trial court to

and conclusions of law (see R. 000490, Addendum Exhib. 4), the order granting

case under advisement until after the parties had submitted their proposedfindingsof fact

See id. Since the trial court had previously ruled that it would not take the merits of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although Plaintiff had been dismissed as a party pursuant to the Memorandum
Decision, in the same decision the trial court ordered Defendant to continue to serve all
papers on Plaintiffs counsel. See R. 000625; Addend. Exhib. 2 (Memorandum Decision)
at 8.

5

absence of afinalorder, apparently either a representative of Plaintiff or of this Court

Following this Court's issuance of a sua sponte motion to dismiss based on the

See Addend. Exhib. 3 at 1-2.

The plaintiff, David Lee Lamoreaux, by his attorney,
Michael W. Park, objects to the Motion to Dismiss and the
Request to Submit for Decision. The Motion to Dismiss and
the Request to Submit for Decision is based on the court's
August 11th, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order
granting defendant's Motion to Substitute in as a Party
Plaintiff The plaintiff David Lee Lamoreaux has appealed
the Memorandum Decision and Order granting defendant's
Motion to Substitute in as Party Plaintiff. The plaintiff,
David Lee Lamoreaux is asking the appellate court to reverse
the decision of the trial court. The Notice of Appeal was
timely filed and it is plaintiff, David Lee Lamoreaux's request
that the District Court take no further action until the matter is
determined on appeal.

Exhib, 3), stating in full:

September 13,2011, Plaintiffs counsel filed his Objection (see R. 000635; Addend.

request to submit the Motion to Dismiss for decision. See R. 000631. The next day,

filed within the time allowed, however, so on September 12,2011 Defendant filed a

opposition to the Motion to Dismiss was due by September 9,2011. No opposition was

Thus, pursuant to Rules 6(a) and 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any

The Motion to Dismiss was served on Plaintiffs counsel5 by mail. See R. 000628.

R. 000629.

2011, Plaintiff filed its first Notice of Appeal, appealing the Memorandum Decision. See

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As noted above, Plaintiff was dismissed as a party to the case and Defendant was

Disposition Below

Defendant limits its statement of facts herein to those issues relevant to this

Statement of Facts

-9-

disputes almost all of Plaintiff s factual assertions regarding the merits, made on page 17

the merits of Plaintiffs claims against Black Diamond, except to note that Defendant

appeal. For this reason, Defendant does not address the underlying facts going toward

D.

in their entirety, with prejudice.

Plaintiffs claims against Defendant in the Black Diamond Lawsuit have been dismissed

Motion to Dismiss by issuing the Dismissal Order. SeeR. 000647. As a result,

See R. 000625; Addend. Exhib. 2 at 8. Thereafter, the trial court granted Defendant's

substituted in as party plaintiff by the trial court's order in the Memorandum Decision.

C.

13,2011, for failure to file a docketing statement.

Case No. 20110929, and has now been dismissed by this Court's order dated December

submitted a second Notice of Appeal. See R. 000650. That second appeal was assigned

no doubt to avoid prejudice in the event thefirstappeal were to be dismissed, Plaintiff

disposition, based on the entry of the Dismissal Order. However, prior to that time and

On October 26,2011 this Court withdrew its sua sponte motion for summary

prejudice, SeeK. 000647.

Dismiss ("Dismissal Order"), dismissing the Black Diamond Lawsuit in its entirety, with

a result, on September 23,2011 the trial court issued its Order Granting Motion to

contacted the trial court and notified it of the absence of afinalorder. See R. 000645. As
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a judgment against Lamoreaux, obtaining a writ of execution, providing notice of

(or Plaintiff has waived any claim of a procedural defect) in the Fisher's obtaining

causes of action following the repeal of Rule 69, there was no procedural defect

5. AsidefromPlaintiffs legal argument about the ability to execute upon

in his Opening Brief and by failing to otherwise preserve a contrary argument for appeal:

Plaintiff implicitly concedes the following by failing to make a contrary assertion

lawsuit". See id. at 21.

the highest bidder, "purchasing whatever interest Lamoreaux had in the instant

4. The public sale was conducted on March 21,2011 and Black Diamond was

published. See id.

served on Lamoreaux and his counsel, as well as being publicly posted and

3. The notice of sale of Lamoreaux's claims against Black Diamond was

pursuant to Rule 64 E(d)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." See id. at 20.

reply or objection to the Writ of Execution within 10 days of service of the Writ

2. Lamoreaux was served with the Fisher's writ but "did not file a written

against Black Diamond, See Opening Brief at 19-20.

1. The Fishers obtained a writ of execution to execute on Lamoreaux's claims

would be supported by the Record, even in the absence of Plaintiffs admissions):

Plaintiff expressly concedes all of the following in his Opening Brief (all of which

source of evidence to support such assertions. See Opening Brief at 17.

record citation at all or merely cite to Plaintiffs Complaint, which is not an appropriate

of Plaintiffs Opening Brief. Defendant further notes that such assertions either lack any
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-11-

trial court directed "counsel to each submit their proposedfindingsand orders, and

n",!;., hi ill I i luilm iisnoicd iihou1 in lln romsc ol Proceedings secuu»

take the merits of the case under advisement as asserted in the Opening Brief. See,

9. Upon closing the proceedings on thefinalday of trial, the trial court did not

supported by the Record:

The following are relevant facts which are not conceded by Plaintiff, but which are

"whatever interest Lamoreaux had in the instant lawsuit". See id. at 16.

8. Defendant was the successful bidder at the public sale and purchased

secretly transferred his claims against Black Diamond. See, e.g., Opening Brief at

sought to have the sale stopped on the alleged basis that Lamoreaux had already

by Lamoreaux and his counsel, whereby they appealed at tin public sulti and

prior to the sale being conducted on March 21,2011 was the self-help action taken

7. The only attempt any person made to stop the writ process or public sale

Fxhil'i, /"' (Mrmoi'iiiKlnm 11 h'cision) ,il "l,

Lawsuit, prior to the public sale on March 21,2011. See R. 000619; Addend.

execution and public sale, in either the Fisher Lawsuit or the Black Diamond

in/ph ohjtvlion, motion In discharp

of Plaintiffs claims against Black Diamond), nor any other person filed a written

6. Neither Mr. Lamoreaux, nor Jake Austin Lamoreaux (the alleged transferee

Lamoreaux's claims at the public sale.

• the writ and public sale, conducting the public sale, and 1 k I aidant pin i liasm^
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See supra note 4.
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Notwithstanding this invitation by the trial court, counsel for Plaintiff failed to

to Dismiss. See R. 000624-25; Addend. Exhib. 2 (Memorandum Decision) at 7-8.

invited Mr. Park to provide in opposition to Black Diamond's anticipated Motion

briefing on the issue was necessary—further briefing which the court expressly

Mr. Park's contingency-fee argument was not ripe for decision and that further

Substitution at 15. In the Memorandum Decision, the trial court concluded that

Lamoreaux's claims against Black Diamond. See R. 000578; Opposition to

contingency fee agreement that operated as a lien and encumbrance on

substitution should not be granted, in part, because Plaintiffs counsel had a

Party Plaintiff ("Opposition to Substitution") (April 5,2011), Plaintiff argued that

10. In submitting his Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Substitute in as

I' See R. 000594; Rescission Memorandum at 3.

conclusions of law without further delay so the case can properly be concluded."

pleads with the court to require the parties to file their findings of fact and

by Judge Walton6 should be reversed, concluding as follows: 'The plaintiff now

(April 5,2011). There, Plaintiff argued that the Motion for Enlargement granted

Motion to Rescind Order of Judge John Walton ("Rescission Memorandum")

I case had not yet been taken under advisement, in his Memorandum in Support of

000490; Addend. Exhib. 4. Plaintiff effectively conceded that the merits of the

court 'take this matter under advisement and render a written decision." See R.

any case law, to the Court by 3 p.m. on [April 1,2011]." Only then would the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IIIICVCI

sin IJL* I ill Ih intervene in the Black

SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT

iii\ohes al lr<isl OIK Uiiii hmiijjjil on hcli.ilf of PhnnlilVs counsel, Mr.

of Plaintiff;!: , claims is
the purported secret transfer of Plaintiffs claimsfromMr. Lamoreaux to his son Jake

issue implicating the effectiveness of Black Dian -

of execution, noticing a public sale, and conducting the sale. Thus, the only remaining

concedes that all appropriate procedures were followed by the Fishers in obtaining a writ

following the repeal of Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Plaintiff

should, be affirmed Execution "upon causes of action remains fully appropriate in Utah

As will be set forth below, the trial court's Memorandum Decision was correct and

Park (or the Park Firm).

Plainti

Dismissal Order. Further, while this appeal involves multiple issues raised on behalf of

This appeal involves claims of error in both the Memorandum Decision and the

V.

claims against Black Diamond.

Diamond Lawsuit, in order to protect his alleged lien interest in Lamoreaux's

Il \ I'lamltfl s (oiJiiscllL, Mi. hut,

Rules of Civil Procedure, for the failure to submit a timely opposition. See id.

Dismiss or any attempt to show excusable neglect, under Rule 6 (b)(2) of the Utah

In mrlmli' ii'illin .i nqiusl lot ;in i\\\\\\\n mint ol \\w lime In Dpposc (In Moth in In

the Motion to Dismiss. Further, when the Objection was belatedly filed, it failed

11. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel, Mr, Park, submitted a timely opposition to

Motion to Dismiss. See R. 00635-36; Addend, Exhib 3 at 1 2

include any argument about contingency fees in his untimely Objection to the
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correctness of the trial court's ultimate decisions, such delay would not have been

Memorandum Decision and Dismissal Order, and even if there had been, given the

There was no improper delay by the trial court in reaching its decisions in the

defendant's side of the case.

only real party in interest in the action would have been on both the plaintiffs and

absurd result, and would have failed to present a genuine case or controversy—as the

opportunity to obtain a contingency fee. Such a course of action would have produced an

proceed to obtain a judgment against itself, in order to preserve Plaintiffs counsel's

ultimately rest on the novel assertion that Black Diamond should have been required to

in order to dismiss the case. Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary lack merit, and

would have been erroneous not to allow Black Diamond to substitute in as party plaintiff

interest owning the plaintiff-side claims against itself in the Black Diamond Lawsuit, it

Once the trial court correctly determined that Black Diamond was the real party in

sale operated to render the public sale inoperative.

Lamoreaux nor the self-help steps taken by Mr. Lamoreaux and his counsel at the public

the writ procedure in the Fisher Lawsuit Neither the alleged secret transfer to Jake

had the opportunity—and was obligated—to assert that interest by filing an objection to

Lamoreaux truly obtained his father's interest in the claims against Black Diamond, he

fraudulent—did nothing to undermine the validity of the public sale. Rather, if Jake

Lamoreaux. However, such a secret transfer—even if it actually occurred and was not
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ARGUMENT

In Issue No. 1, Plaintiff asserts that execution by a judgment creditor against the

Execution Upon Causes Of Action Remains Appropriate Under Utah Law
Foiiowing The Repeal Of Rule 69,

that causes of action (except those specifically identified by statute as being excluded)

statutory provisions. ' I he plain language of the relevant statute and rules leaves no douhl,

directly at odds with the operative language of the relevant, currently-applicable rules and

Plaintiffs understanding of the state of the law in Utah following the repeal of Rule 69 is

PLimtiff provides, im aiillioinh lor this nsserlion ol (lie drafters' intent. Moreo \ er,

Procedure "no longer sanctioned" by repealing Rule 69. See Opening Brief at 26-27.

practice, which it "seems patently clear" that the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil

A.

trial court were correct and should be affirmed.

in the order presented by Plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, the decisions of the

Defendant addresses below each of the argumentsfromPlaintiffs Opening Brief,

reciprocal-attorney-fee doctrine.

is entitled to an attorney-fee award against Plaintiffs counsel directly, under the

belii'ill of .in i iilillnitciil lit piescrw .in oppoiliimh l« »• •• • i • • 1 ailoiim "s fro Defendant

by failing to preserve them on appeal Given Mr. Park's assertion—on his firm's own

own claims in this appeal, and even if he otherwise had standing he has waived his claims

not properlj before this Court on appeal Plaintiffs counsel has no standing to assert his

Finally, the claim of Plaintiffs counsel based on his contingency fee agreemc
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See, e.g., Cosby v. Cazares, 2010 UT App 269, 2010 Utah App. LEXIS 270
(unpublished memorandum decision).

7

primary—source of authority for such execution.

the legality of executing upon causes of action, Rule 69(f) was never the sole—or even

express reference to "choses in action" in Rule 69(f) as a short-hand way to demonstrate

portions of former Utah R. Civ. P. 69 (2003)). However, while courts often referred to this

forth herein

collecting or selling the choses in action and selling the other property in the manner set

directing the levy "on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient property;

Former Rule 69 (f) contained language aimed at the officer executing a writ,

generally available for execution and sale.

interpretive case law is not necessary in order to conclude that causes of action remain

699* However, given the clarity of the operative language in the current statute and rules,

seminal decision in Applied Medical Technologies, Inc, v. Eames, 2002 UT 18,44 P.3d

may not limit the precedential value of former cases such as the Utah Supreme Court's

the law under the current rules, following the repeal of Rule 69 in 2004. This fact may or

former Rule 69 was still in effect Defendant is aware of no case interpreting the state of

purposes of obtaining a dismissal,7 such appeals appear to befromtrials conducted while

decisions affirming the ability of a party to purchase causes of action against itself for

At the outset, Defendant acknowledges that although there are recent appellate

the Memorandum Decision.

remain available for execution. Thus, Issue No. 1 fails to present a basis for reversal of
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«ses of uclion, in ,„i middle subsecti<

* See, e.g., Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, f 16,250 P.3d 48, 52 ("When we interpret a
rule of civil procedure, we look to the express language of the rule and to cases
interpreting it. Like statutes, we read each term in the rule according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning.") (quotation and citations omitted); Cox v. Krammer, 2003 UT App
264, f 10,76 P.3d 184,187 ("When interpreting court rules, we apply our rules of
statutory construction with an understanding that rules, like statutes, are passed as a
whole and not in parts or sections.") (quotation omitted); Summit Water Distribution Co.
v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, J 17,123 P.3d 437,442 ("It is well settled in this court
that our goal when interpreting a statute Ms to give effect to the legislative intent, as
evidenced by the [statute's] plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant
to achieve.'") (bracketing in original; quoting Foutz v. City ofS. Jordan, 20041IT 75, f
11,100 P.3d 1171).

placemen!

property and sell it at a sheriffs sale.") (bracketing in original; emphasis added). This

sheriff or constable, pursuant to a writ of execution, may levy upon the nonexempt

Ci\ P 69(b) Accordingly; itittk i Rule (>*>< (I i»l the I Hiih Rules oil ('ivil Procedure a

real property which is not exemptfromexecution under state or federal law.' Utah R.

of execution may be used to levy upon all of [a] judgment debtor's personal property and

2002 UT 18 at f 11 ("Rule 69(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, 'A writ

acknowledged by the court in Applied Medical Technologies. See Applied Med, Techs.,

reference in Rule 69(f) to executing on causes of action was at least partially, implicitly

R. Civ. P. 69(f) (2003); Addend. Exhib. 1 at 1-4. The somewhat secondary nature of the

used by an officer in levying against the judgment debtor's property. See generally 1Jtah

collecting and selling causes of action as an example, in the context of the process to be

of a lengthy rule regarding writ procedure generally, and it only incidentally mentioned

authority to exeeuit on umses of admn Rallim, ill wai- J siihseclmn btiiial in Ihe nmldli

Under a plain-language review,8 former Rule 69 (f) did not read as a grant of
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See, e.g., State ex rel Z.C., 2007 UT 54,16,165 P.3d 1206,1208 ("When
examining the statutory language we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and
in accordance with its ordinary meaning.") (quotation omitted); Olsen v. Eagle Mt. City,
2011 UT 10, f 9,248 P.3d 465,469 ("when the words of a statute consist of 'common,
daily, nontechnical speech/ they are construed in accordance with the ordinary meaning
such words would have to a reasonable person familiar with the usage and context of the
language in question.") (quoting O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, % 32; footnote omitted);
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp, 609 P.2d 934,936 (Utah 1980) ("[S]tatutory enactments are
to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that
interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or

10

The 1999 version is relied upon herein because that is the last year where
amendments are reflected in former section 78-23-5 prior to the 2004 repeal of Rule 69,

9

would be nonsensical.10

not intend to exclude all causes of action generally—otherwise, the specific exclusions

as to particular types of causes of action required the conclusion that the legislature did

were exempted from execution. See id. This legislative expression of specific exclusions

5( 1 )(ix), certain causes of action related to personal injury and wrongful death claims

Ann. § 78-23-5 (1999),9 Addend. Exhib. 1 at 7-8. Indeed, pursuant to section 78-23-

types of personal property subject to exemption from execution. See, e.g., Utah Code

pursuant to section 78-23-5, causes of action (at least generally) were not identified as

execution under state or federal law." See Addend. Exhib. 1 at 1 (emphasis added). And,

levy upon all of the judgment debtor's personal property... which is not exempt from

Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5. Pursuant to Rule 69(b), "[a] writ of execution may be used to

69 (again; under a plain-language analysis) came from Rule 69(b), in conjunction with

Rather, the primary source of authority to execute on causes of action under Rule

for execution.

long and complicated rule of procedure, however, is hardly the sole source of authority
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|>ni\ mlail Ihe . in il I ion lh, inn excelling on

see Kill u I |<(a), Addend IMnh I ,il I 1) includes "the defendant5s

third person to perform for the defendant." See

"Current" for purposes of this appeal meaning the rules operative in 2008 when
Mr. Lamoreaux initiated the Black Diamond Lawsuit.

11

absurd.") (bracketing in original; citations omitted); see also, e.g., Black's Law
Dictionary (6th ed.) at 403 (expressio tmius est exclusio alterius is the "maxim of
statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another.").

jdligatio

and personal property, tangible and intangible property, the right to property whether due

property of any type not exempt from seizure. Property includes but is not limited to real

writs ol'execution

repealed, under current Rule 6411 the definition of "property" subject to writs (including

in place in 2008 and remains in place today. Specifically, even though Rule 69 has been

• Critically, this frames orkofR i lie <>•> |l I .iinl 1 'll.iti I 'ode Ann l\ !t-l I "> remained

emphasis added; italics in original; footnote omitted).

exempting causes of action from execution. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69.") (underline

Cal Rptr.. at 152- Like Nevada, Utah's rules of civil procedure contain no direct language

language to the contrary, all causes of action are subject to execution. See Denham, 262

980 P.2d 208,210 ("The Denham court interpreting Nevada law, held that, absent direct

to execution. Cf, e.g., Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, % 10,

exempt from execution, then causes of action (except as noted in the statute) were subject

executed upon, and causes of action (generally) were not identified in the statute as being

causes of action. If all personal property '"which is not exempt from execution" could be

tmady the sfMxifik laiigiwj."!1 mi Kill*1 h^l'l

This broader framework of Rule 69 (b) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5—not
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R 000621; Addend. Exhib. 2 (Memorandum Decision) at 4.

being exempt from seizure, then it follows that choses in action may be executed upon."

upon unless it is exemptfromseizure, and no provision identifies choses in action as

court correctly put it: "If the relevant rule provides that all property may be executed

of action remain subject to execution regardless of the repeal of Rule 69. As the trial

language of Rule 64 and section 78B-5-505 therefore compels the conclusion that causes

because it is not statutorily identified as being "exempt from seizure." The plain

(a)(9) and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505, a cause of action remains subject to execution

section 78B-5-505(l)(x) (2008), Addend. Exhib. 1 at 9-10. By the interaction of Rule 64

exempted from execution and continues to not exclude causes of action generally. See

continues to specify that certain claims related to personal injury and wrongful death are

Ann. § 78B-5-505 contains essentially identical language to the former statute. It

identified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5, the current statutory provision in Utah Code

Moreover, just as causes of action generally were not among the exemptions

included in the types of property subject to execution.

motorized transportation—causes of action, like metaphorical motorcycles, are still

current rule replacing such specificity with a provision allowing execution upon all

difference between the former rule specifying execution upon motorcycles and the

The difference between former Rule 69(f) and current Rule 64 (aX9) is thus akin to the

fits within the category of personal, intangible property, "whether due or to become due."

Utah R. Civ. P. 64(a)(9) (2008); Addend. Exhib. 1 at 13. A cause of action comfortably
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in Hie Memorandum Derision Hull i wises oluttion, generally, remain subject to

In sum, Plaintiffs Issue No. 1 lacks merit. The trial court was correct to conclude

perform for the defendant." See Utah R. Civ. P. 64(a)(9) (2008); Addend. Exhib. 1 at 13.

the right to property whether due or to become due, and an obligation of a third person to

includes but is not limited to real and personal property, tangible and intangible property,

writs as being "the defendant's property of any type not exempt from seizure. Property

was accomplished (or clarified) by Rule 64 (a)(9)'s definition of "property" subject to

subject to levy under execution" is precisely what

") (footnotes omitted). See Addend. Exhib. 5 at Exhib. 5.
Making "intangible propert)

execution

intangible property, including choses in action owned by the debtor, subject to levy under

rather, intangible property had to be reached through actions of equitable origin, such as a

writ of execution can not be levied against a mere contractual right or chose in action;

fan utums nul hiUHtcmcni' at .Ituh'int m\ f> 14? (<?()<) i) ("Under the common law, a

law intangible personal property was not subject to execution. See 30 Am. Jur. 2d.,

that causes of action are considered to be intangible personal property, and at common

that the on Is ic.ison |«isi n li\ imcn'nw Jurisprudence for excluding causes of action is

Procedure. See Opening Brief at 26. What Plaintiff fails to acknowledge, however, is

"sharp practices" which are "no longer expressly authorized by the Utah Rules of Civil

one may not execute upon a chose in action," and appears to relate this citation with the

Plaintiff cites M) Am lui ,M /','w< utions for (IK1 propo iluiii lh.il (IK i>eneriil mle h I lint

Finally, Plaintiffs argument based on American Jurisprudence is also misplaced.
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In Issue No. 2, Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting

The Trial Court Was Not Required To Hold An Evidentiary Hearing Prior
To Granting The Motion To Substitute; The Validity Of Plaintiffs Purported
Transfer Was Not At Issue.

-22-

55. Such blatant contradictions strike Defendant as sufficient for the trial court to have

address all the creditors if he ever receives any funds from this lawsuit." See R. 000554-

he also swore that "if he is fortunate enough to get a judgment in his favor... he will

that he no longer owned the claims against Black Diamond at the time of the public sale,

IV. B., supra. Even more troubling, in the very affidavit where Mr. Lamoreaux swore

identify either the alleged transferee or when the transfer allegedly occurred. See section

occurred. As noted above, at the March 21 public sale Plaintiffs counsel failed to

time), and at least equally skeptical of the legitimacy of such transfer if the attempt in fact

whether Plaintiff really did attempt to transfer his claims to his son prior to trial (or at any

Plaintiff s argument misses the point. Defendant is admittedly skeptical of

a fraudulent transfer." See, e.g., id. at 28-29.

of the execution or sale and whether the assignment of his interest was valid or otherwise

whether "Lamoreaux held any interest [in the claims against Black Diamond] at the time

to determine Lamoreaux's intent in allegedly transferring his claims to his son, and

at 7. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a hearing (or separate trial) was required in order

the Motion to Substitute without first holding an evidentiary hearing. See Opening Brief

B.

(Memorandum Decision) at 3-5.

execution notwithstanding the repeal of Rule 69. See R. 000620-23; Addend. Exhib. 2
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*

*

Mr. Lamoreaux's arguments [that he no longer owned
his causes of action at the time the writ was issued] are
unavailing, however, because the writ procedures in Rules 64
and 64E apply not only to Mr. Lamoreaux but also to his son
Jake, the purported transferee of Mr. Lamoreaux's claims
against Black Diamond. Specifically, under Rule 64 (e)(1)
"[a]ny person claiming an interest in the property has the

*

Rules 64 and 64E contain the procedure not only for a party
to obtain a writ and seize property, but also for a defendant or
interested third party tofightthe issuance of the writ and
seizure of the property. In such circumstances and under the
facts of the present case, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness
of Mr. Lamoreaux's purported transfer of his choses in
action to his son is irrelevant.

court concluded in the Memorandum Decision that:

Exhib. 6 (June 17,2011 Hrg. Tmscrpt.) at 16, In. 22 through 17, In. 5. Likewise, the trial

and have a hearing before an execution is accomplished." See R, 000655; Addend.

request the hearing, do all of the things that the writ process allows for you to proceed

own son, there would have been a way for him to present himself, file the objection,

certainh in this i .isc win in Ihr .illegal in w IMHIIHI nil lln- inkiest <
,i> Mi ranunculi* '•

his son] was a non-fraudulent transfer. It doesn't matter. Notice was sent out. And,

"we can just assume for purposes of our motion that [Mr. Lamoreaux's alleged transfer to

lHrnd.mf1 i/oiiiisdl '.lipiihli ill n tin1 hmr I'1 ticaiini? mi lln Mol ion to Substitute that

Plaintiffs alleged transfer was never really at issue in the Motion to Substitute. Rather,

Notwithstanding Defendant's skepticism, however, the validity or invalidity of

submit j my evidence in support of his alleged transfer of claims to his son.

disregarded Lamoreaux's affidavit in its entirety and therefore find that Plaintiff failed to
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waived any objection they may have had to the [public] sale." Id. at 7.

procedures available to object to the writ, "both Plaintiff and Jake Lamoreaux have

correctly determined that such rules did apply, and that having failed to utilize the

Jake Lamoreaux, as the alleged transferee of Mr. Lamoreaux's claims. The trial court

attempt to persuasively argue why the requirements of Rules 64 and 64E did not apply to

to even acknowledge the trial court's Memorandum Decision in this regard, much less

the applicability of Rules 64 and 64E of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has failed

Thus, the validity of the secret alleged transfer is not at issue. Instead, the issue is

R, 000622-24; Addend. Exhib. 2 (Memorandum Decision) at 5-7 (emphasis added).

same rights and obligations as the defendant with respect to
the writ and with respect to providing and objecting to
security/' and "[a]ny claimant not named by the plaintiff and
not served with the writ and accompanying papers may
exercise those rights and obligations at any time before the
property is sold or delivered to the plaintiff" The Court can
find no support for the proposition that merely having
Plaintiff and his counsel appear at the public auction and
orally assert that Plaintiff no longer owned the claims is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rules 64 and 64E.
Such an extrajudicial approach is not exercising 'the same
rights and obligations as the defendant with respect to the
writ" If Jake Lamoreaux wished to assert that the writ
should not have issued or that the sale should not have
proceeded because he, not his father, owned the claims
against Black Diamond, he should have filed a reply
under Rule 64 E(d) or utilized the procedures under Rule
64(f), Having failed to do so, Jake Lamoreaux cannot now
assert that the writ procedure was deficient or ineffective.
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The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Granting The Motion To

Plaintiff asserts in his Issue No. 3 that the trial court abused its discretion in

Substitute; For The Court To Have Refused To Substitute After Determining
That Black Diamond Was The Real Party In Interest Owning Plaintiffs
Claims Would Have Been An Abuse Of Discretion,

UT82,n.l4,100 P.3d 1177).

2t: -

evidence that fnrmnl Ik Ivi is lor (lie Iii all < mtifu iulni|' "I Intui)-, ('hen v, Simun

(KM

questions reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard-have a duty to marshal all the

explained, parties who ask this court to consider fact-sensitive questions-including those

Mayflower ML Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 37, 140 P.3d 1200 ("As we have previously

which Plaintiff has failed to do. See, e g, I kited Park City Mines Co v. Stichting

would require Plaintiff to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's decision,

correct and the decision on the Motion to Substitute was a discretionary, that conclusion

exercise its discretion in the manner that it did. But assuming arguendo that Plaintiff is

Substitute was discretionary, on the facts of this case the trial court was required to

on this issue. If, as a technical legal matter, the court's decision granting the Motion to

I;irsl 1)1 iillll I Muidunl does mil inn t swrily itgn/i lJul Ik1 liini.il! conrl li.,nl! disrn lion

the merits of the action," See Opening Brief at 32.

action would have been for the Court to deny the motion to substitute but rather to rule on

the' ''action had been completed up Ihroii^h <i liiiiil iii 11 it mmls" mini "the itppmprifili

and that 'the equities weighed against substitution of any party for the Plaintiff5 because

argues that substitution under Rule 25 (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is discretionary,

granting the Motion to Substitute. See Opening Brief at 7 8 More specifically, Plaintiff

C
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judgment. See, e.g., Opening Brief at 38 ("By so dismissing the action, Black Diamond

however, Mr. Park could seek to argue that he was entitled to 33% of the amount of that

were entered in favor of Black Diamond as the successor to Lamoreaux's claims,

defendant it would defeat the claims against itself that it held as plaintiff. If a judgment

Black Diamond would obtain a judgment as plaintiff against itself as defendant or as

proceeding to render a decision on the merits have been of benefit to Defendant—either

Lamoreaux's continued nominal status as party plaintiff. Nor, of course, would

merits would have been of no benefit to Mr. Lamoreaux (or his son), notwithstanding

owning Plaintiffs claims, pursuing the charade of proceeding to render a decision on the

claims was effective and that as a result Black Diamond was the real party in interest

If the trial court concluded—as it did—that Black Diamond's purchase of Lamoreaux's

In other words, Issue No. 3 is really about Mr. Park's claim to a contingency fee.

See Opening Brief at 32-33.

have been addressed in numerous ways, including thefilingof a satisfaction thereof."

interest plaintiffs wishes, and thereafter,... the resulting judgment (if any) could

appropriate for the trial court to proceed to rule on the merits, against the real-party-in-

the real party in interest on the plaintiffs side of the case), it still would have been

Diamond's purchase was effective (so that, as it necessarily follows, Black Diamond was

purchase was somehow invalid). Rather, in this section Plaintiff argues that even if Black

example, that the equities weighed against substitution because Black Diamond's

Black Diamond's purchase of Lamoreaux's claims at the public sale (to argue, for

Moreover, this section of the Opening Brief does not focus on the validity of
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" Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) (2008). Moreover, while a typical
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Black Diamond. Perhaps most fundamentally among its problems, Plaintiffs theory fails

Lamoreaux should have been allowed to continue to prosecute the case on behalf of

such an arrangement, Defendant cannot make sense of Plaintiff s theory that Mr.

Other than to facilitate Mr. Park's novel attempt to obtain a contingency fee under

case—Black Diamond wished for those claims to be dismissed.

Lamoreaux's claims—the only real party in interest on the plaintiffs side of the

Mr. Park's desire for a contingency fee at Black Diamond's expense). As the owner of

were directly opposed to those of Lamoreaux (not to mention being directly opposed to

this case Black Diamond certainly did care. Black Diamond's interests in the lawsuit

named as a party—so that an objection under Rule 17(a) may or may not be lodged, in

assignee or transferee (as the new real party in interest) may or may not care about being

real party in interest

reasonable time has been allowed after objection... for joinder or substitution of, the

ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest" as long as "a

to be "prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest" and may be "dismissed on the

Plaintiffs Rule 25 argument fails to take account of the fact that civil actions are

address the merits of Issue No. 3 in this section.

specifically addressed at Mr. Park's personal claims. However, Defendant will also

for rejecting Issue No. 3 subject to the arguments raised in section VI. F. below,

To thus state the reality of what is at stake in Issue No. 3 renders much of the basis

any compensation.").

effectively constructively discharged the Park Firm, without cause and without paying
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"). Defendant could not conceivably have relied on
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cited in section VI. A. above, allowing for the continued execution and sale of causes of

remains (at a minimum) persuasive on this issue given the current state of the law, as

Finally, under the relevant case law interpreting former Rule 69 (which authority

itself were dismissed.

intervention on the plaintiffs side of the case in order to ensure that the claims against

Mr. Lamoreaux or his counsel to protect its interests, and Black Diamond required

ability to protect that interest

. . . and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may... impair or impede his

action:... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction

P. 24(a) (2008) ("Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an

speak in discretionary terms but the terms of Rule 24(a) are mandatory. See Utah R. Civ.

party to press forward and obtain a judgment against itself. Moreover, Rule 25 (c) may

make it any more reasonable for the judge to use his discretion to require an unwilling

belong to Black Diamond. The mere fact that the case had proceeded to trial does not

step in as plaintiff if in fact—as the trial court found—Mr. Lamoreaux's claims now

the trial court would use any discretion it possessed to deny Black Diamond's attempt to

Even putting aside justiciability, however, Plaintiff has identified no reason why

keystone [of] our judicialframework")(citation omitted).

32, 100 P.3d 1151,1157 ('the presence of a justiciable controversy" identified as 4Cthe

plaintiffs and defendant's sides of the case. Cf, e.g., Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, \

the case lacked once Black Diamond became the real party in interest on both the

to account for the requirement of an actual case or controversy between the parties, which
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[and] [o]nce acquired by another, the

Plaintiff asserts in Issue No. 4 that the trial court erred in concluding that

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Lamoreaux's Actions Seeking
To Undermine The Effectiveness Of The Writ Procedure Constituted An
Impermissible Collateral Attack.

-29-

Lamoreaux's actions did constitute a collateral attack, such an attack was permissible

did not constitute a collateral attack (see Opening Brief at 33); and 2) even if

in the argument section of the brief into two sub-arguments: 1) that Lamoreaux's actions

thejudgmentofa sister court. See Opening Brief at 8. This assertion is further enlarged

Lamoreaux's actions taken in this case constituted an impermissible collateral attack on

D.

reversal of the Memorandum Decision.

this case. Plaintiffs Issue No. 3 therefore fails to identify an appropriate basis for

of that discretion for the court not to have granted the Motion to Substitute on the facts of

Thus, to the extent the trial court had any discretion, it would have been an abuse

(emphasis added; citations omitted).

purchased, including therightto move to dismiss the pending claims." Id, at f 17

new litigant has therightto determine the course and scope of the litigation of the claims

"Indeed, causes of action are regularly sold

dismiss those claims." Applied Med. Techs., 2002 UT 18 at \ 13. (citations omitted).

can purchase claims, i.e., choses in action, pending against itself and then move to

Rules 64,64E, and section § 78B-5-505—as argued above) "it follows that a defendant

Rather, "[g]iven that choses in action are amenable to execution under rule 69(f)" (now

action), there is no consideration given to any potential argument under Rule 25 (c).
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" See id. at 34.
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(allegedly) transferred his claims in the Black Diamond Lawsuit to his son, then proceeded

Plaintiff ignored the available remedies under Rules 64 and 64E and instead secretly

execution and sale process to go forward. Upon learning of the Fishers' writ of attachment,

Fisher Lawsuit, specifically the order granting a writ of attachment and allowing the

sister court, Plaintiff certainly did collaterally attack the orders of the trial court in the

Whether or not Plaintiff is correct about not collaterally attacking the judgments of a

R. 000623; Added. Exhib. 2 (Memorandum Decision) at 6 (emphasis added).

defects in the procedure employed by the Fishers in obtaining
the writ, providing notice or conducting the sale, belonged in
the Fisher Lawsuit. By ignoring the writ procedure in that
case and instead attacking the effectiveness of the writ in
this case, Plaintiff is seeking to collaterally attack the
judgment and orders of a sister court. Such a collateral
attack is inappropriate. See, e.g., RMA Ventures Cal v.
SunAmerica Live Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070,1076 (10th Cir.
2009) (the validity of a writ of execution cannot be questioned
collaterally (citing Edmonston v. Sisk, 156 F.2d 300,302 (10th
Cir. 1946)).

held "as a threshold matter" that any arguments about

language in the Memorandum Decision. In the Memorandum Decision, the trial court

33. That statement is possibly true; however, it fails to address the trial court's actual

collaterally attacked the "judgment" of the trial court in the Fisher Lawsuit. See id. at

argument, Plaintiff attempts to parse words by claiming that Lamoreaux never

legality of execution upon causes of action under current Utah law. As for the first sub-

As for the second sub-argument, Defendant has already addressed above the

authorizes the execution upon a chose in action

because the Fisher's execution and sale were void given the fact that "Utah law no longer
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Lamoreaux or his son. See R. 000623-24; Addend. Exhib. 2 (Memorandum Decision) at

under Rules 64 and 64E), the sale was valid and effective, whether as against Mr.

objection about publication of the notice of sale (leaving him with no preserved objection

The trial court was correct, then, in concluding that once Mr. Lamoreaux withdrew his

the obtaining of writs of execution and conducting public sales would be of no effect.

property merely by secretly transferring title to it, the rules of civil procedure governing

personal property goes). If a judgment debtor can escape execution and sale of his

execution and public sale process would befrustrated(at least as far as unsecured

Finally,froma policy perspective if Plaintiffs argument were correct, the entire

(Memorandum Decision) at 7 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 64(e)(1)).

obligations as the defendant with respect to the writ/" R. 000624; Addend. Exhib. 2

64 and 64E. Such an extrajudicial approach is not exercising 'the same rights and

that Plaintiff no longer owned the claims is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rules

that merely having Plaintiff and his counsel appear at the public auction and orally assert

the trial court below correctly held: "The Court canfindno support for the proposition

completely extrajudicial to either the Fisher Lawsuit or the Black Diamond Lawsuit. As

Black Diamond claims. Such action was not only collateral to the Fisher Lawsuit, it was

and assert that there was nothing to be sold because he had already secretly transferred the

objection to the execution and sale procedure, only to show up on the day of the public sale

either the Fisher Lawsuit or the Black Diamond Lawsuit to notify the parties of any

to trial in the Black Diamond Lawsuit as if the claims were still his own and did nothing in
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In Issue No. 5, Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In The Timing Of Its DecisionMaking.

-32-

and orders, and any case law, to the Court by 3 p.m. on [April 1,2011]

The Court

of trial. Instead, Judge Ludlow directed "counsel to each submit their proposed findings

court did not take the merits of the case under advisement at the close of the second day

matter under advisement); id. at 15 (same); id. at 30,34 (same). As noted above, the trial

repeatedly misstates the fact. See, e.g., Opening Brief at 8 (court allegedly took the

contrary, on the only fact Plaintiff attempts to identify regarding timing, Plaintiff

United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35 at f 37. Plaintiff has failed to marshal. To the

discretion standard of review, Plaintiff was required to marshal the evidence. See, e.g.,

Issue No. 5 is another instance where because Plaintiff has invoked the abuse-of-

less reversible error.

timing issue alone, it clear that Plaintiff fails to raise any instance of actual error, much

decision-making, such matters are addressed elsewhere in this brief. Focusing on the

Insofar as Plaintiffs argument is focused on the substance of the trial court's

dismissing] the action without deciding the case on the merits." See id. at 36.

and the error of granting the "substitution of Black Diamond as a party plaintiff and

both the "unnecessary delays and a failure to decide cases which are ripe for decision"

Plaintiffs argument section goes on to elaborate that the abuse of discretion consisted of

court took the matter under advisement on February 16,2011." Opening Brief at 8.

to render a decision "on the merits of the action after more than six months when the trial

E.
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Also pursuant to Rule 3-101, the shortest period of time to issue a decision after
taking a matter under advisement, beyond which a judge's performance evaluation may
be affected, is two months. See Rule 3-101(2)(c)(i).

13

Pursuant to Rule 3-101(1) of the Judicial Counsel Rules of Judicial
Administration, a matter is considered to be under advisement '"when the entire case or
any issue in the case has been submitted to the judge for final determination." Given the
trial court's direction for counsel to submit proposed findings and orders, and any case
law, before the judge would consider the matter for afinal,written decision, under the
applicable rule the trial court did not take the matter under advisement on February 17,
2011.

12

Dismiss were correct, any delay in the decision-making could not have prejudiced

Moreover, if the trial court's decisions on the Motion to Substitute and Motion to

final resolution.

matters, and in the circumstances of the case, six months was not excessive to achieve a

IV. B. (Course of Proceedings) above. The trial court could not simply ignore these

Motion to Rescind the order granting the Motion for Enlargement. See generally section

the schedule. Then the Motion for Enlargement was filed. And finally Plaintiff filed his

matters further. First, the public sale and Motion to Substitute operated to intervene in

the case under advisement), there was little the trial court could have done to expedite

the April 1 deadline was set (after which the trial court had intended to take the merits of

did so, however, nor does Plaintiff present such an argument in the Opening Brief. Once

have objected at the time of the court's February 17 decision. There is no record that he

parties to submit proposedfindingsof fact and conclusions of law, his counsel should

If Plaintiff considered it excessive for the court to allow roughly 45 days13 for the

000490; Addend. Exhib. 4 (Minutes, Bench Trial).12

will then take this matter under advisement and render a written decision." See R.
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Plaintiff s final issue, Issue No. 6, is the issue raised directly on behalf of

The Trial Court Did Not Err In Dismissing The Case Following The Grant Of
The Motion To Substitute, Thereby Precluding Mr. Park From Potentially
Obtaining A Contingency Fee.

-34-

intervene in the action below, and it would be too late to do so now that a final order has

Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 442 P.2d 938,941 (Utah 1968)). Mr. Park did not seek to

foreclose his charging lien if any he has.'") (bracketing in original; quoting Midvale

bring a separate action against his client to determine the amount of his fee and to

circumstances requiring a contrary holding to prevent injustice,... counsel [should]

Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, n.3,989 P.2d 1073,1077 ('"in the absence of special

intervene in the underlying suit prior to judgment being entered") (citation omitted);

to enforce a lien must either bring a separate action to enforce his attorney lien or

e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91,116,67 P.3d 1055,1058 ("An attorney seeking

separate legal action." See Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7, Addend. Exhib. 1 at 5; see also,

pending legal action in which the attorney has assisted or performed work, or by filing a

who wishes to enforce a charging lien may only do so "by moving to intervene in a

There are several reasons why mis argument should be rejected. First, an attorney

receiving any compensation...." See Opening Brief at 37.

on the merits . . . , thereby effectively precluding counsel for the Plaintiff... from

Dismissal Order following substitution of the Defendant as parry plaintiff "without ruling

Plaintiffs counsel. The argument alleges error in the trial court's decision to issue the

F.

them in six months rather than two.

Plaintiff. If Plaintiff was going to lose these motions, he received no harmfromlosing
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Second, Mr. Park's argument is based on the premise that by being substituted in
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N.E.2d 1034,1036 (111. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Life Care

client'srightto dismiss the action." Alleman v. Fennell (In re Estate of Simmons), 841

compel the continuation of the lawsuit to protect his lien because the lien is inferior to the

lawyer and the lawyer had served notice of his attorney's lien; and the lawyer may not

a right to dismiss his suit at will, even if he had a contingent-fee agreement with his

Lamoreaux's shoes with regard to Mr. Park's contingency-fee agreement, "[a] client has

Moreover, even if Black Diamond were somehow considered to be in

Park's services provided against its interests.

has not received any services from Mr. Park. Rather, it prevailed below in spite of Mr.

would violate Rule 1.7(a)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. And Black Diamond

Lamoreaux. Mr. Park could not represent Black Diamond in this case because to do so

however, is erroneous. Mr. Park has not been discharged. He continues to represent Mr.

cause and without paying any compensation" See Opening Brief at 38. This premise,

3) by seeking dismissal "effectively constructively discharged the Park Firm, without

judgment in order to preserve the possibility of Mr. Park obtaining a contingency fee, and

Park Firm fee agreement, 2) had some type of duty to maintain the action through

as the party plaintiff, Black Diamond: 1) inherited Lamoreaux's obligations under the

6.

judgment.") (citation omitted). As a result, Mr. Park has no standing to pursue Issue No.

("Generally, the cases hold that intervention is not to be permitted after entry of

been entered. See, e.g., Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072,1074 (Utah 1983)
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Park Firm's contingency fee agreement. See R. 000578; Opposition to Substitution at 15.

agreements and encumbrances attached thereto"—specifically the lien created by the

transferee of Lamoreaux's claims 'took the chose in action subject to the contractual

15 pages of briefing that set out his position that substitution was improper because any

the Opposition to Substitution (R. 000564-88), Mr. Park included one paragraph among

No. 6 because he has failed to appropriately preserve the issue on appeal. In submitting

Finally, and apartfromthe arguments raised above, Mr. Park cannot pursue Issue

entering the Dismissal Order following its grant of the Motion to Substitute.

for the privilege of defeating his client's claims, and the trial court committed no error in

Lamoreaux's claims at the public sale. Black Diamond has no obligation to pay Mr. Park

Lawsuit or assisted Lamoreaux to purchase and/or locate afriendlybuyer to purchase

should have assisted Lamoreaux in appropriately opposing the writ process in the Fisher

If Mr. Park wanted to protect his potential ability to obtain a contingency fee, he

tens of thousands of dollars to defend.

Diamond with cause—Mr. Park's efforts on behalf of Lamoreaux having cost Defendants

"constructive discharge" were to be accepted, Mr. Park was discharged by Black

compensate Mr. Park for his services to Lamoreaux. Indeed, if Mr. Park's premise of

no monetary award by dismissing the case, and Black Diamond had no obligation to

Black Diamond, provided nothing of value to Black Diamond, Black Diamond obtained

suit when client obtained no recovery). In this case, Mr. Park provided no work for

quantum meruit fee allowed following client's voluntary withdrawalfromclass action

Ctrs. ofAm. v. Chiles, 61A So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1996) (no
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Mr. Park's argument regarding his contingency fee agreement is
not ripe for decision. The Court reaches this conclusion both on
the grounds cited by Black Diamond—i.e., that regardless of
whether Mr. Park has an ongoing interest in the claims against
Black Diamond, the time to address the potential
extinguishment of that interest is when Black Diamond moves
to dismiss the claims against itself—and also on the grounds
that Mr. Park's argument has not yet been sufficiently
developed to allow decision. More complete briefing on the
issue, which presumably Mr, Park will provide in response
to the motion to dismiss it is anticipated that Black Diamond
will file, is necessary. For the present, the Court concludes that
any ongoing interest held by Mr. Park is not sufficient to
prevent the process of Rules 64 and 64Efrombecoming
effective, and thereby allowing Black Diamond to step into the
role of party plaintiff in this matter.

Memorandum Decision, the trial court found the following:

when Black Diamond later moved to dismiss the claims against itself. In issuing the

plaintiff), the time to address the possible extinguishment of that interest, if at all, was

alleged lien interest would survive the substitution of Black Diamond as the party

Defendant took the position that under Plaintiffs own argument (that Mr. Park's

presented to this court at trial and was entered into in 2008." Id. at 25, In. 12-16.

claims] is above my interest, which was set forth in a written agreement which was

they certainly haven't proven that their interest [following the purchase of Lamoreaux's

supported by law." (R. 000655; Addend. Exhib. 6 (Hrg. Trnscrpt) at 24, In. 6-10). "And

were going to foreclose on their property. I have had my interest for a long time. It's

Diamond to go ahead [presumably, with the purchase of the Lamoreaux claims] and we

"And I don't know how they could say I would have a breach of ethics if I told Black

The foil extent of counsel's argument on this issue at the June 17 hearing was as follows:
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Therefore, even if it could otherwise be argued that the trial court erred in its

, ..-V.
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Issue No. 6 for appeal, and the contingency fee arguments could not now be raised even

raise such arguments. In such circumstances, Plaintiffs counsel has failed to preserve

Park's arguments during briefing of the Motion to Dismiss. Counsel simply failed to

counsel's contingency fee claim. The trial court remained expressly open to hearing Mr.

Lamoreaux, it certainly did not constitute a final decision with regard to Plaintiffs

Memorandum Decision constituted a final decision under Rule 54(b) as against Mr.

Dismiss, such error was interlocutory and non-prejudicial. That is, even if the

contingency fee should be reserved for later briefing of the anticipated Motion to

conclusion, in the Memorandum Decision, that Mr. Park's argument regarding his

1-2.

decision on the Motion to Dismiss, See R. 000551-52; Addend. Exhib. 3 (Objection) at

conclusion of Lamoreaux's appeal of the Memorandum Decision before issuing a

Instead, Mr. Park merely requested on behalf of Plaintiff that the trial court wait for the

Firm's contingency fee argument, it failed to include any mention of that argument at all.

Dismiss, not only did it fail to include "more complete briefing on the issue" of the Park

Moreover, when Mr. Parkfinallydid submit the untimely Objection to the Motion to

Park as counsel) submitted any timely opposition to Black Diamond's Motion to Dismiss*

invitation, however, neither Mr. Park (as an individual) nor Mr. Lamoreaux (through Mr.

arguments in opposition to Black Diamond's Motion to Dismiss. Notwithstanding such

Thus, the trial court expressly invited Mr. Park to raise his contingency fee

See R, 000624-25; Addend. Exhib. 2 (Memorandum Decision) at 7-8.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs underlying claim against Black Diamond included an argument that the

Defendant Should Be Awarded Its Reasonable Attorneys' Fees Directly
Against Plaintiffs Counsel, For Fees Incurred In Defending Against Mr.
Park's Contingency-Fee Claim.
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argument about his entitlement to attorney's fees in arguing the Motion to Substitute. He

As noted in section VI. F., above, counsel for Plaintiff made only a cursory

against Mr. Lamoreaux.

perception of the costs and benefits, and concern with the ultimate ability to collect

Nonetheless, Black Diamond did not pursue such a claim before the trial court given its

under Utah's reciprocal attorney's fee statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008).

a claim, as the prevailing party, to attorney's fees either directly under the Contract or

Thus, upon prevailing in the action below, Black Diamond likely would have had

000453 (Trial Memorandum) at 3.

a successful resolution of Plaintiff s claims in the Black Diamond Lawsuit. SeeR.

a 1/3 contingency fee in the amount $256,140, which would be due to the Park Firm upon

that Plaintiff was not only entitled to principal and interest, but also to reimbursement of

attorneys' fee provision. See R. 000007 (Contract) at f 8. Thus, Mr. Park asserted at trial

(Complaint). And indeed, the Contract (to which Plaintiff was not a party) did contain an

Contract called for attorneys' fees for the prevailing party. See R. 000003-04

G*

abandonment of issue).

trial court, failure to further pursue issue upon invitation of trial court constituted

2007 UT 37, f 22,163 P.3d 615,620 (even though issue was originally raised before the

if counsel otherwise had standing to do so. See, e.g., Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co.,
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award is appropriate in this case. Specifically, as set forth in section VI. F, there are

reciprocal award (see id.: "A court may award costs and attorney fees ..."), such an

entitlement to attorney's fees. Further, while section 78B-5-826 does not require a

under section 78B-5-826, pursuant to which Plaintiffs counsel has sought to claim an

because both the Contract and the contingency-fee agreement constitute 6twriting[s]"

Reasonable, reciprocal attorney's fees against Plaintiffs counsel are appropriate

Plaintiff s counsel.

assert a claim for reciprocal, or prevailing party, attorney's fees directly against

Memorandum Decision), Defendant never had the opportunity before the trial court to

longer at issue—Lamoreaux having been dismissed as a party pursuant to the

issue during the Motion to Dismiss (when Lamoreaux's interest in the action was no

its compensation, the Court dismissed the action."). Given Mr. Paric's failure to raise this

behalf. See, e.g., id. at 38 ("Despite the Park Firm specifically arguing it was entitled to

does not raise such arguments on behalf of Plaintiff, but rather on his own (or his firm's)

services and award those fees to the Park Firm. See Opening Brief at 38-39. Mr. Park

without first holding a hearing to determine the quantum meruit value of Mr. Park's

a basis for arguing that the trial court should not have granted the Motion to Dismiss

But now Plaintiffs counsel has raised the alleged entitlement to attorney's fees as

fee argument, on his own behalf, before the trial court.

further argument. Thus, Plaintiffs counsel never meaningfully asserted his contingency-

notwithstanding the trial court's invitation in the Memorandum Decision to provide

then completely dropped the issue during argument on the Motion to Dismiss,
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have known that he could not appeal the issue of his contingency fee, and where

In the circumstances of this case, where Plaintiffs counsel either knew or should

brought or asserted in good faith

the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not

Ann. § 7SB-5-825(l) ("court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if

laws. Apathetic ignorance is never the basis of a reasonable belief."); see also Utah Code

business without making any investigation as to their responsibilities under the labor

Even inexperienced businessmen cannot claim good faith when they blindly operate a

("good faith [under Fair Labor Standards Act] requires some duty to investigate

(emphasis added); cf, e.g., Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643,647-648 (Utah 1997)

faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law

reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good

certifies 'that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after

counsel, and citing Rule 11 for the proposition that an attorney signing documents

Mother Earth Indus., 936 P.2d 1068,1080 (Utah 1997) (approving fee award against

Memorandum Decision, to further briefing on the issue. See, e.g., R&R Energies v.

to Substitution (see R, 000578) and given the trial court's express invitation, in the

even before filing this appeal, given the fact that he cited section 38-2-7 in the Opposition

Disposition. Indeed, Plaintiffs counsel should have known of problems with Issue No. 6

briefing, given the arguments on Issue No. 6 raised in Defendant's Motion for Summary

Plaintiffs counsel should have known about such problems with Issue No. 6 prior to

multiple, readily apparent reasons that Mr. Park's attorney's-fee argument fails.
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CONCLUSION

David L. Elmont
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matter be remanded for a determination of those fees.

against the arguments raised in Issue No. 6) against Plaintiffs counsel, and that the

dismissed, that Defendant be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees (related to defending

Memorandum Decision and Dismissal Order be affirmed, that Plaintiffs appeal be

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant respectfully requests that the

appropriate.

should never have been raised, an award directly against Plaintiffs counsel is

Defendant has been required to spend unnecessary attorney's fees defending an issue that
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"(a) Availability of writ of execution* A. writ of execution-is available to: a ''',
judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment or other order" requiring the delivery of
property or the payment of money by a judgment debtor, '
(b) Property, subject to execution, A writ of execution may he use*! to levy
upon all of the judgment? debtor's personal property 'and "real, property which' is
not exempt Hum execution under state or federal Taw
(c) Issuance of writ of execution. Unless-otherwise ordered by the court, a
„ writ of execution may be? issued at aiay time within eight years following the
entry of a judgment or order (except an execution may be: stayed pursuant to
Rule 62), either in the county in which such judgment was tendered, or in aiiy
county in which a transcript thereof has been filed end docketed in the office of
the clerk of the district court Notnsrithstanding the death of a party after
judgment, execution thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be
"enforced, as follows:
\ (cXJ) ia case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application, oi
an authorized executor or administrator, or successor in interest.
(c)(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for the
recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a Hen thereon.
(d) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execution
shall be issued in the name of the State of Utah, and subscribed by the clerk
of the court. It "shall be issued to the sheriff or constable of any county in the
state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties) but where it.
requires the delivery ofpossession or sale of real property, it shall be issued to
the sheriff of the county where the real property or some part thereof is
situated. Ifit requires delivery of possession or sale ofpersonal property, it may
be issued to a constable It must intelligibly refer to the judgment* stating the court," the docket number, the county where the same is entered or docketed,
the names'of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is fox the payment of nloney,
/the amount- thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. The writ may be
accompanied by a praecipe executed by the judgment creditor or the judgment
"creditorV counsel generally or specifically describing, the real or. personal
property to be levied upon. It shall be directed to the sheriff of the county in
which it is to be executed in cases involving real property, and shall require the
officer toproceed in accordance with the terms of the writ- provided that if such
writ is against the property of the judgment debtor generally it may direct the
sheriff or constable to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of thenon- •
exempt personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient non-exempt personal
property cannot be found,; then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with "-. ~rinterest; out of the judgment debtor's non-exempt real property:
(e) When writ to be returned, The writ of execution shall be served at any
thne within sixtydays after its receipt by the officer. It shall then be returned.,
'to the court from w
* it to the record.
*«V*
(f) Service of the writ- Unless the execution; otherwise directs,, ihe officer *
must execute the writ against the non-exempt pfopertjrof the judgmentdebtor' •. V- -1 •
, byleyying on a sufficient amount of property^ if there la suffident' prpfteriy;
collecting or selling the: chpses in action and selling: the other property in- the•
manner set forthherein. Levy includes the seizure of the property; ari&holdirig
the property in person or through one or more agents* induding the judgment
.debtor^ appointedby the officer. Iflhen thereismore property cCthejudgment
debtor than is sufficient to satisfy, the judgment 'and.Mcruin^ ctoto/withur'vi^ *
of the officer, the officer must levy only on such part e£tbe property as the
judgment debtor .may indicate,, if. tie property indicattd.Is^aiiipry sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and costs.
- ..
- When, an officer-'has served an. execution -issued -put of -any court the:-officer
may complete the return thereof after such, date of service

•-•• t o . -

-•Rule. 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental there-
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(g).Notice to judgment debtor of sale and of exempt property and right to a
keariTig. At the time the -writ of execution is issued, the clerk shall attach to the
writ a notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing and two copies
of an. application by which the judgment debtor may request a hearing.
* Upon service• of the writ, the sheriff or constable shall serve/upon the
judgment debtor, in the same manner as service of a summons in a civil action,
or cause to be transmitted hy both regular and certified mail,, returned receipt
requested, to the judgment debtor's last known address as provided by the
judgment creditor, (i) the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a
hearing, and (S) the application by which the judgment debtor may request a
hearing. Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable may also set the date
of sale or delivery arid serve upon the judgment debtor notica of the date and
time of sale or delivery in the same manner as service of the notice of execution
and exemptions and right to a hearing.
The notice of execution and exemptions that is to be served upon the
judgment debtor shall indicate in substance that certain property is or may be
. exempt from execution including but not limited to a homestead; tools of the
trade; a motor vehicle used for the judgment debtor's business or profession;
social security benefits; supplemental security, income benefits; veterans1
benefits; unemployment benefits; workers1 compensation benefits; public assistance (welfare); alimony; child support; certain pensions; part or all of wages or
other, earnings from personal services; certain furnishings and appliances;
musical instruments; and heirlooms (each not to exceed the amount allowed by
law).-.The notice shall also indicate that the list is a partial list and.other
various property exemptions may be available under federal law or the Utah
exemptions statute, and that the judgment debtor must request a hearing
within ten (10) days from the date of service of the notice upon the judgment
debtor. For purposes of this provision, the date of service shall be the date of
mailing, if mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and no period for
-mailing under Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the time period,. ..-• If the writ, the notice of execution and! exemptions and right to a hearing
cannot be served upon the judgment debtor in the same manner as service of
' a summons in a civil action, and the judgment creditor does not have available
; the judgment debtor's last known address, only the following notice need be
published under the caption of the case in a newspaper of general circulation
in each county in which the property levied upon, or some part thereof .is
. situated:
, . •.-...•*
TO >r
'. • . J u d g m e n t D e b t o r , ,
• ,S:.''"
T
Awrit of execution has been issued in the above^captioned case, directed
*
to the sheriff or constable of
County, commanding
, the sheriff or constable as follows:
,
"WHEREAS, 1
,
[Quoting body of writ of execution!.*
YOU M&ST HAVE A BIGHT. TO EXEMPT PROPERlY from; the sale
under JBtatutes of the United States or this sitate, including Utah Code
Annotated, Title 78, Chapter. 23, in the 'manner described in those
statutes.
The date of publication shall be deemed the date of service and tjbe date of
pufelJcaMdn shall be not'less thaix ten, (10): days prior, to the date of sale or
delivery.
1
This paragraph (g):shall not be applicable to judicial mortgage foreclosure
proceeding^, cc^
Code Annotated, Title 78, Chanter 37; ,
1
(h) ^0est for hean^:
....".
.. (h)(i} Time fpr request The.judgment debtor or any other person who owns
or claims an? interest jua the property suhject to execution may request a
helping to claim: aily exemption, to the execution, or to challenge the1 issuance
' of feewriiL SucK^request mnstbefiled or seized upon the judgment creditor or
the attorney for the judgmentcreditor within ten (10) days of the service upon
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Advisory Committer Note. — The 1$94
Paragraph CO now defines Icvy-'as the seiamendments constitute ^substantial reorgani- scura of the non-exempt property and authorizes
zation and revision of the ride applicable to the officer to hold the property in .person.1 or
executions. While not an exhaustive list, the • through one or more agents.. It is • .common
Advisory Committee nates the following signif- practice,forthe officer to appoint a "keeper* to
hold the property pending aalo..aa.it ia not
icant changes;
- "
.' The Rule'has been restructured to eliminate' always practical for the officer to taka physical
possession of the property. Language in this
references to gender.
Paragraph (a) specifies, that £ writ of execu- paragraph on payment of the sales proceeds
tion is available only poifc judgment and Para- has now been relocated to new Paragraph 6} on
graph <b) now states that a writ of execution conducting the sale. Provisions in paragraph.(f)
may only be used to Teach the judgment debt- regarding detefled'proceduree in event of death
:
or's non-exempt real or personal property. The of the officer were deemed onnetssaflry and
* " *.v . f
availability'of writs of execution to reach nan* have bean eliininatedL
-exompt property, end the requirement that the
Paragraph (g) is new and provides that'the
Judgment creditor now notary the judgment ' clerk shall attach to the writ of execution .a
* debtor of a right to exemptions, are described in notice ofexECub'oa and exemptions and right to
several provisions of the revised rule. This a hearing, and two copies of an application by
change incorporates similar notice procedures which the judgment debtor may request a bearnow utilized in Bole 64D, and alleviates constt- - ing. A similar procedure is contained in Bule
'tutional due process problems in the previous 64D. It is expected in'practice that the plaintiff
rule. '.These constitutional issues were ad- will provide to the cferk-the .ntaterialsvto be
attached to the writ OIBcial forms for the
dressed by tha United States Court ofAppeals
in Aacan v. San Juan County ShoruTa Depart- notice of execution; - exemptions and right to a
ment, 944 l£2d 691 (IffihOui 1991), involving/a hearings and the application foiTa hearing nave
been prepared by the Committee. Service of
similar New Mexico Bule.
- Paragraph (3) retains the requirement that these forma may he made personally- finite
.writs of execution be issued^ to and served by a same manner as service of a summons In a civil
.-sheriff or constable. A sheriff must:make ser- action Or may be transnutted by mail to the
vice in the case of real property. Paragraph (d) judgment debtor's last known address 1as proalso allows';tna use of a praecipe, which is vided bjr the judgment creditor. Notice of ifcbe
commonly exocuted by the judgment creditor or time and date of sale may also he served-at the
the: judgment creditor's counsel directing the same time. Paragraph (g) also contains a pahofficer: to specific property to be levied upon. In lication form of service if the jo^gmenl? credipractice, a'maeofiScers will not execute a writ of tor's last known address ia not available. This
paragraph also sets forth^Uxe^language, tn^he
execution without an accompanying: praecipe.
r
Paragraph (a) has been amended to allow: the, included 3n the notice and1 application''td be ;
s
^
e
d
i
n
p
o
n
n
r
matted
to
the
judgrnerii
debtor.
officer, to s m e ; the writ within sfrty (£0) days,
although the^Teturn of the writ may be made Paragraph (g) is not applicable tojudicial mortgage fbrnclhsugB. proceedings mjace..£^e^riaol
thereafter.v

(q) Order prohibiting transfer' ofproperty. If it appears that a person .or
corporation, alleged to.have property of the judgment delator or to be indebted
to .the judgment debtor irj an amount exceedingfiftydollars, not exempt from
execution, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor
or denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or cprporatidii to
refrain from transferring-or otherwise disposing of such interestor debt until
sticih time as m^7 reasonably be necessaryforthe jud^eiitcreditof to bring an
action-to detennirie suchiateest or claim and prosecute the saihe to judgment.
Such order may be modified' or vacated by the court at any time upon such
terms as may be just
' (r) Witnesses^ Witnesses may be required to appear and. testify.in any
proceedings brought under this rule in the same maimer as upon the trial 6f an
issue.
'
.
.
.
" (s) Order for property to be applied on judgment The court or master riay
order any property of fie judgment debtor, not exemptfromexecution, in "the
possession of the judgment debtor or'any other person, or due to the judgment
debtor,'to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment
"\ (t) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the property
of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid any
transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its fui-ther
order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with the ffeal
property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of the appointment shall be
recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real estate
sought to be affected thereby is situated.
,,
." .. ''J'
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(a) the criminal matter has been concluded or the domestic relations matter has been concluded by the securing
of afinalorder of divorce or the attorney/client relationship has terminated; and
(b) the client has failed to fulfill the client'sfinancialobligation to the attorney.

38-2-7. Compensation — Attorney's lien.
(1) The compensation of an attorney is governed bj agreement betw een the attorne> and a client, express or
implied, which is not restrained by law.
(2) An attorney shall have a lien for the balance of compensation duefroma client on any money or property
owned by the client that is the subject of or connected with work performed for the client, including, but not
limited to:
(a) any real or personal property that is the subject of or connected with the work performed for the client;
(b) any funds held by the attorney for the client, including any amounts paid as a retainer to the attorney by the
client; and
(c) any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor in any matter or action in which
the attorney assisted, including any proceeds derivedfromthe matter or action, whether or not the attorney is
employed by the client at the time the settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment is obtained
(3) An attorney's lien commences at the time of employment of the attorney by the client.
| (4) An attorney may enforce a lien under this section by moving to intervene in a pending legal action in which
the attorney has assisted or performed work, or byfilinga separate legal action. An attorney may not move to
intervene in an action or file a separate legal action to enforce a lien before 30 days has expired after a demand for
payment has been made and not been complied with.^
(5) An attorney mayfilea notice of lien in a pending legal action in which the attorney has assisted or
performed work for which the attorney has a lien under this section. In addition, an attorney may file a notice of
lien with the county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to a lien under this section, is
located. A notice of lien shall include the following:
(a) the name, address, and telephone number of the attorney claiming the lien;
(b) the name of the client who is the owner of the property subject to the lien;
(c) a verification that the property is the subject of or connected with work performed by the attorney for the
client and that a demand for payment of amounts owed to the attorney for the work has been made and not been
paid within 30 days of the demand;
(d) the date the attorney first provided services to the client;
(e) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and
(f) the signature of the lien claimant and an acknowledgment or certificate as required undo il itie 'i "', ( hapter
3, Recording of Documents.
(6) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the attorney shall deliver or mail by certified mail to (he chenl
a copy of the notice of lien.
(7) Any person who takes an. interest in any property, other than real property, that is subject to an attorney's
lien with actual or constructive knowledge of the attorney's lien, takes his or her interest subject to the attorney's
lien. An attorney's lien on real property has as its priority the date and time when a notice of lien isfiledwith the
county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to a lien under this section is located
(8) This section does not alter or diminish in any way an attorney's common law retaining lien rights
(9) This section does not authorize an attorney to have a lien in the representation of a client in a crim.na!
matter or domestic relations matter where afinalorder of divorce has not been secured unless:
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(1) (a) AIL individual is entitled to exemption of the following property
(i) a burial plot for the individual and his family;
(ii) health aids reasonably necessary to enable the individual or a
dependent to work or sustain health;
(iii) benefits the individual or his dependent have received or are
entitled to receive because of disability, illness, or unemployment from
any source;
•(iv) benefits paid or payable for 'medical, surgical, or hospital care
to the-extent they are used by an individual or his dependent to: pay
for that care;
(v) veterans benefits;
(vi) money or property received,, and rights to receive money,or
. property for child support;
(vii) one clothes waiher and. dryer, one refrigerator, onefreezer,one •
fitove," one microwaye oven, one sewing-machine, all carpets in use,
provisions sufficient for 12 months .actually provided for individual or
. family use; all wearing apparel of every individual and dependent, not
includingjewelry or furs, and all beds and bedding for every individual or dependent;
(viii), works of art depicting the debtor or the debtor and his
* resident family, or produced try the debtor or the debtor and his
resident family, except works of art held by the debtor as part-, of: a
trade or business;
(he) proceeds of insurance, a judgment,, or a settlement, or other
rights Scoring as a result of Jaodily injury of the individual or of; the
wrongfiil death or bodily injury of another individual of whom' the
individual was or is a dependent to the extent that those proceeds are
compensatory;
(x); except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or other
assets held for or payable to the jindividiial as a participant .or
beneficiary from or an interest of the individual as a participant or
hehefidary in a "retfrement jplan or arrangeinient that is described in
Section 401(a), 401(h), 401(k), 403(a>, 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d),
or 414(e) of the United States Internal Rervenue Code of 1986/ as
amended; and
Cd) the* rateresfc of or any money -or • other, assets' payable' to 'an
- alternate payee under a. 'qualified •domestic relations' order" as thcisfi

78-23-5, Property exempt from execution,

Am. Jur, 2d. •» lii Aim 11 n i iid H on ni i" "i it r 1111
§5 7? et seq.t J16 at seq

75-23 5

stead premiaea sold upon execution oil constructive notice only, and value of stick premises vras within limit of homestead
exemption, sale was void, and fact that judgment debtor made no objection to sale did not
estop him from suing to remove cloud on title
caused by sale* Kimball v. Salisbury, 19 Utah
161. 56 E 973 (18991

I.(iLL.'VJ'EH <\ii REFEHEMfIPi

Void execution sale.
Where judgment debtor selected as bin i iu HK «

Ganfees 86 Utah 250, 39 PM 327,103 A i i k .
928 (1934),jrck^ denied and homestead exception to res Judicata further explained in;
Existing Hens an land cannot be defeated by
subsequent deckratioa of homestead. McMnrdie v. Chtigg, 99 Utah 403, 107 H2d 163 132
A,1,H 435 (1940). .
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History^ C, 1963^ 7B-23-e, enacted by L.
1981, ch. I l l , § 6.

-

«

'

« h

Besides the property specified in Section 78-23hET, an individual is entitled to
exemption of the following property to the extent reasonably necessary for the
supportof the individual andhis dependents: ..
\.
•*
.* (i) money or property received, and rights tpreceive;inoney or property
for alimony or separate maintenance; «
»
.
. (2) proceeds or benefits paid or payable onthe4eatbpf aninstired, if the
individual was the spouse; or a dependentof the Jnanredi and
(3) assets held, payments, and amounts payable under a stock tonus,
.pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan.providingbenefits other"
J
than by reason of Alness or disability.
" •
- '

78-23-6. Property exempt from execution to extent necessary for support.

Am. JUT. 2d. — 31 Am. Jar. 2d Exemptions
§ 28 et aeq.

* *"

not be supported by consideration. Oliver v.
Mitchell, 14 Utah 2d 9,-376 R2d 390 (1982). .
,
Cited in ITtak Parm. ;i%6d. Credit Aas'n. v.
Ubnun, 762 P^d iO70:CUtah 1988).
C01LATERALHEFSIRE»irCES

AruLTSia
.
.. . u
Warmer of exemption.
Cited.
Waiver of exemption.
A waiver of exemption from execration need

w

the string of acctians in Snbsactian (l)(r).
Federal Law.—The Internal Revenue Code
'afl986,dtedniSubsecbWa)»MT!tle26ofiiie
U.S. Code*

NOTES TO DECISIONS

History: C. 1953, 78-23-5, enacted by JL
1981, chuttl, ft 5; 1989, ch. 19,5 i;1907, ch.
138, 5 2; 1999, cb. 370, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, ejffectivB May 3,1999, inserted a408A" in

terms are defined in Section 414(p) of the: United States, Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended^.
,
Cb) The exemption granted by Subsection (lXaXxJdoM^ riot; apply to;:
(i) an alternate.payee tinder a qualified &mestic^'elnlabns prder,.a$
those terms are defined in Section 414(p) of fee Urute^States Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amendedr or
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by- or on behalfo£ a
debtor wiihin one year before the ^
... , *
(2) Exemptions under this section do not lnrjit items winch, may be daimed
as exempt under Section 78-23^3.
•••"''

78-2376 *
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§ 78B—5-505. Property exempt from execution
fl)(a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the followr -n pi * ipei ty:
(i) a burial plot for the individual and the individual's family;
(ii) health aids reasonably necessary to enable the individual or
dentto work or sustain health;
(iii) benefits the individual or the individual's dependent ave iece •-.
or are entitled to receive from any source because o£
(A) disability;
(B) illness; or
(C) unemployment;
(iv) benefits paid or payable for medical, surgical, or hospital care .to the
'extent they are used by -an individual, or the. individual's 'dependent: to pay
for that care;
(v> veterans benefits;
" (vi) money or properly re<:Rj vrd, aiif I nRhI«• 11 w < • 11• i»" "
'" ioiif | OJ pi uperty
for child support;
(vii) money or property received, and rights to receive money or property for alimony or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary
for the support of the individual and the individual's dependents;
(viii)(A) one:
*
'
•
.
(I) clothes -washer and dryer;
(II) refrigerator;
(IED freezer;
(TV) stove;
(V) microwave oven,; iaod
(VI) sewing machine;
(B) aU carpets in use;
• '(C) provisions sufficient1 for 12. months actually provided for ..individual
or family use;
'*
(D) BR wearing apparel .of every individual. and dependent; not ineiudr
ingjewelrydrfurs; arid'
(E) all'beds and bedding for every .individual or dependent;
0 x)' .except, for works- of'.'art held' by 'the debtor "as: part: of a trade or
business^ worlds of art: " '
.,
*
'
(A) depicting the debtor pi* the debtor 'and. his 'resident farbily; or
(BJ produced by the. debtor or the debtor andLhis resident fegoaily;
(x) proceeds bt insurance, a judgment/or. a setdement* or other rights
accruing as a result of bbdily injury of the individual or of the wrongful
death or bodily injury of another individual of whom the individual "was or
is a dependent to the extent that those proceeds are compensatory;
(xi) the proceeds or benefits of any life insurance contracts, or policies
paid, or payable to the debtor or ;any trust of which the debtor lis a
beMficiary upon the' death of the spouse or children of the debtor^provided
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Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Bankruptcy exemption planning: Counseling
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that the contract or policy has been owned by the debtor for a continuous
unexpired period of one year;
' ,..
. (xii) the proceeds or benefits of any life,insurancecontracts or policies
paid or payable to the spouse or children of the debtor or any trust, of
which the spouse, or children are beneficiaries upon the death of the
debtor, provided that the contract or policy has been in existence fpr a
continuous unexpired period of one yean
(xiii) proceeds and avails of any unmatured life in&iurarice contracts
owned- by the debtor or any revocable grantor trust created by the debtor,
excluding any payments made on the contract during the one year immediately preceding a creditor's levy or execution;
(xiv)' except as provided in Subsectidn(l)(b), a&y money or other assets
held for or payable to the individual as a participant or beneficiary from or
an interest of the individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement
plan or arrangement that is described in Section 401(a), 401(h), 401(k),
' 403(a), 403(b), 408, 40SA, 409, 414(d), or 414(e), Internal Revenue Coder*
and
(xv) the interest of or any money or other assets payable, to an alternate
payee under a qualified domestic relations order as those terms are defined
in Section 414(p), Internal Revenue Code,
(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(xiv) does not apply to:
(i) an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as
those terms are defined in Section 414(p), Internal Revenue Code; or
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits.accrued by or on behalf of a debtor
within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy. This, may not
include amounts directly rolled, over from other funds which are exempt
from attachment under this section. '
(2) The exemptions in Subsections (l)(a)(xi), (xii), and (xiii) do not apply to
. proceeds and avails of any matured or unmatured life insurance; contract .
assigned or pledged as collateral for: repayment of a loan or other legal
obligation.
(3) Exemptions under this section do not limit itemsthat may be. claimed as
exempt under Section 78B-5r506.
'/
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 801, eff. Feb. 7, 2008,

§78B-5-505 .

i"

.-v^-t'

';£*•;

•3
in
j«
5t

ex
is

Sit

55

of
§ :
Mi

S-

78127
dor
I .
arr
Int*
exf

55

V
star.
extf
qua
Ret

2.

i
Pe:
cntie
tiao
franc
der :
tion,
atss
be c
not
§2t
ga^w
101
52(1

i.

in go
Ajnot
Bank
Cooti
Hous
Life!
Preei

Cl-

Exe

FRCX

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\ ttoi nei fee s

Q '*' ! "'

j.^Ttj
•

Next Section (786-5-825.5)»

httrr//!** ntah rrnv/ rrvte/TTTT F7ftRrtitm/7«PfK

0 8 0 ^ 0 0 1 it,

•• -•

Questions/Comments 1 Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy | ADA Notice

« Previous Section (78B-3-824)

Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B05 082500.ZIP 1,893 Bytes

on/cnnn

78B-5-825. Attorney fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in. good, faith, except under
Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, maj award no fees or liinited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but
only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court;; oi
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1)
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78B-5-826. Attorney fees - Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees.
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28,1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees.
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Rule 64

o

(a) Definitions. As used in Rules 64,64A, 64B, 64C, 64D, 64E, 69A, 69B and
69C:
(aXD "Claim" means a claim., counterd^
any other claim.
(a)(2) "Defendant" means the party against wl LOO i a clam i sfiled_or against •
whom judgment has been entered.
(a)(3) "Deliver" means actual delivery or to make the property available for
pick up and give to the person entitled to delivery written notice of availability.
(aX4) "Disposable earnings" means that part of earnings for a pay period
iremaining after the deduction of all amounts required by law to be withheld.
(aX5) *13amings" means compensation, however denominated, paid or payable to an individual for personal services, including periodic payments
pursuant to a pension or retirement program. Earnings accrue on the last day
of the period in which they were earned.
(aX6) "Notice of exemptions" means a form that advises the defendant or a
third person that certain property is or may be exempt from seizure under
state or federal law. The notice shall list examples of exempt property and
indicate that other exemptions may be available. The notice shall instruct the
defendant of the deadline for filing a reply and request for hearing,
(aX7) "Officer" means any person designated by the court to whom the writ
is issued, including a sheriff, constable, deputy thereof or any person appointed
by the officer to hold the property.
(aX8) "Plaintiff* means the party filing a • claim oi in whose fav or judgment
has been entered.
(aX9) "Property" means the defendant's property of any type not exempt
from seizure. Property includes but is not limited to real and personal property,
tangible and intangible property, the right to property whether due or to
become due, and an obligation of a third person to perform for the defendant.
(aX10) "Serve" with respect to parties means any method of service authorized by Rule 5 and with respect to non-parties means any manner of service
authorized by Rule 4.
(b) Security.
(bXD Amount When security is required of a party, the party shall provide
security in the sum and form the court deems adequate. For security by the
plaintiff the amount should be sufficient to reimburse other parties for
damages, costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of a writ wrongfully
obtained. For security by the defendant, the amount should be equivalent to
the amount of the claim or judgment or the value of the defendant's interest in
the property. In fixing the amount, the court may consider any relevant factor.
The court may relieve a party from the necessity of providing security if it
appears that none of the parties will incur damages, costs or attorney fees as
a result of a writ wrongfully obtained or if there exists some other substantial
reason for dispensing with security. The amount of security does not establish
or limit the amount of damages, costs or attorney fees recoverable if the writ
is wrongfully obtained.
(bX2) Jurisdiction over surety. A surety submits to the jurisdiction of the
court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as agent upon whom

Rule 64. Writs in general.

PART V m . PROVISIONAL AND FINAL
REMEDIES AND SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS

Amendment Notes. — The 2009 amend- • -sion (a)-and substituted "associate ^raiding
ment substituted, "actions with only one party* -judge, to another judge of the district, "brio any
for "small claims proceedings, in any civil ac- judge of a court of like jurisdiction"for"Chief
tion commenced after April 15, 1992 in any Justice" in Subdivision (c).
district court*' near the beginning of Subdivi-
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papers affecting the surety's liability may be served. The surety shall file wi
the clerk of the court the address to which the clerk may mail papers,
surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of
independent action. If the opposing parly recovers judgment or if the writ
wrongfully obtained, the surety will pay the judgment, damages, costs
attorney fees not to exceed the sum specified in the contract. The surety'
responsible for return of property ordered returned.
(bX3) Objection. The court may issue additional writs upon the or
security subject to the objection of the opposing party. The opposing party n
object to the sufficiency of the security or the sufficiency of the sureties wit
five days after service of the writ. The burden to show the sufficiency of 1
security and the sufficiency of the sureties is on the proponent of the;
(bX4) Security of governmental entity. No security is required of the Uni
States, the State of Utah, or an officer, agency, or subdivision of either, n
when prohibited by law.
(c) Procedures in aid of writs.
(cXD Referee. The court may jp|Miinl m
. IH'UIIM' to monitor hiwiruigs i-»id*
this subsection.
(cX2) Hearing; witnesses; discovery. The court may conduct hearings
necessary to identify property and to apply the property toward the satisfac
tion of the judgment or order. Witnesses may be subpoenaed to appear,'
and produce records. The court may permit discovery.
CcX3) Restraint. The court may forbid any person from trantferring, d" 1*08ing or interfering with the property.
(d) Issuance of writ; service.
(dXD Clerk to issue writs. The clerk of the court shall issue writs. A court i
which a transcript or abstract of a judgment or order has been filed has I
same authority to issue a writ as the court that entered the judgment or order,
If the writ directs the seizure of real property, the clerk of the court shall issue
the writ to the sheriff of the county in which the real property is located. If the
writ directs the seizure of personal property, the clerk of the court may issue
the writ to an officer of any county.
(dX2) Content. The writ may direct the officer to seize the property, to keep
the property safe, to deliver the property to the plaintiff, to sell the property, or
to take other specified actions. If the writ is to enforce a judgment or order for
the payment of money, the writ shall specify the amount ordered to be paid and
the amount due.
(dX2XA) If the writ is issued ex parte before judgment, the clerk shall attach
to the writ plaintiffs affidavit, detailed description of the property, notice of
.hearing, order authorizing the writ, notice of exemptions and reply form.
* (dX2XB) If the writ is issued before judgment but after a hearing, the clerk
shall attach to the writ plaintiff's affidavit and detailed description of the
property.
(dX2XC) If the writ is issued after judgment, the clerk shall attach to the
writ plaintiff's application, detailed description of the property, the judgment,
notice of exemptions and reply form.
(dX3) Service
(dX3XA) Upon whom; effective date. The officer shall serve the writ and
accompanying papers on the defendant, and, as applicable, the garnishee and
any person named by the plaintiff as claiming an interest in the property. The
officer may simultaneously serve notice of the date, time and place of sale. A
writ is effective upon service.
(dX3XB) Limits on writs of garnishment
(dX3XBXi) A writ of garnishment served while a previous writ of garnish^jaent is in effect is effective upon expiration of the previous writ; otherwise, a
writ of garnishment is effective upon service.
.'(dXSXBXii) Only one writ of garnishment off M **,„&
tit*ei a\ of.e
time One addifcin«ol ™ •»•* ,«,r ™— : -i

Rule 64
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period may be served *
• <yt -nee while ai? ^irlier writ of continuing
garnishment is in effect
(dX3XC) Return; inventory. Within 10 days after service, the officer shall
return the writ to the court with proof of service. If property has been seized,
the officer shall include an inventory of the property and whether the property
is held by the officer or the officer's designee. If a person refuses to give the
officer an affidavit describing the property, the officer shall indicate the fact of
refusal on the return, and the court may require that person to pay the costs
of any proceeding taken for the purpose of obtaining such information.
(d)(3XD) Service of writ by publication. The court may order service of a writ
by publication upon a person entitled to notice in circumstances in which
service by publication of a summons and complaint would be appropriate
under Rule 4.
(dX3XDXi) If service of a writ is by publication, substantially the following
shall be published under the caption of the case:
lb,
, [Defendant/Garnishee/Claimant
A writ of
:
_ _ has been issued in the above-captioned case
commanding the officer of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
County as follows:
[Quoting body of writ]
Your rights may be adversely affected fay these proceedings. Property in
which you have an interest may be seized to pay a judgment or order. You have
the right to claim property exempt from seizure under statutes of the United
States or this state, including Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 5.
(dX3XDXii) The notice shall be published in a newspaper of general circuation in each county in which the property is located at least 10 days prior to
he due date for the reply or at least 10 days prior to the date of any sale, or as
he court orders. The date of publication is the date of service,
(e) Claim to property by third person.
(eXD Claimant's rights. Any person claiming an interest in the property has
tie same rights and obligations as the defendant with respect to the writ and
nth respect to providing and objecting to security. Any claimant named by the
laintiff and served with the writ and accompanying papers shall exercise
lose rights and obligations within the same time allowed the defendant. Any
aimant not named by the plaintiff aiid not served with the writ and
xompanying papers may exercise those rights and obligations at any time
rfore the property is sold or delivered to the plaintiff.
(e)(2) Join claimant as defendant. The court may order any named claimant
ined as a defendant in interpleader. The plaintiff shall serve the order on the
aimant. The claimant is thereafter a defendant to the action and shall
iswer within 10 days, setting forth any claim or defense. The court may enter
dgment for or against the claimant to the limit of the claimant's interest in
e property.
(e)(3) Plaintiffs security. If the plaintiff requests that an officer seize or sell
operty claimed by a person other than the defendant, the officer may request
at the court require the plaintiff to file security.
[f) Discharge of writ; release of property.
fKD By defendant. At any time before notice of sale of the property or before
j property is delivered to the plaintiff, the defendant may file security and a
tion to discharge the writ. The plaintiff may object to the sufficiency of the
urity or the sufficiency of the sureties within five days after service of the
tion. At any time before notice of sale of the property or before the property
lelivered to the plaintiff, the defendant may file a motion to discharge the
t on the ground that the writ was wrongfiilly obtained. The court shall give
plaintiff reasonable opportunity to correct a defect. The defendant shall
m the order to discharge the writ upon the officer, plaintiff, garnishee and
p
third person claiming an interest in the property.
X2) By plaintiff. The plaintiff may discharge the writ by filing a release
serving it upon the officer, defendant, garnishee arid any third person
ming an interest in the property.
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Cited "in Booth v. Bootl /• * •
134 P.3d 1151.

of former rule rendered the attachment proceeding void. Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581
E2d 1001 (Utah 1978)

(a) Availability. A writ of replevin, attachment or garnishment is available
after the claim has been filed and before judgment only upon written order of
the court.
(b) Motion; affidavit lb obtain a writ of replevin, attachment or garnishment before judgment, plaintiff shall file a motion, security as ordered by the
court and an affidavit stating facts showing the grounds for relief and other
information required by these rules. If the plaintiff cannot by due diligence
determine the facts necessary to support the affidavit, the plaintiff shall
explain in the affidavit the steps taken to determine the facts and why the facts
could not be determined. The affidavit supporting the motion shall state facts
in simple, concise and direct terms that are not conclusory.
(c) Grounds for prejudgment writ. Grounds for a prejudgment writ include,
in addition to the grounds for the specific writ, all of the requirements listed in
subsections (cXD through (cX3) and at least one of the requirements listed in
subsections (cX4) through (cXIO):
(cXD that the property is not earnings and not exempt from .execution;, and
(cX2) that the writ is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud a .creditor of the
defendant; and
(cX3) a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of
the underlying claim; and
(cX4) that the defendant is avoiding service of process; or
(cX5) that the defendant has assigned, disposed of or concealed, or is about
to assign^ dispose of or conceal, the property with intent to defraud creditors;
or
(cX6) that the defendant has left or is about to leave th« state w itl i intent h i

Rule 64A. Prejudgment writs in general.

Failure to file inventory and return.
A failure to file an inventory and return in
compliance with the mandatory requirements

Failure to file inventory and return.
Cited.

Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amend- satisfaction of judgment are available 'tinder
ment substituted "Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 5* the circumstances and in the manner provided
for "Title 78, Chapter 23* in the last paragraph by the law of the state in which the district
of Subdivision (dX3XDXi).
court is held, including arrest, attachment,
Compiler*s Notes,—Rule,64, F.R.C.P., pro- garnishment, replevin, sequestration, and
vides that all remedies providing for seizure of other corresponding or equivalent remedies,
person or property for the purpose of securing subject to certain qualifications.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

(fX3) Disposition ofproperty. If the writ is disci
any remaining property and proceeds of sales deli
(fX4) Copy filed with county recorder It an order discharges a writ up^u
property seized by filing with the county recorder, the officer or a arty sn;ili
file a certified copy of the order with the county recorder.
(£X5) Service on officer;-disposition of property. If the order discharging the
writ is served on the officer:
(fX5XA) before the writ is served, the officer shall return the writ in I he
court;
(fX5XB) while the property is in ilu1 (ilfin'iii""!1. (custody, thn officii Miall iiHiiiiii
the property to the defendant; or
(fX5XO after the property is sold, the officer shall deliver any remaining
proceeds of the sale to the defendant.
(Added effective November 1, 2004; amended effective November I, 2008

XVU^
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Rule 64E

(a) Availability. A writ of execution is available to seize property in the
possession or under the control of the defendant following entry of a final
judgment or order requiring the delivery of property or the payment of money.
(b) Application. l b obtain a writ of execution, the plaintiff shall file an
application stating:
(bXl) the amount <i t\>o |IIK1|«IIIIIJ»I»I nm OHIIM mi4 (in*1 mion mi ilueonthe
judgment or order;
(bX2) the nature, location and estimated value of the property; and
(bX3) the name and address of any person known to the plaintiff to cte
interest in the property.
(c) Death ofplaintiff. If the plaintiff dies, a writ of execution may be issued
upon the affidavit of an authorized executor or administrator or successor in
interest.
(d) Reply to writ; request for hearing.
(dXD The defendant may reply to the writ and request a hearing Fhe reply
shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of the writ and
accompanying papers upon the defendant.
(dX2) The court shall set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. If the court
determines that the writ was wrongfully obtained, or that property is exempt
from seizure, the court shall enter an order directing the officer to release the
property. If the court determines that the writ was properly issued and the
property is not exempt, the court shall enter an order directing the officer to
sell or deliver the property. If the date of sale has passed, notice of the
rescheduled sale shall be given. No sale may be held until the court has decided
upon the issues presented at the hearing.
(dX3) If a reply is not filed, the officer shall proceed to sell or deliver the
property.
(e) Mortgage foreclosure governed by statute. Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter
6, Part 9, Mortgage Foreclosure, governs mortgage foreclosure proceedings
notwithstanding contrary provisions of these rules.
(Repealed and reenacted. eiBfective November 1, 2004; amended eiBfective
November 1, 2008.)

Rule 64E. Writ of execution.

Liability insurer's potential liability for fail'Utah Law Review. — Sniadach, Fuentes
and Mitchell: A Confusing Trilogy and Utah ure to settle claim against insured as subject to
Prejudgment Remedies, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 536. garnishment by insured's, judgment creditors,
Note, New Standards for Child Support En- 60A.LJt3dll90.
Post-Sniadach status of banker's right to set
forcement in Utah, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 591.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment off bank's claim against depositor's funds, 65
and Garnishment §§ 2 to 65, 91 to 217, 332 to A.LJEL3d 1284.
342,346 to 407, 523 et seq., 572 et seq.
Special bank deposits as subject of attachCJJS. — 38 C.J.S. Garnishment §§ 1 to 22, ment or garnishment to satisfy depositor's gen69 to 118,140 to 155,169,170,194 to 264,274, eral obligations, 8 AX.R.4th 998.
276 et seq., 293 to 295.
Garnishee's duty to give debtor notice of
AJLR.—Funds deposited in court as subject garnishment prior to delivery of money without
judgment against the garnishee on the debt, 36
of garnishment, 1 AJLJUd 936.
Branch bank or main office of bank having AXJEMth 824.
branches, attachment and garnishment of
Wrongful discharge: employer's liability unfunds in, 12 A.L.R.M 1088.
der state law for discharge of employee based
.Issues in garnishment as triabletocourt or "to on garnishment order against wages, 41
AJLR.5th31.
jury, 19 AJLJUd 1393.
Joint bank account as subject to attachment,
Client's funds in hands of his attorney as
garnishment, or execution by creditor of one
subject of attachment or garnishment by cli
joint depositor, 86 A.L.R.5th 527.
entb creditor, 35 A.L.R.M 1094,

(1 »L1 .ATKHAI . KKKKKKW M \

Constr. Assocs , 2008 UT App 436, 198 P.3d
1017.

UTAHRIT1 i « OF CIVIL PHI K'KIM 1!«.

which exceeded the amount-of property it held
for the debtor. Colonial Bldg. Supply, LLC v.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
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DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS OF FACT

On or about February 1, 2010, the Fishers obtained a judgment against David

On or about January 19, 2011, the Fishers obtained a writ of execution in the

The writ of execution was served on Plaintiff on February 16, 2011; however, Mr.

Neither Plaintiff, nor his son Jake Lamoreaux, nor any other person filed a written

March 21, 2011.
2

the instant action, within 10 days of service or at any time prior to the time of the public sale on

reply, objection, or motion to discharge the writ of execution, whether in the Fisher Lawsuit or

4.

interest to his son.

day of trial in this matter, but Plaintiff did not notify the Court of his purported transfer of

Lamoreaux some time prior to being served with the writ. February 16, 2011 was also the first

Lamoreaux claims to have transferred his interests in the instant lawsuit to his son Jake

3.

instant lawsuit.

Fisher Lawsuit to execute upon David Lamoreaux's interests against Black Diamond in the

2.

"Fisher Lawsuit").

Lamoreaux and Diane Lamoreaux in the amount of $16,484.96 in Case No. 080502955 (the

1.

Plaintiff;

supporting documentation provided by Black Diamond, none of which were contested by

purposes of deciding the motion. These findings are taken from the statements of fact and

The following are the findings of fact that the Court deems appropriate to make for

a party to this action.

hereby substituted as the party plaintiff. Plaintiff David Lee Lamoreaux is therefore dismissed as

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On March 4, 2011, a notice of sale scheduling a public auction of the seized

On March 21, 2011, a public auction was conducted to sell all of Plaintiff s right,

Austin Anderson, representing Black Diamond, attended the auction and

Both Mr. Park and Plaintiff attended the public sale, and Mr. Park orally requested

3

the current state of the law as it relates to a defendant's ability to purchase a cause of action

Rule 69 was repealed in 2004, however, and it appears that no reported decision has addressed

the pending claims." Applied Med. Techs, v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, f 17, 44 P.3d 699, 702-703.

course and scope of the litigation of the claims purchased, including the right to move to dismiss

regularly sold," and "[o]nce acquired by another, the new litigant [had] the right to determine the

Under former Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "causes of action [were]

L The executability ofchoses in action following the repeal of Rule 69

ANALYSIS

as a purchaser in Plaintiffs pleadings in opposition to the instant motion.

purported transferee of the claims at the time of the sale; rather, Jake Lamoreaux was first named

action in the instant lawsuit. Neither Mr. Park nor Plaintiff identified Jake Lamoreaux as the

that the sale be cancelled or postponed, asserting that Plaintiff no longer owned the causes of

8.

right, title and interest in the instant lawsuit.

submitted the highest bid, $17,383.78, which it paid to the Fishers to purchase all of Plaintiff s

7.

title, and interest in this current lawsuit.

6.

later published as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 64.

record in the instant action, Mr. Park. On that same day, a notice of sale was publicly posted and

personal property for March 21, 2011, at 10:00 AM, was served on Plaintiff and his counsel of

5.
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4

choses in action generally—otherwise, the specific exclusions would make no sense. See, e.g.,

types of choses in action requires the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to exclude all

exempted from execution. This legislative expression of specific exclusions as to particular

certain causes of action related to personal injury and wrongful death claims were, and are,

conclusion. Pursuant to former Section 78-23-5(1 )(ix) and current Section 78B-5-505(l)(x),

A broader reading of former Section 78-23-5 and current Section 78B-5-505 supports this

from seizure, then it follows that choses in action may be executed upon.

unless it is exempt from seizure, and no provision identifies choses in action as being exempt

not exempt choses in action. If the relevant rule provides that all property may be executed upon

current § 78B-5-505 contains essentially identical language to the former statute and still does

execution) did not identify choses in action as generally being exempt from execution, the

Additionally, just as the former Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (identifying exemptions from

purposes of Rule 64E as being "the defendant's property of any type not exempt from seizure."

following the entry of a final judgment," and the current Rule 64(a)(9) defines property for

of execution is available to seize property in the possession or under the control of the defendant

execution under state or federal law," the current Rule 64E(a) continues to provide that "[a] writ

be used to levy upon all of the judgment debtor's personal property ... which is not exempt from

plaintiffs chose in action. Just as the former Rule 69(b) provided that "[a] writ of execution may

straightforward: the law in Utah continues to allow the execution upon and public sale of a

plain language of the applicable statute and rules render the answer to this question

Despite this absence of current case law on the question, the Court determines that the

pending against itself for purposes of dismissing the claim.
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the property. In such circumstances and under the facts of the present case, the effectiveness or

but also for a defendant or interested third party to fight the issuance of the writ and seizure of

Rules 64 and 64E contain the procedure not only for a party to obtain a writ and seize property,

Fishers to obtain the writ, provide appropriate notice, and conduct the public auction and sale.

Plaintiff has raised questions regard the sufficiency of the process employed by the

2. The procedural sufficiency of the writ, notice and public sale

in action against Black Diamond were subject to execution.

identifying choses in action as being exempt from seizure. Therefore, Mr. Lamoreaux's choses

being exempt. Mr. Lamoreaux has provided no authority, nor has the Court discovered any,

In sum, property is generally subject to execution unless it is specifically identified as

Judgments §§ 142-43 (2005).

intangible personal property. See, e.g., 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions and Enforcements of

to perform for the defendant." Choses in action comfortably fit within this definition, as

property, the right to property whether due or to become due, and an obligation of a third person

such property "includes but is not limited to real and personal property, tangible and intangible

Moreover, in defining property subject to execution, current Rule 64(a)(9) provides that

(citations omitted).

interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd")

are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that

omitted); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) ("[Statutory enactments

legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning") (quotation

State ex rel Z.C., 2007 UT 54, \ 6 ("When examining the statutory language we assume the
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Lamoreaux's claims against Black Diamond. Specifically, under Rule 64(e)(1) "[a]ny person

64E apply not only to Mr. Lamoreaux but also to his son Jake, the purported transferee of Mr.

Lamoreaux's arguments are unavailing, however, because the writ procedures in Rules 64 and

writ was issued, and therefore the Fishers had nothing to sell at the public auction. Mr.

i

process is irrelevant because Mr. Lamoreaux no longer owned his causes of action at the time the

Mr. Lamoreaux's response to this is to state that the procedural sufficiency of the writ

by Plaintiffs counsel at oral argument.

exception to this—originally objecting to the sufficiency of proof of publication—was withdrawn

effectively conceded such sufficiency by failing to make any objection to the procedure. The one

Black Diamond support the sufficiency of the Fisher's actions, but Mr. Lamoreaux has

employed by the Fishers were sufficient. Not only do the facts and documentation produced by

before Judge Shumate in the Fisher Lawsuit, the Court would still conclude that the procedures

However, even if Mr. Lamoreaux had not waived his objections by failing to raise them

questioned collaterally) (citing Edmonston v. Sisk, 156 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1946)).

Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2009) (the validity of a writ of execution cannot be

court. Such a collateral attack is inappropriate. See, e.g., RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life

the writ in this case, Plaintiff is seeking to collaterally attack the judgment and orders of a sister

Lawsuit. By ignoring the writ procedure in that case and instead attacking the effectiveness of

the Fishers in obtaining the writ, providing notice or conducting the sale, belonged in the Fisher

As a threshold matter the Court concludes that any defects in the procedure employed by

irrelevant.

ineffectiveness of Mr. Lamoreaux's purported transfer of his choses in action to his son is
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claims against Black Diamond, the time to address the potential extinguishment of that interest is

by Black Diamond—i.e., that regardless of whether Mr. Park has an ongoing interest in the

agreement is not ripe for decision. The Court reaches this conclusion both on the grounds cited

Finally, the Court concludes that Mr. Park's argument regarding his contingency fee

3. Contingency fee agreement

Motion should be granted.

Black Diamond is the real party in interest owning the plaintiffs claims in this matter, and the

Lamoreaux have waived any objection they may have had to the sale. In such circumstances,

instant action to Black Diamond were effective, and that, in any event, both Plaintiff and Jake

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the public sale of Plaintiff s claims in the

so, Jake Lamoreaux cannot now assert that the writ procedure was deficient or ineffective.

filed a reply under Rule 64E(d) or utilized the procedures under Rule 64(f)). Having failed to do

proceeded because he, not his father, owned the claims against Black Diamond, he should have

Lamoreaux wished to assert that the writ should not have issued or that the sale should not have

exercising "the same rights and obligations as the defendant with respect to the writ." If Jake

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rules 64 and 64E. Such an extrajudicial approach is not

appear at the public auction and orally assert that Plaintiff no longer owned the claims is

The Court can find no support for the proposition that merely having Plaintiff and his counsel

those rights and obligations at any time before the property is sold or delivered to the plaintiff."

not named by the plaintiff and not served with the writ and accompanying papers may exercise

respect to the writ and with respect to providing and objecting to security," and "[a]ny claimant

claiming an interest in the property has the same rights and obligations as the defendant with
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ORDER

Dated this

8

JUDGE ERIC A. LUDLOW

day of August, 2011 ^ _ - _ ^ ^

continue to serve allfilingsin this matter on Mr. Park, as counsel for Mr. Lamoreaux.

order to avoid any prejudice for purposes of appeal, Black Diamond is hereby ordered to

reason, David Lee Lamoreaux is hereby dismissed as party plaintiff. Notwithstanding this, in

granted and Black Diamond is hereby named as the party plaintiff in this matter. For the same

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Black Diamond's Motion is

role of party plaintiff in this matter.

Rules 64 and 64E from becoming effective, and thereby allowing Black Diamond to step into the

concludes that any ongoing interest held by Mr. Park is not sufficient to prevent the process of

dismiss it is anticipated that Black Diamond will file, is necessary. For the present, the Court

briefing on the issue, which presumably Mr. Park will provide in response to the motion to

Mr. Park's argument has not yet been sufficiently developed to allow decision. More complete

when Black Diamond moves to dismiss the claims against itself—and also on the grounds that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2011,1 provided a true and

David L. Elmont
R. Daren Barney
BARNEY MCKENNA & OLMSTEAD, P.C.
43 South 100 East, Suite 300
St. George, Utah 84771-2710

Michael W. Park
James M. Park
THE PARK FIRM, P.C.
315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4
St. George, UT 84770
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parties/attorneys named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE IN AS PARTY PLAINTIFF to each of the

correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING

I hereby certify that on this
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Civil No.: 080500885
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOI
EX PARTE ORDER

people who attended the sale were told that David Lee Lamoreaux had no interest in the lawsuit.

time and the lawsuit has no value until there is a judgment awarded. In any event, all of the

There is no law that says David Lee Lamoreaux cannot transfer a chosen in action at any

and the Affidavit of David Lee Lamoreaux.

all of his interest in the lawsuit. This objection is supported by the Affidavit of Michael W. Park

lawsuit against Black Diamond Holdings at the time Black Diamond Holdings claims it bought

Order. This request is made for the reason that David Lee Lamoreaux had no interest in the

The Plaintiff, by his attorney, Michael W. Park, objects to the Request for Ex Parte

Defendants.

BLACK DIAMOND HOLDINGS, LLC,

v.

DAVID LEE LAMOREAUX,

Plaintiff,

WASH^uTOH^tjUNTY

20ff HAR 2U PM li: 50

r i l ' U ! DISTRICT COURT

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Attorney for Plaintiff

Michael W.Park (2516)
THE PARK FIRM. P.C.
315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4
St. George, UT 84774
Telephone: (435) 673-8689
Facsimile: (435) 673-8767
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DATED this/ /

of the funds collected.

Michael %
Attorney for Plaintiff

day of March, 2011

lawsuit since March of 2008 when it contracted with David Lee Lamoreaux to receive one-third

the interest of The Park Firm cannot be sold at this sale. The Park Firm has had an interest in the

Even if David Lamoreaux could not transfer this interest, which, in my opinion, he can,

this type of transfer cannot be made by David Lamoreaux.

In their request for an Ex Parte Order, the defendant does not set forth any law which states that
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BARNEY McKENNA & OLMSTEAD, P.C.
David L. Elmont
R. Daren Barney
43 South 100 East, Suite 300
St. George, Utah 84771-2710

DARWIN C. FISHER,
A Professional Corporation
40N300E, Suite 101
St. George, Utah 84770

I hereby certify that on this ^ _ day of March, 2011,1 by first class mail, mailed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR EX PARTE
ORDER to the following:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
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COUNT: 9:00
Day 2
Original deposition of David Lamoreaux 10-13-09 submitted.
Howard Thayne Houston is sworn and testifies on direct examination
by Mr. Elmont.
Mr. Houston is declared as an expert witness.
COUNT: 9:25
Cross examination by Mr. Park
COUNT: 9:32
Witness steps down; recess
COUNT: 9:41
David Lamoreaux testfies on rebuttal.
COUNT: 9:45
Respective counsel, Mr. Park and Mr. Elmont, present their
closing arguments.
COUNT: 10:17
The Court directs counsel to each submit their proposed findings
and orders, and any case law, to the Court by 3 pm on 4-1-11. The
Court prefers submission by pleading and hard disc in the word
perfect format..
The Court will then take this matter under advisement and render a
written decison.
10:21] Recess.

TRIAL

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): DAVID LEE LAMOREAUX
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The Honorable Eric A. Ludlow

Civil No. 080500885

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUBSnTUTE IN AS PARTY
PLAINTIFF

^Pn

_
#~\\

^JiV2\i

INTRODUCTION

execution may be levied against choses in action. As will be set forth below, none of these arguments

arguments about the effect of amendments to the rules of civil procedure as to whether writs of

the procedural sufficiency of the notice of sale of Mr, Lamoreaux's choses in action, to legal

The Opposition presents wide-ranging arguments against the Motion, fiom objections about

David Lamoreaux.

the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Substitute in as Party Plaintiff ("Opposition*')filedby

memorandum in support of its motion to substitute in as party plaintiff ("Motion") and in response to

Defendant Black Diamond Holdings, LLC ("Black Diamond") hereby submits this reply

Defendant.

BLACK DIAMOND HOLDINGS, LLC,,

Plaintiff

DAVID LEE LAMOREAUX,

vs.

±1

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BARNEY McKENNA&OLMSTEAD,P.C
DAVID L. ELMONT - 9640
R. DAREN BARNEY-6824
43 South 100 East, Suite 300
St George, Utah 84771-2710
Telephone: (435)628-1711
Fax: (435)628-3318
Attorneysfor Defendant Black Diamond Holdings, LLC
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Diamond in this lawsuit In such circumstances, the Motion should be granted.

Black Diamond appropriately purchased Mr. Lamoreaux's right to bring claims against Black

Lamoreaux's choses in action were levied, a public sale was appropriately noticed and conducted, and

The bottom line as it relates to the Motion is that a writ was appropriately issued, Mr.

the transference of Mr. Lamoreaux's choses in action.

ability to contest the absence ofjudgment) in this case, he certainly has no interest that would prevent

whether or not Mr, Park has an ongoing, contingent lien interest in the outcome of any judgment (or

action or perhaps may even require a separate lawsuit asserting a right to attorney's fees. That is,

lien interest would be appropriately heard either as part of the later motion to voluntarily dismiss the

lien interest will remain following the grant of the Motion. Arguments about the effect of any attorney

Park purported lien interest survives the transference of Mr. Lamoreaux's causes of action, then his

rendered moot—but rather one to be substituted in as the party Plaintiff. Assuming arguendo that Mr.

instant Motion is not one for dismissal—wherein any ongoing lien interest could be extinguished or

As for Mr. Park's argument about attorney liens, the argument is, at best, premature. The

attack on the judgments and orders of a sister court in a separate case.

the sale took place. Raising such arguments in this matter constitutes an impermissible collateral

and notice of sale belong in matter 080502955 (Fisher v. Lamoreaux), where the writ was issued and

Instead, all of Mr. Lamoreaux's arguments regarding the sufficiency and effect of the writ of execution

agreement—none of Mr. Lamoreaux's arguments are even appropriately before the Court in this case.

are persuasive. Indeed, with the possible exception of one argument—that regarding Mr. Park's fee
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On or about February 1, 2010, Darwin and Cheryl Fisher (the "Fishers'5) obtained a

On or about January 19,2011, the Fishers obtained a Writ of Execution to execute upon

The Writ of Execution was served on Lamoreaux and his claim in this lawsuit was

Neither David Lamoreaux nor his son Jake Austin Lamoreaux filed a written reply

The date Mr. Lamoreaux was served with the Writ of Execution, February 16,2011,

Indeed, the only "notice* given that Mr. Lamoreaux was no longer the RPI in this

Portions of these statements of fact are takenfromthe Opposition, in which case Black Diamond may accept
the statements' truth for purposes of present argument but does not concede their truthfulness for any other purpose.

1

case, prior to the submission of Mr. Lamoreaux's affidavit dated March 24, 2011, was the oral

6.

longer die real party in interest ("RPI") in this case.

Opposition at 4, f 21), no notice was given either before or during trial that Mr. Lamoreaux was no

Opposition avers that Mr. Lamoreaux no longer had an interest in this lawsuit as of that date (see

was the first day of the two day bench trial in this matter. Notwithstanding the fact that the

5.

64E(d)(l) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or at any time prior to the public sale.

or objection to the Writ of Execution within 10 days of service of the Writ pursuant to Rule

4.

Seizure of Intangible Personal Property).

seized on February 16,2011. (See id; See also Exhibit 3 of Memorandum, Notice of Execution and

3.

Execution).

David Lamoreaux's interests in this current lawsuit (See Exhibit 2 of Memorandum, Writ of

2.

080502955. (See Exhibit 1 to original memorandum accompanying Motion: "Memorandum")-

judgment against David Lamoreaux and Diane Lamoreaux in the amount of $16,484.96 in civil action

1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
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Notwithstanding the alleged prior transfer of his rights in this action, Mr.

As noted in the original Memorandum, a Notice of Sale was both publicly posted

ARGUMENT

Lamoreaux'sright,title, and interest in this lawsuit pursuant to Rules 64E and 69A of the Utah Rules

As set forth in the original Memorandum, the Fishers properly executed against Mr.

is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

could not be attached as an exhibit. However, the proof of publication has since been received and

Memorandum the proof of publication had not yet been receivedfromthe newspaper, and therefore

and published as required under Rule 69B(b)(2). At the time of the filing of the Motion and

8.

continues to file papers as if Mr. Lamoreaux remained the RPI.

Opposition at Exhib. 1 (Affidavit of David Lee Lamoreaux), J 7. Further, Mr. Lamoreaux's counsel

his favor that he will address all the creditors if he ever receives any fundsfromthis lawsuit" See

Lamoreaux's March 24,2011 affidavit provides that "if he is fortunate enough to get a judgment in

7.

reasonable assessment of the regularity of such alleged transfer.

action to his son and ceased to be the RPI. Nor has he provided any infonnation to allow a

Lamoreaux has still not provided any information about when he allegedly transferred his choses in

months after trial, and after the submission of the Opposition and accompanying affidavits, Mr,

Barney "Barney Declaration,0 attached hereto as Exhibit 1), Even at this late date almost two

owner was or when the purported assignment allegedly occurred (See Declaration of R. Daren

lawsuit However, when asked, Mr. Park refused to provide any infonnation about who the actual

halt the sale and stated that Mr. Lamoreaux no longer owned the causes of action in the instant

statement of Mr. Park given at die public sale on March 21, 2011, wherein Mr, Park attempted to
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As a threshold matter, every argument raised in the Opposition attacking the procedural and

Arguments Concerning The Writ, Notice Of Sale, Or Conduct Of The Sale Belong in
Case No. 080502955, Not In This Case.

See generally Memorandum at Exhibs. 4-6. Anything else is an

attacked.'*) (quoting 12 Wright et aL Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3013, at 158).

300,302 (10th Cir. 1946)); see id. at 1076 ("A writ of execution, once issued, cannot be collaterally

validity of a writ of execution cannot be questioned collaterally) (citing Edmonston v. Sisk, 156 R2d

RMA Ventures Col. v. SimAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. Utah 2009) (the

impermissible collateral attack on the judgments and decisions rendered in another case. See, e.g.,

Diamond in this action.

of Sale and the conduct of the public sale of Mr. Larnoreaux's rights to proceed against Black

which it was based were issued. That matter is where the process was accomplished for the Notice

080502955, not here. That matter is where the Writ of Execution and the underlying judgment on

substantive effect of the sale belongs before Judge Shumate in Fisher v. Lamoreaux, Case No.

A.

granted.

proper owner of Mr. Larnoreaux's claims in this action. For this reason, the Motion should be

conclusion that the writ process was appropriately followed and that Black Diamond is now th6

during the Writ process are unavailing. Nothing set forth in the Opposition undermines the

the sale. The arguments Mr. Lamoreaux now makes for why it was unnecessary for him to object

exempt under Rule 64E(dXl) or otherwise appropriately objected to the notice of sale or conduct of

other person timely claimed that the Writ was wrongfully obtained, that the property seized was

undisclosed interest in the choses in action to object Neither Mr, Lamoreaux, nor his son, nor any

of Civil Procedure, including providing proper notice that would allow any third party claiming an
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The inappropriateness of Mr. Lamoreaux's collateral attack on the

Given the fundamental importance of the issue, Black Diamond will first address the ability

Execution Of A Chose In Action Remains Permissible Under Utah Law, Even After
The Repeal Of Rule 69.

to execute on a chose in action stemmedfromRule 69(f), that Rule 69 has been repealed, and that

The entirety of the Opposition's argument on this issue consists of the assertion that the right

therein.

action, rather than addressing the arguments raised in the Opposition in the order they appeared

of a creditor (in this case, the Fishers) under Utah law to obtain a writ of execution on a chose in.

B.

arguments and will do so below.

arguments in the Opposition, Black Diamond considers it appropriate to also address those other

Opposition and grant the Motion, However, given Mr. Lamoreauxfs presentation of numerous

proceedings of Case No. 080502955, alone, ought to be sufficient for the Court to reject the

addressing the Motion.

Such matters are threshold concerns that the Court should consider at the outset in

Motion.

should not be granted, did not object to the Writ or sale, and has yet to seek to be heard on the

owner of David Lamoreaux's claims against Blade Diamond and ultimately the reason the Motion

the positions of Jake Lamoreaux. Jake Lamoreaux, in turn, while being held out as the purported

no longer has proper standing to participate in this lawsuit, and he certainly has no standing to assert

own admission David Lamoreaux no longer owns the claims in this case, Mr Lamoreaux arguably

allegedly now has the interest in this case that conflicts with Black Diamond's Motion* If by his

Moreover, according to Mr. Lamoreaux's affidavit, it is Jake Austin Lamoreaux who
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The Opposition's statement of the source of authority to execute on a chose in action,

choses in action.

very long and complicated rule of procedure, is hardly the sole source of authority for executing on

added). The placement of an incidental reference to choses in action, in a middle subsection of a

upon the nonexempt properly and sell it at a sheriffs sale.") (bracketing in original; emphasis

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a sheriff or constable, pursuant to a writ of execution, may levy

execution under state orfederallaw.* Utah R. Civ. P. 69(b). Accordingly, under rule 69(f) of the

levy upon all of [a] judgment debtor's personal property and real property which is not exempt from

("Rule 69(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, *A writ of execution may be used to

court in Applied Medical Technologies. See Applied Med Techs, v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, % 11

of the reference in Rule 69(f) to executing on choses in action was implicitly acknowledged by the

(2004), relevant portions of which are attached hereto as Exhib. 3. The somewhat incidental nature

be used by an officer in levying against the judgment debtor's property. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69

only incidentally mentioned collecting and selling choses in action in the context of the process to

action. Rather, it was a subsection of a procedural rule regarding writ procedure generally, and it

baseless. Former Rule 69(f) did not purport to be a grant of authority to execute on choses in

however, is mistaken; and the Opposition's speculation about the reason for repealing Rule 69 is

See id.

most probably to avoid the very circumstance the Defendant seeks to create in the instant action. *

repeal of Rule 69 "seems patently clear" and that it had to do with preventing ushaip practices .. .

action-" See Opposition at 14. The Opposition then goes on to speculate that the reason for the

there "is no companion rule which expressly provides for the execution upon and sale of a chose in
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The 1999 version is relied upon herein because that is the last year where amendments are reflected in former
section 78-23-5 prior to the 2004 repeal of Rule 69.

thing is the exclusion of another.")-

est exclusio alterius is the "maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one

46, f 32; footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) at 403 (expressio unius

familiar with the usage and context of the language in question." (quoting O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT

construed in accordance with the ordinary meaning such words would have to a reasonable person

% 9 ("when the words of a statute consist of 'common, daily, nontechnical speech,1 they are

accordance with its ordinary meaning.") (quotation omitted); Olsen v. Eagle ML City, 2011 UT 10,

examining the statutory language we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and in

the specific exclusions would be nonsensical. See, e.g, State ex rel ZC, 2007 UT 54, % 6 ("When

conclusion that the legislature did not intend to exclude all choses in action generally—otherwise,

legislative expression of specific exclusions as to particular types of choses in action requires the

action related to personal injury and wrongful death claims were exempted from execution. This

(1999),2 attached hereto as Exhib. 4. Indeed, pursuant to section 78-23-5(l)(ix), certain causes of

personal property subject to exemption from execution. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5

pursuant to section 78-23-5, choses in action (at least generally) were not identified as types of

not exempt from execution under state or federal law." See Exhib. 3 (emphasis added). And,

of execution may be used to levy upon all of the judgment debtor's personal property... which is

from Rule 69(b), in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5. Pursuant to Rule 69(b), "[a] wit

Rather, the primary source of authority to execute on choses in action under Rule 69 came
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Notably, while the Opposition is correct in observing that choses in action were not subject to execution at
common law, this had nothing to do with alleged "shaip practices." Rather, as noted in the very section ofAmerican
Jurisprudence cited in the Opposition, choses in action were merely part of the broader category of "intangible persona]
property" that was not subject to execution. See 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions and Enforcements of Judgments §§ 142*43
(2005), a tnie and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhib- 5. Rule <S4's inclusion of "personal property,
tangible and intangible" as property subject to execution makes clear that Utah has abrogated the common-law rule
against execution of intangible personal property such as choses in action.

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5, the current statutory provision in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505 contains

due." Moreover, just as choses in action generally were not among the exemptions identified in

64(a)(9).3 A chose in action is certainly personal, intangible property, '^whether due or to become

become due, and an obligation of a third person to perform for the defendant" See Utah R. Civ P.

real and personal property, tangible and intangible property, the right to property whether due or to

defendant's property of any type not exemptfromseizure. Property includes but is not limited to

"property" subject to writs (including writs of execution—see Rule 64E(a)) includes "the

today. Specifically, even though Rule 69 has been repealed, under cunent Rule 64 the definition of

Critically, thisframeworkof Rule 69(b) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 remains in place

execution. See Utah R Civ. P. 69**) (emphasis added; footnote omitted)*

Nevada, Utah's rules of civil procedure contain no direct language exempting causes of action from

contrary, all causes of action are subject to execution. See Denham, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 152. Like

49, % 10 ("Hie Denham court interpreting Nevada law, held that, absent direct language to the

action were subject to execution, Cfu e.g, Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT

choses in action were not identified in the statute as being exemptfromexecution, then choses in

action- If all personal property "which is not exemptfromexecution" could be executed upon, and

specific language in Rule 69(f)—provided the legislative authority for executing on choses of

This broader framework of Rule 69(b) and Utah Code Ann, § 78-23-5—not merely the
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that he failed to receive notice of the Writ or of the Notice of Sale. He had every opportunity to

As for what constitutes "sharp practices," it is notable that Mr. Lamoreaux has not asserted

and by continuing to riot include choses of action in section 78B-5-505*s list of exempt property.

under broader terms addressing all personal, intangible property, "whether due or to become due,"

"sharp practice," the legislature and rules committee continued to provide for such execution, albeit

do with "sharp practices," and indeed far from condemning execution of choses in action as a

with writs of execution was re-written. There was no indication that the re-writing had anything to

Rules Annotated (2010). In other words, the entirety of the set of complicated procedures dealing

effective November 1, 2004. For comparable provisions, see Rules 69A to 69C." See Utah Court

69, establishing procedures for writs of execution and supplemental proceedings, was repealed

grounded in basis of fact or law. The annotation explaining the repeal merely provides that "Rule

The Opposition's speculation as to the reason(s) for repealing former Rule 69 is not

cannot do so.

where in the law choses in action are identified as "exemptfromseizure." He has not done so and

property of any type not exempt from seizure," then it is incumbent on Mr* Lamoreaux to identify

remain subject to execution. Put differently, if Rule 64 allows for execution on a "defendant's

plain language of Rule 64 and section 78B-5-505 thus compels the conclusion that choses in action

subject to execution because it is not statutorily identified as being "exempt from seizure/' The

by the interaction of Rule 64(a)(9) and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505, a chose in action remains

exclude choses in action generally. See section 78B-5-505(lXx), attached hereto as Exhib. 6. Thus,

related to personal injury and wrongful death are exempted from execution and continues to not

essentially identical language to the former statute. It continues to specify that certain claims
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The only procedural defect alleged in die Opposition was the absence of proof of

The Writ Of Execution And Notice Of Sale Were Procedurally Appropriate, And The
Sale To Black Diamond Was Effective.

Incidentally, given die requirements of Rules <S9A and 69B there would have been no prospect of a bidding
war. Rather, the Fishers would only have been entitled to sufficient money to satisfy their judgment and cover costs, and
any amount bid m excess of that would have gone to Mr. Lamoreaux. See Rule 69a(a), Rule 69B(eX3). Thus, no party
could have realistically outbid Mr. Lamoreaux as any amount he bid over the amount necessary to pay the Fishers would
have gone to himself

4

is no basis for the Opposition's sole procedural objection.

Memorandum, the proof of publication has been received and is attached as Exhibit 2. Thus, there

publicly and published as required by Rule 69B(b)(2). Since the time of filing the Motion and

publication. See Opposition at 6, As noted in the original Memorandum, notice was both posted

C.

a judgment against Black Diamond (in a case where he allegedly no longer holds any interest).

he allegedly intends to pay his creditors with the money he expects to make in the event he receives

his assertion that he had transferred his claims), andfinallydisavows anyfraudulentintent because

proper judicial procedure (and failing to provide any information that would allow an evaluation of

owns the claims, then comes with his counsel to try to disrupt the public sale without following any

his judgment creditor or to the Court or Black Diamond, but proceeds to trial anyway as if he still

where a plaintiff allegedly secretly sells his claims before trial, without providing notice either to

such opportunity. Moreover, it is interesting to hear complaints of sharp practices in circumstances

Lamoreaux's son—both of whom apparently assert interests in the cause of action—similarly had

couldn't afford to pay the judgment or bid at the public auction4 then Mr. Park and Mr.

take appropriate measures to ensure that the sale to Black Diamond did not take place, and if he
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Black Diamond.

have taken place in Case No- 080502955, Fisher v. Lamoreaux—not in the case of Lamoreaux v.

defendant in the Fisher v. Lamoreaux case (see Rule 64(e)(2)). All of the above, of course, would

Rule 64(b))- Similarly, the process may have involved having Jake Lamoreaux named as a party

to the Writ and request a hearing (see Rule 64E(d)) and the likely obligation to provide security (see

Lamoreaux) could exercise. See id. Those "rights and obligations** included therightto file a reply

delivered to the plaintiff to "exercise [the same]rightsand obligations" as the defendant (David

Writ, and assuming he claimed an interest, Jake had until the time the property was "sold or

alleged interest by Jake in the chose in action. Thus, Jake Lamoreaux could not be served with the

of the alleged transfer to Jake Lamoreaux, there is no allegation that the Fishers had notice of any

Utah R. Civ. P. 64(e) (emphasis added). In this case, due to the either secretive or post hoc nature

Anv person claiming an interest in the property has the same rights
and obligations as the defendant with respect to the writ and with
respect to providing and objecting to security. Any claimant named
by the plaintiff and served with the writ and accompanying papers
shall exercise those rights and obligations within the same time
allowed the defendant Any claimant not named by the plaintiff and
not served with the writ and accompanying papers may exercise those
rights and obligations at any time before the property is sold or
delivered to the plaintiff

for third parties to object to the issuance of a writ Specifically:

(see Opposition at 11-12), this fails to account for the fact that Rule 64 also provides an opportunity

David Lamoreaux had no need to object to the Writ because he no longer owned the chose in action

Jake Austin Lamoreaux to anyrightin the properly. Specifically, while the Opposition asserts that

Moreover, the procedure employed in the Notice of Sale also extinguished any claim by
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The Opposition relies on the language of Rule 25(c) for the argument that the substitution of

Cases Should Be Prosecuted By The Real Party In Interest; Even If Substitution Under
Rule 25 Is Discretionary, In This Case Not Allowing The Substitution Would Be An
Abuse Of Discretion.

Rule 17 even contemplates potential dismissal of a case when it is not prosecuted in the name of the

"every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest" Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a).

Notably, however, the Opposition ignores the requirements of Rule 17, which provides that

Opposition at 7-9.

inequitable for the Court to order the substitution by granting the Motion at this late date. See

parties is discretionary, and given the fact that the case has already had a trial it would be

D.

the property.").

P. 64E(dX3) ("If a reply [objecting to the writ] is notfiled,the officer shall proceed to sell or deliver

sale based on their failure to follow the procedures established for objecting. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ.

sale, and conducting the sale. Both David and Jake Lamoreaux waived anyrightto object to the

Simply put, the Fishers followed appropriate procedure for obtaining the Writ, noticing the

Mr, Lamoreaux's chose in action.

identified at the sale by Mr. Park when specifically asked for the identiiy of the alleged transferee of

party who neither appeared at the sale to assert a claim, nor sent a representative, nor was even

been ineffective on behalf of David Lamoreaux, and it was certainly ineffective on behalf of a third

sale and sought to use self-help to stop the salefromgoing forward Such an attempt would have

Diamond, Instead, David Lamoreaux and his attorney, Mr, Park, simply showed up at the public

nothing to assert any claim to an interest in David Lamoreaux's chose in action against Black

But instead of taking the actions available under Rules 64 and 64E, Jake Lamoreaux did
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M

See id.

" See Utah R. Civ.

Finally, the contention that the Motion should be denied because of the alleged interest in

Mr. Park's Argument About His Attorney Lien Is, At Best, Premature.

case of a voluntary dismissal where no judgment against Black Diamond is entered. However, such

interesting arguments to be had about what happens to Mr. Park's contingency arrangements in the

Mr. Lamoreaux's claim held by Mr. Park is, at best, premature. That is, there may well be

E.

allowed to seek voluntary dismissal of its claims.

on the merits. Rather, it should be allowed to substitute as the RPI plaintiff and thereafter be

required to go through the expense and risk of proceeding to the stage of the issuance of judgment

from substituting in as the plaintiff in order to protect its interests. Black Diamond should not be

action against Black Diamond, it would not be in the interests of justice to prevent Black Diamond

its interests. In a case where Black Diamond now appropriately owns Mr. Lamoreaux chose in

enforce a judgment against Black Diamond, that would impede Black Diamond's ability to protect

P. 24(a). Obviously, if Mr- Lamoreaux were allowed to proceed to attempt to obtain and seek to

may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest

transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action

right should be permitted "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or

would be analogous to the mandatory intervention provisions of Rule 24, where intervention as of

would effectively nullify Black Diamond's right to pursue its own interests. In effect, this case

are diiectiy opposed, any discretion under Rule 25 exercised to prevent the RPIfromparticipatiiig

Moreover, in a case such as this where the interests of Black Diamond and Mr. Lamoreaux

substitution o£ the real party in interest

real party in interest as long as "a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for... joinder or
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the Motion.

circumstances, the presence of Mr. Park's contingency arrangements provides no basis for rejecting

conclusion that the Motion can be granted without any harm to Mr. Park's interests. In such

subject to the attorney contingency fee agreement" (see Opposition at 15), that position leads to the

arguendo the accuracy of Mr. Park's assertion that "the transfer of the chose in action remains

lawsuit filed by Mr. Park seeking to obtain a fee. For present purposes, however, assuming

arguments would belong either in the briefing of a motion to dismiss or potentially in a separate
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DAVID L^LMONT
R. DAREN BARNEY
Attorneys for Defendant l&lackDiamond Holdings, LLC

BARNEY McKENNA & OLMSTEAD, P.C

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: April 12.2011.

reasons, Black Diamond respectfully requests that the Motion be granted.

Diamond should be substituted in as party plaintiff in the place of David Lee Lamoreaux. For these

obtained the plaintiffs right, title, and interest in this lawsuit As the real party in interest, Black

Motion. Rather, as established in the original Motion and Memorandum, Black Diamond legally

For the foregoing reasons, the Opposition does not identify any legitimate basis to deny the

CONCLUSION
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to:
Michael W.Park
James M. Park
THE PARK FIRM, P.C.
315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4
St. George, UT 84770

Legal Assistant

PLAINTIFF, on the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUBSTTTUTE IN AS PARTY

I hereby certify that on the /^Z- day of April, 2011, I served a copy of the REPLY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i naraxa
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The Honorable Eric A. Ludlow

Civil No. 080500885

DECLARATION OF R. DAREN BARNEY IN
SUPPORT OF REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE IN
AS PARTY PLAINTIFF

On or about March 21, 2011 I accompanied Austin Anderson of Black Diamond

2.

At the outset of the auction, counsel for Mr. Lamoreaux, Michael Park, sought to

In response to Mr. Park's assertion, I asked him to whom Mr. Lamoreaux's interest

5.

I also asked Mr. Park when the transfer had taken place. Mr. Park said he could not

Lamoreaux was also present at the public auction.

had been transferred Mr. Park replied he could not answer my question, even though Mr. David

4.

had allegedly already transferred that interest

have the auction postponed on the basis that there was no interest to be sold because Mr. Lamoreaux

3.

captioned action, conducted at the Fifth District Court House.

Holdings in attending the public auction and sale of the interests of David Lamoreaux in the above-

I am counsel for defendant Black Diamond Holdings, LLC in this matter.

1.

Professional Conduct, and the laws of perjury of the State of Utah as follows:

I, R. Daren Barney, declare under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of

Defendant

BLACK DIAMOND HOLDINGS, LLC,,

vs.

Plaintiff

DAVID LEE LAMOREAUX,

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BARNEY McKENNA & OLMSTEAD, P.C.
DAVID L. ELMONT - 9640
R. DAREN BARNEY-6824
43 South 100 East, Suite 300
St. George, Utah 84771-2710
Telephone: (435)628-1711
Fax: (435)628-3318
Attorneysfor Defendant Black Diamond Holdings, LLC
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R. Daren Barney

1^

Finally, I asked Mr. Park whether there was any documentation to substantiate the

transfer, and Mr. Park responded that he did not know.

6.

answer my question.

JL/AXLIDI 1 L
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ime
.day of
2011.
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•

Noyombct iO^OI?

State of Utah

Notary P u b l i c
t
BONNIE THOMPSON J
D3mmii^cm>iuml»r^5Gi& i!
fty Commission Explcns J

NOTARY'PUBUC RESIDING
ATWASHIHGTON COUNT?

this ts8£k
kL&irrJ*

Subscribed and

Kahlfliahi Corpus

AipMJL

^

I KahSiiant Corpus, being; duly syvqfn,
deposes and says that I am
the advertising representative of
The Spectrum, a newspaper of general
circulation published daily at
Saint George, Washington County,
State of Utah, also distributed in Iron
County, and placed on Utphlegais.com;
and that the notice;
PUB#: L4261
^
is a true copy of which is here to
attached, was published In its issue
dated the
20
day of
March
201t and
was published again in the issues of said
newspaper and Utahiegals.com dated:
for
a total of
insertion(s)
and on Utahlegais.cpm
on the same day as the first newspaper
publication and the notice remained
on tltahlegals.com until the
day of the scheduled foreclosure sale.

STATE OF UTAH S S ,
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

PUBLICATION

OF

PROOF

EXHIBIT 3
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fe) Availability of writ of execution. A. writ of execution is available to a '
.Judgment creditar to satisfy a judgment or other order requiring the deliyery of.
property or the payment Of money by a judgment debtor, ' '
(b) Property, subject to execution. A writ of execution may he used to levy
upon all of the judgment debtor's personal property and red property which is
not exempt from execution under state or federal Taw.
(c) Issuance of writ of execution. Unless- otherwise: ordered by the court, a ;
.writ of execution may be issued at airy time within &g$y$fa foDpwing toe \
"entry of a judgment or order (except an execution may bestayed pursuant to
Rule 62), either in the county in which such judgment wa3 rendered, or in any
county in which a transcript thereof has been filrf end aocketed hi the office of .
the clerk of the district court Notwithstanding the death erf a party after
judgment, execution thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be*
"enforced, aa follows':
(cXl) m case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application, of
hn authorised executor or administrator, or successor in interest
(c)(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for the
recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien thereon.
(d) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execution
'shall be issued in the name of the State of Utah, mid subscribed by the clerk
of the court It'shall be issued to the sheriff or constable of any county in the
* 'state (and may be issued at the same tuna to different counties) but where it.
requires the delivery ofpossessionor aale of real property, it shafl be issued to
the sheriff of the county where the real property or some part thereof ite *.
situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personaLproperty, it may
be issued to a constable- It must mtelhgihly refer tothe judgment, stating the.
court,- the docket number, the county where the same is entered or docketed,
the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for the payment of irioney, ...
/the amount thereof^ and the amount actually due thereon The writ; may be
accompanied by a praecipe executed by the judgment creditor or the judgment * •'
creditor's counsel generally or specifically describing, the real or. personal *
propertyto belevied upon-It shall be directed to the sheriff of toe «>unty-in ..
which it is to be executed in cases involving real property, and shall require the -.
officer to proceed in accordance with t ^ terms ofthevnd^ provided that n7such
writ is against the property of the judgment debtor generally it may direct the
sheriff or constable to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the nan- exempt personal properly of the debtor, and if sufficient non-exempt personal ;
property cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with \
interest; out of the judgment debtor's non-exempt real property.
. _ >v
(e) When writ to be returned, The writ of execution shall be served at any
tune within sixty days after its receipt by the officer. It shall then be' returned...
to toe court i r o m w ^
and when it is returnedthfc dark must attach ^
it to the record*
. r, ' /
(f) Service of the writ. Unless the execution otherwise directs, ihe officer* ;
must execute the writ against the non-exempt property of the judgment debtor \
f byleyying on a sufficient; amount of property* if there m sufficient property;
collecting or spelling tfc£ chbses in. action apd selling: toe other property in. the*
manner set fortonerein. Levy includes toe seizure of the property andholding
the property in person or through one or more agents, hiduding the judgment -'
. debtor; appointed by the officer, When there is moreproperty tftoe jpdgmmii
debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment a±id acciniiigtiosts/flitoin' VilW'-'
of the officer, the officer ittust levy only on such part ofiftfe prppgrty as the •
judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is ampry sufficient to
satisfy toe. judgment and costs.
, . ' . , .
* • When an officer has served an execution issued out of ^ny court toe officer. M
may complete the return thereof after such date of service.

-—• t o ;

Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental there-

Kule69

•Ml
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,
.. (h)(l} Thru jfpr request Thejudgment debtor or any other person who owns
or claim* an- interest m the prupeiiy subject to execution niay request a
hearing' to claim any exemption to the execution, or to challenge the* issuance
- ofthtewrijt Such'r^uest must be filed or served upon thejudgment creditor or
t$ie attorney for the judgment: creditor within ten (10) days of the service upon

""- Q#

case, directed
' to the sheriff or constable of
County, commanding
. thesherhTu^
,
"WHEREAS,
I
_ . {Quoting body of writ of executionl.* •
YOU MAY HAVE A BIGHT. TO RXWMPT PROPERTY from; the" sale
under statutes of the United States or this state, including: Utah Code
Annotated,, Title 78, Chapter 23, i n the'manner described in those
;statutes~
' The^date of publication shall be deemed the date of service and the date of
publication ahsjl be not less than ten (10) days prior, to the date of sale or
aeHvery
"\
*
'
;K
This paragraph (g) : shall not be applicable to judicial mortgage foreclosure
preceed^^. cOTtnne^
Code Annotated* Title-78, ChaDter 37: ,

TO t /
• ,,,;Judgment Dgbton ,
7
Awrit of execution has been issued i n l i e above^-captioned

(g) Notice to judgment debtor of sale and of exempt property and right too,
hearing. Atihe time the writ of execution Is issued, the clerk shall attach to the
writ a notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing and two copies
of a n application by which the judgment debtor may request a hearing:
" Upon service-of the writ, the 'sheriff or constable shall serve/upon the
judgment debtor, in the same rmrninc as service of a summons in a civil action,
or cause to be transmitted by both regular and certified mail, returned receipt
requested, to the judgment debtor's last known address as provided by the
judgment creditor, (i) t h e notice of execution and exemptions and right to a
hearing, and (5) the application by which the judgment debtor may request a
hearing. Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable may also set the date
of sale or delivery and serve upon the judgment debtor notice of the date &nd
time of sale or delivery in the same manner as service of the notice of execution
and exemptions and right to a hearing.
The notice of execution and exemptions that is to be served npon the
judgment debtor shall indicate in substance that certain property i s or may be
. exempt from execution including but not limited to a homestead; tools of the
trade; a motor vehicle used for the judgment debtor's business or profession;
social security benefits; supplemental security, income benefits; veterans'
benefits; unemployment benefits; workers' compensation benefits; public assistance (welfare); alimony; child support; certain pensions; part or all of wages or
other. earnings from personal services; certain furnishings and appliances; '
musical instruments; and heirlooms (each not to exceed the amount allowed by
law).- The notice shall also'indicate that the list i s a partial list and. other
various property exemptions may be available under federal law or the Utah
exemptions statute, and that the judgment debtor must request a hearing
within ten (10) days from the date of service of the notice upon the judgment
debtor. For purposes of this provision, the date of Bervice shall be the dkte of
mailing, if mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and no period for
•mailing under Sole 6(e) shall be used in computing the time period:. ..*
- I f the writ, the notice of execution a n d exemptions and right to a hearing cannot be served upon the judgment debtor in the same manner as service of
' a summons in a civil action, and the judgment creditor does not have available
the judgment debtor's last.known address, only the following notice need be
published under the caption of the case in a newspaper of general circulation
in. each county in which the property levied ujpon, or some-part thereof* is
. si&ated:
, . •
:..-
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Paragraph (0 now defines levy" aa the seiAdvisory Committee Note. — The 1994
amendments cons&iibs a substantial raorgnni- zurs of the uon*exsmpt property and authorises
tairon. and revirioa of the rule applicable to the officer to hold the property in -pemoa4 or
executions. While not an exhausthr* list, the . through one or mare agent*. It is •common
Advisory Committee mites the following signify practice fox the officer to appoint a "keeper* to
hold the property pending salo..aa*.it is not
icfuit changes: ,.
I The Bale has beenrestructirradto •Hmmote* always practicalfin-the officer to take physical
possession of the property. Language in this
ran&eiices m gender.
Paragraph (a) specifies that tf writ of execu- paragraph on payment of dm sales 'proceeds
tion, is available only post judgment Bad Para- has now beenrelocatedto new Paragraph GJon
graph <b) now states that a writ of execution conducting the sale. Provisions in paragraph,/!)
may oniy be used to teach thejudgiaant debt- regarding detailed 'procedure* in event, of dea£h
and
jarfe non-exempt real or personal property The of the officer were deemed unnecessary"
. -' *"%.v *** *
availability'of write of aracutioh to reach nan- have bean eliminated,
*exsnipt <propex t$ and the requirement thai'the
Paragraph (g) is new and provides that'the
judgment creditor now notify the judgment •' clexk .shall attach to the writ of execution'a
* debtor of aright to exemptions, are described in notice ofexecooon and exemptions and right to
sfiYeral praviswras of toe revised rule, t i n s a hearing, and two copies of an application by
change Incorporates similar notice procedures which, the judgment debtor may leanest a heapnow utilized in Bale 6413, and alleviates consti- - nig. A similar procedure it contained hi Bnle
tutionel dim-process problems in the previous 64D. It is expected to practice that the ulaMfcUT
,ru6. ;Thefe conatitaatmal issues wore eeV will provide to the Jerk, the material to be
dressed by the United. States Genii of Appeals attached to die writ OIBcial fonns fe-tha
hvAacan-v. :3an Juan County Sheriff's Depart^ notice of execution^ 'exemptions and. rfghC.to a
ment, &44FJM 691 (lOtb Oir 1991), involvings hearing; and the application foe's hflflrifig nave
similar New Mexico Bula,
been prepared by the Committee, Service of
-.* Paragraph (d) retains the requirement that these forms may be made personally inj-tfac
writs of axecpoon be issued^ and served by a same manner aa service of a smnmcmalna dvfl
.-sheriff; qr constable. A sheriff must: mate ***- action' or may be transmitted by mail to the
v ^ hvthe case of real property, Paragraph (dj judgment debtor? last lenown address ai proalso allowa'.the use of a praecipe, winch i s vided by the judgment cremtor; N d ^ ' o f & e
commonly executed by the judgment creditor or tnrie and date ofsale may alsohe eeWedef the
the judgm/mt creditor^ counsel directing the same tune, Parographjg) also contains a pubofficer to specific property: to jbe levied upon- in lication form of service i f the judgnient^cre^i-practice, some officers wnt not execute a writ of tor's ]assloiown4u)dresa'is not a
executim without an a n ^ n f m y n ^ p r a e c ^
paragranh alco sets &rtk the Jangua^'to v be
Paralpraph (a) hat been amended to aDow the included hi'ihe notice and a^pneatibn-to'be
•'
officer to serve, the writ ivr^hin sixty (60) days, ^ ^ l a ^ n r i n a i l ^ t o : ^
eJthough the .return of the writ may be made pBJ^raph (jgj iajiot apnhcabls *Qjudac&l mortfcheifcafter.\'
••>
gag* ibfodbima. procAddingH alac«..ti^^reai

(q) Order prohibiting pansfir' ofproperty. If it appears that a person .or
corporation, allegedtohave property of"the judgment debtor or to be indebted
to £he judgment debtor in an amount exceedingfiftydollars, not exempt from
execution, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor
or denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or coiporatidn to
refrain from transferring-or otherwise disposing of such interest.or'debt until
such time asmayreais^^
bring an
action to detenniae such interest or claim and prosecute the sametojudgment.
Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon such
terms as may be just
' (r) Witnesses.^ Wttnessjes may be required to appear and testify, in/*any
proceedings brought under this rule in the same manner as upon the trial 6f an
issue.
'
. . • * . _
'
' (s) Order for property to be applied on judgment The court or master niay
order any property of the judgment debtor, not exemptfiromexecution, in the
possession of the judgment debtor er'any other person, or due to. the judgment
debtor,' to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment! ""'.'• .'!**' *''-. T
'[ (t) Appointment ofjreceioen The court may appoint a receiver of the piroperty
of the judgment debtor, not exempt firom execution, and may forbid any
transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its further
order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with the rfeal
property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of the appointment shall be
recorded in the office .of the recorder of t i e county in which any real estate
r
aotight.tb bereflected thereby is situated.
.,
* ./' ' /
;..*''. .

:2S?
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(x): except as provided in Subsection (1XW, any money or other
assets held for or payable to the ^individual as a participant or
beneficiary from or an interest of the individual as a participant or
beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement that is described in
Section 401(a), 401(h), 401(k), 403(a)- 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d),
or 414(6) of the TJnited States Internal Revenue Code of 1936, as
amended; and
(xi) th^ interest of or any money or other assets payable to an
alternate payee under a 'qualified domestic relations order as those

(1) (a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property:
CO a burial plot for the individual and his family;
(ii) health aids reasonably necessary to enable the individual or a
dependent to work or sustain health;
(iii) benefits the individual or his dependent have received or are
entitled to receive because of disability, Alness, or unemployment from
any source;
(iv) benefits paid or payable for medical, surgical, or hospital care
to the extent they are used by an individual or bis dependent to pay
for that care;
(v) veterans benefits;
(vi) money or property received, and rights to receive money or
property for child support; *
(vii) one: clothes washer and dryer, one refrigerator, one freezer, one stove,"one u^icrowaye oven, one sewing,machine, all carpets in use,
provisions sufficient for 12 months actually provided for individual or
. fzunily use, an wearing a p p a r e l
including jewelry or furs, and all beds and bedding for every individual or dependent; •
(viii), works of art depicting the debtor or the debtor and his
" ' resident family, or produced, by the debtor or the debtor and his
resident family, except works of art held by the debtor as part of a
trade or business;
(he) proceeds of insurance, a judgment,, or a settlement, or other
•» ri^ts accruing a^
wrongful death or bodily injury of another individual of whom' the
individual was or is"a dependent to the extent that those proceeds are

78-23-5- Property exempt from execution.

Am. Jur. 2d, — 40 Am. Jar. 2d Homestead
§§ 77 et aeq^ 115 at seq.

COLLATERAL BJ2FEHENCES

Gardner, 86 tftah 350, 39 B2d 327,103 AJbJL stead premiefes sold upon igecotfaa
92B{1934)l^k,$6wDMBndhomeBtBud6X3a9p'
stroctrve notice only, and valueofsuch pretiarxto rea^ooicata fUrtker explained isu
- xmses xctu within Htnit of hgyirartftiM
Existing Hess on tod cannot be defeated by exemption, sole was void, and fact that jndgsubsequent
of hmwrtcad,
otgection to sale did not
, _ declaration
- •—-•** «McMurv » i u - ment debtor made no objection
:
Ctaiefc. 89 Utah 403.
id? P5«
« a 132
*«* estop him
. . from
die v. Ctaigfc
403,107
P.2d 163,
auing to remove cloud on title
AIJRL 435 U940X
" caused by sale. Kimball * SaKsborr, 19 Utah
Void execution eale.
101. 56 P. 973 (1899).
WharejiidgmentdebtorMlecteda^hiflhome-

UTAH EXEMPTIONS ACT

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JQDICIALCQDB

not be supported by conadaradon. OKver v.
MHduD, 14 Utah 2d9,376 R2d 390 (1962). . .
ai^iriXf&aiParmJPtdd. GcedHAaaSi,v.
1**™*, 7 < * *** «W0 :tt?tah|988>.

CJT.S,— 35 CJ& Exemptiona § 39 et acq.
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History! C 1963, 78-23-0, enacted by L.
1981, ch. Ill, 8 R

*

*

...

•

Besides the property specified in Section 78-23-5^ an individual is entitled to
exemption of the fdlowing property to the extent r^onahfriificessary for the
supportof the individual and:hk dependents: t ..
\*f
.-* XI) money or property received, and rights tft receive nioney or peedpettjr'
for alimony or separate maintenance; <
*
r
(2) proceeds or benefits pmd or payable o^
individual was the spouse: or a dependent of the insured; and
(3) assets held, payments, and amounts payable under er stock bonus,
. pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or .'similar plan providing' benefits other"
than hy reason df illness or disability.
' •
•,
•
• ..
* •*

78-23-6. Property exempt from execution to extent necessary for support.

Azn. JUT. 2d. — 31 Am. Jnr. 2d Exemptions
$ 23 at ttq.

COII^TERALBEFEEENCES

Aruufsia
Waiver of eaein ttan.
'
C*tei
Waiver of exemption.
A waiver of exemption from execution need

NOTES TO DECISIONS

History: a 1953, 78*23-5, enacted by I* the string of aeddans in Subsection (ltfx).
1081.eh.ail,* 5;I960,ch. 19,§ ijia97 f cli.
FedemlLam—T3»JBo!»nialReveniieOod«
138, 5 2; 1999, ch. 370, § 2.
cif 1986. died in SubsectfouCl), is Title26 of tie
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- U.S. Code* '
meat, effective Maj 3,1999, inserted "408A* in

terms are defined in Section 414(p) of the United States Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended^
,
(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (lXaXr)tfoesinot apply to:
(i) an alternate payee under a qualified (fci^estic lotions order, ag
those terms aire defined inSection 414(j») c^ffieUmt^Sfei^intemld:
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; or
GQ amounts contributed or benefits accrued by* or on behalf cf a
debtor within one year before the^ debtor ffl» & booknaptcy. -. , ••
(2) Exemptions under this section do not Innft items which may ba claimed
as exempt under Section 78-23-8.

78-23^ *
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Itasca Bank and Trust Co. V.Thdrkif
Laraen and Son, Inc., 362 H i App. 3d
262*, 287 BL Dae 458, 815 NJBJ2d 1259
(2dBist20D4).
^n re Uuianey, 29 B:H. 79 (Bankr.
WJ): Va. 1982); Prodigy Centers/Atlanta
flfd. 1 £JP. V. T-C. Associates, Ltdl, 269
Ga- 522, 501 B£M 209 (1998): Arbie

Serrices Co., Inc. •. Petit* 690 A2d 1054,
16 U.C.O. Hep, Senr. 2d 649 (Me. 1991>,
Xiyzm v. International JBrotlv of firemen
and Oilers, 228 S.a 357, 9tfS.E.2d 204
C1S55); Safeco Ina. Co. Of America v.
Skaea, 4? Wash. App. 196, 734P.2d 41
(Efa i 1987).

749 R2cf 606 (1088); New England jMkrtg:

299N-W.22(194i).
4
Com., to Use of French v. Weglein,
147 Pa, Super. 257. 24 AJtd 638 (1942).
[Section 142]
^ a n Ness v. Efratt, 38 U.S. 294, 10
L. JSkL 168 (1838); Harvey v. WiifiM 80
Gfiu App. 232, 55. S.E.2d 836.(1949);
Itasca Bonk and Trust Co. v/Thorleif
Larson and Son, luc.^ 362 1IL App. 3d
262, 287 IH Dec 466, 816 NJE.2d 1269
(2d Dial 2004)] Arbia Bfinaral Feed Co.,
Inc. v. Farm Bureao Mut Ins. Co., 462
N.W.2d 677 dowa 1990); City ofArkansas
City v. Anderson, 12" Kan. App. 2d 490,

•

."•

^

IJiifler the modern
intangible property, i
aoiaec* to l e v y u 1 1 ^
^'Al'cskiiBe of action ii
erty t^jcm yibi&L a ju
Stated, the seizute o:
the: creditor a l i w ^
smt.3
.. While in some jur:

f West? s K a j r l * ^ ^

&Y i£? Cause of act!

fcreditprB.
*&• Wenfiircament of
^ o n l t o o r does not <
^aejiberty of contract

^ • L t r w t purchaser's.

^lirid^r a land contn

feacaoaareiJDtaubj

*Dodos v.Shamer, 339 Md. 540, 663
A_2d 1318 0996); Victoria Graphics, Inc.
t . Priorities Publications, Inc. 167 Misc.
2d 607, 640 N.YJS.2d 400 (NX City Chr.
C t 1996); Smith v. United States Fire
Ins, Co., 126 Tenn. 435, 150 S.W. 97
(1912); Johnson y. Dahiqnist, 130 Wash,
teec yeairt!); In re App£
29,225 P. 817 (1924). ney;233:APJML147,>i
•Collier •• Stenhroogh, 47 UJ5L 14, 6
..-iV'i.r-- (lsfcDenrt 1696). (debtor a
to pnrdiasa certain coo
Bow. 14,12 L* Ed. 324 (1848); Howe • .
Colpoys, 137 FJJd 249, 148 Alr.B, 488 •' •i'fcic.; inent as rights to execute
(App, B.C. 1943); Steifens^. American
" *In|emotional Fids.
Standard In* Co. arm*:, JL81 N*W.2d - .Y3fc.S-'V
Aahland, Isujmber Co,^ In
174 (Iowa 1970); Dodds v. Shamer, 339
.463^2*664.(1^951.
••-•Tt?--'
M i 540, 663 A2d 1318 (1996); Benton's
r ^' /%od|gy ficnters/Atl;
Apparel r. Hegna, 213 Minn. 271-, 7
v.-T-C Assoctateftt L * * 5
K.WJZd 3,143 AJMBL 1148 (1942# Jacobs;*
vS^2a2D9(l998>
Ball & Batfcnol v. Curtis, 232 NuJ, Stiper.
J ^Cain. i Bnltman, ^
165, 556 A^d 817 (Law Dfv. 1989i:Hai«r
^Jna>409So,2tf1^^
inas-v. He&nes, 70 SJX266, 1&.&MJM
V^jftKpktlSBa);
'
921(1944).
5j?* ^^ndicott-doluisonL.
• 7Wastchestar Fin Ins. Co, v. HasBarJ& 'Smith; 266TJ.S. 29X 45
gen, 632 NT.W.2d 754 (Minn. C t App.
^J?o>293 (1924)/ .,
2001) (although statute limited actions to

Vl53.

Mineral Feed Co., Inc. v. Farm fiureao
Mnt 1m. Co., 462 N.W^d 677 (Iowa
1990}; Applied Medical Technologies, l a c
v. Eamefl, 2002 UT IB, 44P.3d 699 (Utah
2002).
»'-..:!

Under the common law, a writ of execution can not be levied against: ;
a mere contractual right or chose in action;1 rather, intangible.property had to. be reached through actions of equitable origin, such as a
creditor's bill/
Under the modern view, state legislatures may make incorporeal or .
intangible property,3 including choses in action owned by the debtor,4" ^
subject to levy under execution,1 and this authority has been exercised
in some instances/ Thus, under these types of statutes, an executory
contract constitutes property against which execution may be sought7
Similarly, a writ offierifacias creates a lien in favor of tie judgment

s&ch levy wqiild be limited to those contents biihe Safe which were ^
the property of the debtor/
6. Incorporeal and Intangible Property
§ 142 Intangible property, generally; executory contracts
Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Executions «=» 42

§141.
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Victoria G r a ^ t o . . :

0 w 1£M

t{99^.

i«d MedicalTedmologWBjlM..

ad Co.. Inc. v. fiwm Bureau

ay make incorporeal or
loaned by the debtor,
nity has been exercised
fgtatotts, an executory
p-ntion may be sought,
ivor of the judgment

a not be levied against'
ather,' intangible prop-,
table origin, such as a

atdry. contracts

: iiie aafe wMdi "were
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fStetlSaS).

&^5Ji~..;;

Uaiii Jb Bplbnen, Inc. v. Mica Sam,
k 4 » S a 2d U 4 (Pla. Disk Gt App.
11^,1982}. /
icott-'Joiinson Corporation v.
r266U.S. 291, 4 5 S . Ct 63; 69 L.
^(1924).
•

|*fliree jeara); l a re Application of CharJrt^233 JLB^a 147, 649 N.Y.S.2d 145
HatJtepH; 1996) (debtor's "insider" rights
' I p u i ^ i ^ ceitnin cooperative apart' f A/rrightB to executory contract).
£cfinternational Fidelity Ins. Co. v.
* Wand l i m b e r Co., Lic^ 260 Va, 607,
g & U d 6 6 4 (1996).
igy Centers/Atlanta No. 1 LJ>.
updates, LfaL, 269 6a. 522, 501

.
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[Section 143]
tin re Dulaney, 29 B;R. 79 (Bankr..
WD. Va. 1962); Prodigy Centera/Atlanta*
No., 1 L * ; v.T-C Associates, Ltd., 269
Ga. 622, 501 &lL2d.209 (1998);TAstoe
Mineral Peed Co., Inc. v; ITazm Bureau
•Mut/ItaL Co., 462NN.W.2d 677 (tow*
1990); Applied Medical Technologies, Inc.
v. Eames, 2002 UT X8,44 P.3d 699CUtah
2002).
a
Arbie Mineral Feed Co., i i c ^ r Farm
B i n w n M u c i n s . Co* 462 NIWi2S 677
(Iowa 1990).
3
Mena T. Muhleisen Propertied '652 ,So; 2d 05: (La. C t App. 5th Cfr, J995).

As to supplementary wage or income
executions, see 5 668.

While in some jurisdictions a claim or cause of action for nnliqtd-

. creditor tmly to the extent that ithe judgment, debtor haa a possessory
': interest in the intangible property sulrject to the writ,'
1- /Under a view which lies somewhere between the foregoing, choses
*'. in>actio& are not subject to seizure and sale under executions based
j upon ordinary judgments.9
r
Under a land contract, the interest of the seller, who continues to
" hold the legal tiiicfroljjectto t^yinyhaser^s eqt^table title, is' snigect
-.toXavT under execution on a judgment. It is not inconsistent with the
contract ptirchaser's equitable rights to recognize that the seller's
. legal title can be conveyed, devised, encumbered, or levied on by
creditors,10
• '• '• The enforcement of a writ of execution against wages due the execution debtor does not constitute an unconstitutional interference with
title liberty of contract between an employer and his or her employee.11
§ 143 Cause of action; choses in action *
Research References
Weste Key Number Digest, Executions <B» 47
- Under the modern, view, state legislatures may make incorporeal, or
/ intangible property, including choses in action owned by the debtor,1,
.!; subject to levy under execution.
-: •.' A cause of action in existence prior to a judgment is personal
property .upon which a judgment creditor may seek execution-2 Otherwise
stated, the seizure of a debtor's litigious right under a statute gives
the creditor a lien or preference on what the debtor realizes from the

ExBCOTTONSr ETC.
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Writ denied, 653 So. 2d 592 (La. 1995).
*Bargan v. P/V S t Patrick, 686 P.
Scarlett V. Barnes, 121 BJEL 578 Supp. 786 (D. Alaska 1988); Nicholson v.
St.: Anno Lanes, Inc., 168 III App, 3d 838,
WM Mo; 1990),
^cWi,KafferfEiigstrQm & Drake v. 111 m Dec 223, 5121*JS:2d 127 (3d Dfefc
Tanasse, 199&OT; 49,980 P*2d 208 (Utah 1&87); Lange •. Fidelity ft Gas: Co. of
New York, 29QJM^6l, 185 lOKlirf 881
1999%
(19713; Butter v, Kin& 57 Mcfc. App, 152,
Moody's:
Olympia
Lumber,
Inc.
T.
Bonqv:9 Wash. App. 626, .513 P.2d 849 226 N.W.2d 79 (1974),
ld
(Dbr, 3 1973} (such fytf claim is riot
Hnnt v. I^an^RiskMut Ins. Co.,
Bubjefct; to attachment or garnishment).
568 So. 2d 253 (Miss. 1990%
" • 'Snow; ^ii^^ikgstrtmi ft Drake v. (Section 144]
Tariaasei 1999 UT 49, 980 P\2d$08 (Utah
. t%3BVa.ajL H1001 etseq. ,
1999).,
, - " *
* abhaflfee v* Sinitfc, 98 Ne* 222, 645
^Hoglfct- v. Hogie, 732 N.BJZd 1278
Ond. Ct Appv2000).
&m$$&c&B& ,
• ...

Because the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 proviisions1do i^ot provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments, state law methods for collecting money generally
reinain tmdisfatiirbed by ERISA; otherwise there3would be no way to
enforce a judgment won against an ERISA plan.
Though the restriction against alienation in the Employee Retire-

Research References
Wests Key Number Digest, Executions «=» 42

§ 144 Salary, wages, <*r earnings; benefits; pensions

dated damages is not Subject to execution,4 in others a writ of execution may encompass unliquidated tort claims/ Thus, a claim for medical malpractice that is capable of being converted into a definitive
judgment, although presently undetermined and unliquidated, may be deemed property under a state statutory provision governing execution sales.? Similarly, a legal malpractice claim! like any other
chose in action, may ordinarily
be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.7 However, as a matter of public policy, a
legal malpractice action which has been transferred by levy and execution sale, but which was never pursued by the original client, cannot be enforced as the decision as to whether to bring a malpractice
action against an attorney is one peculiarly vested in the client.1.
In states where a cause of action for bad faith failure to settle is
voltuitarily assignable, and where the*
question has. arisen, such a
cause of action is subject to execution.9
4 n injured parly who obtains a judgment against an insured party
may levy execution on the insured's causes of action against his or her
insurer. In such a case, the injured party steps into the 11shoes of the
insured and can sue the insurer on such causes of action*

$143
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§788-5-505

§ 7 8 B - 5 - 5 0 5 . Property exempt from execution
(iXa) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property:
(i) a burial plot for die individual and the individual's family;
(ii) health aids reasonably necessary to enable the individual or a depen.. dent to work or sustain health;
(iii) benefits the individual or the individual's dependent have received
or are entitled to receive from any source because of:
(A) disability;
...
•
(B) illness; or
(C) unemployment;
(iv) benefits paid or payable for medical, surgical, or hospital care to the
extent they are used by an individual or the individual's dependent to pay
for that care; '
(v> veterans benefits; . • •
(vi) money or property received, and rights to receive money or property
for child support;
(vii) money or property received, and rights to receive money or property for alimony or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary
for the support of the individual and the individual's dependents;
(ViixXA) one;
(I) clothes washer and dryer;
(II) refrigerator;
(IID freezer;
(TV) stove;
(V) microwave oven; and
(VT) sewing machine;
(B) all carpets in use;
(C) provisions sufficient Cor 12 months actually provided for individual
4
or family use;
&
„ (D) aU wearing apparel of every individual and dependent* not inciudr
.. ihgjewelry Or furs; and """ *
,.
(E) all beds and bedding for every individual or dependent;
(ixj except far works of art held by the debtor as part of a trjide or
bysMess,Wort? pf art:
(A) dc^Us^og tb^ cteb^bi^ .of*' tjbe .ddbtDir- aiict.his jrsid^ife AEtfiily; cat
(B): produced by the debtor of the debtor and-his resident family;
(x): proceeds of insurance, a judgment, or. a settlement^ or other rights
accruing as a result of bodity injiny of the individual or of the wrpngful
death or bodily injury of another individual of whom the individual ~\tas or
is a dependent to the extent that thrae proceeds are compensatory;
(xi) the proceeds or benefits of any life insurance contracts or policies
paid or-payable to the debtor or -airy trust: of which the debtor is a
beneQqary upon the death of the spouse or children of the debtor^provided
/
:
^ 539 .
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111, § 5.
X9, § 1.
1315,5 2.
370, £ 2 .

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Bankruptcy exemption pfenning: Counseling
in shades of gray. Marker, 21 Utah BJ. 20
(March/April 2008).
. 540

Prior Laws:
Laws 1981. c
Laws 1989, c
Laws 1997. c
Laws 1999, c

Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2004. c. 135, § 2 .
La\vs2005,c-i34 # fL
Laws2067ya3±J»§ L
C 1953. f 78-23-^-

(3) Exemptions under this section do not limit items that may be claimed as
exempt under Section 78B-Sr506/
- ', '
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 801, cfc Feb. 7, 2008.
"

that the contract or policy has been ownfed by the debtor for a continudus
unexpired period of one year;
• (xii) the proceeds or benefits of any life, insurance contracts or policies
paid or payable to the spouse or.children of the debtor or any trust-of
which the spouse, or children are beneficiaries upon the death of the
debtor, provided that the contract or policy hats bean in existence fpr a
continuous unexpired period of one yean
(xiii) proceeds and avails of any uamatiired life insurainicb contracts
owned- by die debtor or any revocable grantor trust created by the debtor,
excluding any payments made on the contract during the one year immediately preceding a creditor's levy or execution;
(xiv) except as provided in Subsectidn*(l)(b), any money or other assets
held for or payable to the individual as a participant or beneficiary from or
an interest of the individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement
plan or arrangement that is described in Section 401(a), 401(h), 4010c),
' 403(a), 403(b), 408, 40BA, 409, 414(d), or 414(e), Internal Revenue Code;'
and
(xv) the interest of or any money or other assets payable, to an alternate
payee under a qualified domestic relations order as those terms are defined
in Section 414(p), Internal Revenue Code:
(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (lXa)(xiv) does not apply to:
(i) an alternate payee muter a qualified domestic, relations order, as
those terms are "defined in Section 4I4(p), Internal Revenue Code; or '
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits, accrued by-or on behalf of a debtor
within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy. This, may not
include amounts directly rolled, over from otter funds which\are exempt >.
from attachment under this section. '
(2) The exemptions in Subsections (l)(a)(xi)f (xii), and (xiii) do not apply to
. proceeds and avails of any matured or unmatured life insurance contract .
assigned or pledged as collateral for: repayment df a loan or other legal
obligation,
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CERTIFICATE

UTAH, RESIDING AT WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH;

8

THEREAFTER CAUSED BY ME TO BE TRANSCRIBED INTO
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION
OF SAID TESTIMONY SO TAKEN AND TRANSCRIBED TO THE BEST
OF MY ABILITY IS SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING PAGES

11
12
13
14

25

24

23

22

21 | October 27, 2011

20

19 I

18

17

16

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

/s/Russel D. Morgan
RUSSEL D. MORGAN, CSR
LICENSE #87-108442-7801

15 I NUMBERED FROM 3 TO 33 INCLUSIVE.

IN STENOTYPE FROM AN ELECTRONIC RECORDING, AND

10

THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BY ME

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF

7

9

PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BEFORE ME, RUSSEL D. MORGAN, A

6

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

4
5

STATE OF UTAH

3

2

1

34
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And that

All right.

Thank you.

Okay?

Thank you.

That's correct.

It simply denies their motion.

I have submitted an order, Your Honor,

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

THE COURT:

MR. ELMONT:

THE COURT:

if that's sufficient.

MR. PARK:

Okay?

But, right now, let's do July 1st.

will be like 5 o'clock.

deadlines.
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Because that writ of

So, we would submit respectfully,

I'm not going to do it.

Okay.

And I'm just not comfortable

I spent two days

That's two weeks.

I think that's
And if you'll go ahead and prepare some

July 1st.

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

past that issue, if we do, then we'll see about the other

proposed orders on the substitution issue, and after we get

acceptable.

of July 1st.

The court is going to give a deadline, gentlemen,

of cases that I need to read.

ruling from the bench, especially now that I have a couple

on February 16th and 17th.

spent time listening to pretrial motions.

But I

I know it's

going to make you not very happy with the court.

afternoon.

indicated you wanted the court to rule from the bench this

I know that both of you

time vested in this case as well.

No, sir.

Mr. Park, anything else?

Gentlemen, I've got some

THE COURT:

MR. PARK:

THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.

dismiss.

arguments Mr. Park has about attorneys fees when we seek to

32

in interest as plaintiff in this action, then we'll see what

Diamond should be allowed to substitute in as the real party

Your Honor, that the motion should be granted that Black

the publication notice.

execution process goes out to the whole world by virtue of

whoeverfs claims they claim they are.

Lamoreauxfs claims, or Mr. Lamoreauxfs sonfs claims, or
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It was followed.

And Mr. Park's interest,

Mr.

For

We are

If he's got an

That's not where we are today.

Black

And the

Black Diamond now is

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

appropriately the real party in interest with Mr.

Diamond bought the interest.

The procedure was followed.

You know, this is black letter stuff.
procedure's there.

stretch.

fact that these are not done every day, this is not a

Again, Your Honor, I think notwithstanding the

proceed separately.

are only talking about dismissal, substitution and to

judgment that's awarded.

having any possibility of claiming a contingency on a

the time we seek to dismiss the claim preventing him from

31

We

extinguished, well, it will be extinguished, if at all, at

ongoing lien interest, and he thinks it's going to be

purposes now, whatever he has, would remain.

something to be addressed in the motion to dismiss.

But that's

There's no judgment.

not trying to step ahead of his interests.

^entered at the end of the day.

whatever it is, is a contingent interest on a judgment being

publication was accomplished.

Park has now conceded it was followed by knowing the

of execution process is what it is.

The writ

So, all of that is protected in the rules.

This is not some dead of night sneaky procedure.

what we did.

way than to have all the legal arguments associated with

In many ways, it would be cheaper to do it that
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The reason for that is once Mr. Fisherfs

We couldn't bid in it.

He could have bid

—

MR. ELMONT:

THE COURT:

—

So, there is

You know, that is, that type of

associated.
Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

these defendants, and all the other things that are

saying wait a minute, this is unfair, he's been bled dry by

30

money is not the type of a thing that we ought to be in here

Buy it.

You can't sell it because you are selling out my

He's the one who is now ultimately saying wait a

lien interest.

minute.

Park.

equitable interest built into the system, including for Mr.

There's the ability to protect

to go to Mr. Fisher.

Fine, correct.

the ability of protection.

chunk

that he wouldn't ever have to pay except for that one

$20 million, it would have all been money coming back to him

Lamoreaux.

additional bid beyond that amount would have gone to Mr.

interest in this case, roughly $17,000, was satisfied, any

win the bid.

wouldn't have ever had any contest as to whether they would

somebody step in and purchase it, the upshot of it is, they

could buy the interest and dismiss the case, I need to have

side and he thought, hey, this is a problem, the defendant

person who Mr. Lamoreaux considered to be favorable to his

Lamoreaux or Mr. Park or Mr. Lamoreaux!s son or any other

The upshot of that is, Your Honor, if Mr.

ts
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But, in any event, there is no way to follow the

So,

Everybody knows.

And the case law that

And

Mr. Fisher, who had the judgment against

at a public sale.

And he did.

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

sale to satisfy his judgment against Mr. Lamoreaux.

I

29

Mr.
Fisher was only entitled to obtain enough money out of that

the notice procedures in order to do that.

proceeded to conduct the public sale, had to follow all of

Mr. Lamoreaux, who obtained the writ of execution and

We need to be clear about what happens

buy out interests.

talked about when he talks about sneaking in and trying to

that's this sort of general equitable position that Mr. Park

And that's the last thing I want to address.

dismissing them.

buying the case, the claims, with the specific intent of

opposition to the interest of the former plaintiff who is

we cited assumes this is a person who is directly in

misunderstanding.

There's no

Well, that's not the case when we are

dealing about an execution here.

.of transaction.

sells a cause of action to a party in an arm's length type

you are talking about a normal circumstance where somebody

it's just, you may have the language of Rule 25, assuming

the plaintiff, hasn't told anybody what's going on.

under Rule 25 when the party in control of the knowledge,

procedure for trialing a motion to substitute a party in

son.

way in saying that he didn't really transfer anything to his
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This happens every day.

The notion that the case should proceed in Mr.

And if we are talking about

That's completely within Mr. Lamoreaux's

In fact, he

I don't

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

this case to satisfy creditors, which I think goes a long

28

still says he's going to use the benefits, the proceeds from

think he claims he sold them in this case.

selling his interest or transferring his interest.

control, if he's going to be going off before trial and

transferred?

motion if we don't know that the interest had been

Rule 25, well, how are we supposed to make that type of a

a court acting upon motion to substitute in a party under

of the real party in interest.

Rule 17, which says that a case should proceed in the name

rule of discretion on Rule 25, doesn't take account of

opposed to Mr. Lamoreaux's interest, and that's merely a

party in interest is Black Diamond, who is diametrically

Lamoreaux's name, notwithstanding the fact that the real

Honor.

And that's the

This is

So, the last couple of brief points here, Your

only way to protect those rights.

plain to notice up.

The notice goes out.

If you don't do it within that time,

publication is effective.

provisions of Rule 64.

do it is within the time it's set forth in the execution

wants to object to that, hefs got a procedure, the time to

property, and grabs the TV out of my house, and Mr. Anderson

along with a judgment against me and seeks to execute on my
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again referring back to the same

is ssold

or

If you don't, you don't just get to

If you want to try to gain the system,

That doesn't work

I mean,

Well, when somebody comes
Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

payments on its total value.

still owned by him because I only make tiny amounts of

And I haven't given any notice to anyone else that that is

But I'm buying it off of Mr. Anderson.

And, well, it's really not a great one because of
the UCC filings.

place.

an expensive television that I gained from a rent-to-own

27

the equivalent situation, Your Honor, is, you know, I've got

that objection, Mr. Lamoreauxfs son has no claim.

be held on whether the writ should issue notwithstanding

an appropriate objection and the opportunity for hearing to

Rule 64E is crystal clear that in the absence of

under Rule 64.

collateral attack in a separate case.

not object to the writ, then just claim it's invalid in a

was going forward.

certainly, at least, had constructive notice that this thing

ignore it, especially in a case where Mr. Lamoreaux's son,

written procedure.

written procedure, you deal with it in the context of the

raised earlier, which is, if you have a problem with the

Black letter law, goi ng back to the point that I

deliver ed to the plaintiff."

and obi igations at any time bef ore the properl:y

rights that the defendant has --- may exercise those rights

exercise those ]rights —
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And that's

That's not Mr. Lamoreaux's son,

"Any claimant not made by the plaintiff

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

and not served with the writ and accompanying papers may

is what applies.

So, in the last sentence of Section El of Rule 64

didn't know about Mr. Lamoreaux's son.

26

That would only be if the writ had
been served on that person because we knew about it or we

So, that's not relevant.

what was, apparently, not Mr. Lamoreaux's claims anymore.

purported transfer before trial and not letting anybody know

And that was this

I think the facts of the
case show who did the sneaking here.

sneaking in and sneaking around.

It's interesting that Mr. Park talks about

because we didn't know anything about it.

allowed by the defendant.

to serve those rights and obligations within the same time

Any claim made by the plaintiff and served with the writ has

required for the party who is seeking to object to provide.

it, that security is one of the obligations that's often

you have an objection to a writ and you have a hearing about

Remember, one of the things that has to happen if

providing and objecting to security.

defendant with respect to the writ and with respect to

property has the same rights and obligations as the

because under El, any person claiming an interest in the

effectiveness of the sale to Black Diamond.

doesn't really leave any room at all to doubt the
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My researcher says that itfs no

MR. ELMONT:

THE COURT:

I'll be brief.

Mr. Elmont.
Thanks, Your Honor.

All right.

That's all I have, Your Honor.

And they knew that interest was

Rule 64E

And I think it's

And that language
Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

In this case, Mr. Lamoreaux's son.

I

25

specifically addresses claims of property by a third person:

well in line with Mr. Park's argument.

specifically, I didn't quote this before.

I'll just refer back to our arguments under Rule 64. But,

have to prove what interest we bought at the execution sale,

Respectfully to Mr. Park's argument on this notion that we

there.

entered into in 2008.

agreement which was presented to this court at trial and was

above my interest, which was set forth in a written

And they certainly haven't proven that their interest is

And they haven't proven it today.

If they are correct, and they have some interest,

they've got to prove it.

decision.

submit findings of fact and conclusions of law and get a

case when I have tried this to trial and we are ready to

facts of the transfer and all of the legal issues in this

Now, it doesn't seem like to me that we want to get into the

longer permitted in Utah to execute on "Chose in Action."

Number five.

nothing purchased at that time.

that they rely on, 64E and Rule 69, because there was

anything by reason of the execution sale under the rules
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further —
saying, okay.
what we are going to do there now is —
would do that, Your Honor.

3
4
5
6

so

relates to the rule where you are allowed to include them in
this lawsuit.

transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or
against the original party unless the court, upon motion,
directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original party.

14
15
16
17
18
19

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

did was provide in argument four that they didn't purchase

25

24

But the next thing my researcher

well, actually,
I didn't do this research.

The next thing I did was in my —
24

23

You don't have to let them in.

interest.

it

22

You don't have to —

In case of any

wouldn't matter if they proved to you today that they had an

So, it's your discretion.

It says transfer of interest.

21

20

They did show where they had published.

13

Argument three

skip to, because they did argument two in my memorandum.

The next thing I did, Your Honor, is, and we'll

supported by law.

It's

12

11

10

I have had my interest for a long time.

to go ahead and we were going to foreclose on their

8
9 [ property.

say I would have a breach of ethics if I told Black Diamond

7

And I don't know how they could

I don't know how you

Black Diamond's part of the lawsuit —

well, what we would be doing is we would be

We really don't need that kind of

interest in it.

2

I have an affidavit that says they didn't have an

they did.

1
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They can't ask you to come to allow them to become

And these cases

I mean, if we look at it as a summary judgment

Now, that's impossible to do at this point.

They

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

motion, they have an affidavit that says it did and what

have —

lawsuit.

they brought Mr. Lamoreaux's "Chose in Action" in this

they are asking for is summary judgment determining that

In my memorandum to you, I pointed out that what

of this judgment.

23

They are interested in sneaking around and trying to get out

They are not interested in what's fair or what the law is.

And they don't care.

And I

They didn't buy his
All they bought was whatever was there.

told them, there isn't anything here.

interest.

follow the rules in Mr. Fisher's case.

case that Mr. Fisher had, they can't say, well, you didn't

I mean, they have got to show, and they can't rely on the

do not take into account that he transferred his interest.

statute they relied on has been repealed.

And, as Mr. Elmont pointed out, even the

And now, they sneak in here and try to buy it

"Chose in Action."

he has.

everything

Now, they have starved him out

since 2006 until 2011, putting him at his last —

Lamoreaux at least $550,000.

evidence before you will show that Black Diamond owed David

What's happened in this case is, in 2006, the

That just doesn't work here, Your Honor.

plaintiffs in this matter and then have a whole new lawsuit.

lawsuit.
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Thank you, Your Honor.

The way I

Maybe.

Itfs not even clear that they purchased that.

As you'll recall, in the case

—

If they are going to claim that he

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

25 I did this in an improper manner, that's a whole different

to defraud creditors.

consideration, that's a whole different lawsuit.

Transfer

But if they claim, if they are going to
claim, well, you transferred this interest without

there's nothing.

Maybe

Now, all Mr. Elmont or Black Diamond
bought at the sale was whatever there might be.

prior to this sale.

22

Now he claims that he went, that he transferred it

except transfer his interest in whatever this is.

there's nothing that says Mr. Lamoreaux has to do anything

They

To transfer real

To change that,

property, you have to have some kind of a deed.

you also have to have it in writing.

commission, you have to have it in writing.

before you, what the law said was to get a real estate

interest in any manner.

And there was no law that says that he has to transfer his

been.

they purchased is whatever Mr. Lamoreauxfs interest may have

It looks like to me, Your Honor, when Mr. Lamoreaux, what

have to show up at this sale and say I have a lien on this?

of recovery services who has sent a lien to my office, they

property, have to show up at the sale, say that the division

Lamoreauxfs cause of action, "Chose in Action" or intangible

understand his argument is, whoever has the lien on Mr.

MR. PARK:
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But the point is it's premature.

If there is

We think that it's a very simple case for

That's exactly what

And,

I do not.

However, before, Mr. Park,

Mr. Park.
Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

THE COURT:

(Whereupon, a discussion took place off the record.)

Mr. Shaum, I need to address you.

you stand up.

THE COURT:

before I sit down.

again, I will reply, unless Your Honor has any questions

I'll let Mr. Park have his opportunity to respond.

So, I think, Your Honor, that lays things out.

against itself.

the wrongful owner of those claims it's got a judgment

proceed to have a judgment when if in fact Black Diamond is

admission somehow, yet, is the engine that's turning to

former plaintiff no longer has any interest by his own

And the

It's not merely a discretionary issue

when you have diametrically opposed interests.

party in interest.

plaintiff to be substituted in because they are the real

Your Honor to conclude that that's appropriate for this

we intend to do.

And we are not hiding any balls here.

Diamond, when it seeks to dismiss the case against itself.

comes for what we believe the appropriate plaintiff, Black

rights, then we can readdress those issues when the time

something to be said for Mr. Park having continuing with

there.

Z1
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I!m sorry, Mr. Parkfs, apparently, comfortable

But envisioning that down the road, I

I don't see how that

That

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

20

responsibility, other things, no doubt, would come into play

Now, contractual issues, rules of professional

longer want to proceed with.

ability to force you to proceed with the case that you no

for one thing, to say that I have, as the attorney, have the

would be consistent with our rules of professional ethics,

would be a novel argument to be held.

against themselves, I guess I would like to see that.

that they get a judgment, even in this case a judgment

required to do everything in their diligence to make sure

required to proceed with the litigation in course, it's

that is, if Mr. Park has some law that says a plaintiff is

think Your Honor can see where that argument heads. And

ability to proceed.

you can't do that because you are somehow extinguishing his

appropriate time for Mr. Park to raise his arguments that

And when we seek to dismiss, that's the

Black Diamond, that's still there.

Lamoreaux to the execution process to the public sale to

legitimate lien interest, then the transfer from Mr.

If in fact Mr. Park has a

Well, we are no different than Mr.

Lamoreaux's son in that regard.

Mr. Lamoreaux's son.

and under Mr. Lamoreaux's version of the facts, and that is

proceeding at a pace with a different real party in interest

apparently —
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And we'll see what Mr.

There's been nothing

And it can't be

And that is Mr. Park's

And we address that in our

We don't yet have a

And whether or not Mr. Lamoreaux transferred to his

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

interest not be here, but be someone that Mr. Lamoreaux's

in terms of now purportedly having the real matter in

son, which I notice Mr. Park doesn't seem to object to that

there.

attached to the.cause of action, well, then they are still

that there remain a lien interest that he has that are

If Mr. Park is right

The substitution is to place another
person in Mr. Lamoreaux's position.

motion to dismiss.

have is a motion for substitution.

Park's argument doesn't avail anything for now is, all we

But the short version of why Mr.

Yes.

Attorney's, right.

memoranda, Your Honor.

MR. ELMONT:

THE COURT:

attorney's lien.

claim that this can't go forward because he has an

where we are with one exception:

1!

So, I think that sort of in a broad brush captures

address that as a factual component.

So, there is no reason to

It was valid.

Well, if there wasn't, then the writ

collaterally attacked now.

process was final.

the writ process.

that I have seen that says there was anything improper in

given proof that it was accomplished.

Park has to say beyond this idea of publication that we have

been no objection that I have seen.
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and, also, by virtue of the fact that itfs brought as a
collateral attack in a different proceeding.

3
4

goes through all of the ways, the timing to have service

assert a third-party's interests in a claim.

15

So, again, there is no factual argument that comes

The factual

25

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

did you avail yourself to use the writ process?

There's

24 I question is no more than was the writ process followed and

23 I there was nothing legitimate to be sold.

22 J and the notice that was purportedly given by Mr. Park that

J

18

21 I in to play by virtue of what happened on the day of the sale

20 I

And that's exactly

And you can't just show up
and extrajudicially say stop the sale.

19 I what happened in this case.

18

17 J then seeking to execute on it.

16 I already accounted for in the process of obtaining a writ and

All of that is

to object, for there to be a hearing if somebody wants to

14

13 J accomplished, to have an opportunity for people to have time

That's why Rule 64

12

That's why there's a writ process.

no.

11

Well,

that it wasn't going to buy anything of any worth.

that should have been enough for Black Diamond to realize

9
10

that should have been enough for the sale to be stopped,

8

He!s transferred it, that

Lamoreaux came to the public sale, and they warned him, hey,

7 I he no longer owns this stuff.

6

Mr. Park has also raised the fact that he and Mr.

shell game that's going on and trying to hide the interest

2

5

Itfs doubly objectionable, both by virtue of the

1

m
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1

If Mr. Lamoreaux's son believed he had some

So, whether or not it should have been Mr.

Just perceived to go

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

forward in this case.

buy anything at the public auction.

17

happened in that other case is no good, so these guys didn't

to a different court and say all of the writ stuff that

impermissible as we cite in our reply memorandum to come in

interest, it's still a collateral attack that's

been Mr. Lamoreaux's son, the alleged transferee of the

Lamoreaux making the objections or whether it should have

objections.

where the writ was issued that he should have made those

the writ procedure went through, it was in Mr. Fisher's case

objection to make to the way that that notice was handled or

another case.

collaterally attack the writ process that was engaged in in

mockery, frankly, of the writ process, but it's seeking to

Well, not only is that making a

I didn't have any obligation to object to it.

transferred it to my son.

_anymore.

your writ's no good because I didn't own the property

to remember, Your Honor, is we have Mr. Lamoreaux arguing

And that's an additional element here that we need

accomplished.

proceed and have a hearing before an execution is

all of the things that the writ process allows for you to

present himself, file the objection, request the hearing, do

Lamoreaux's own son, there would have been a way for him to
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So, whether it's Mr. Lamoreaux's

I mean, you can't —

just can't work for

And that's exactly

So, the notice provisions cover people such as Mr.

In terms of the things

Notice was sent out.

And, certainly, in this case

It doesn't

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

where the alleged new owner of the interest is Mr.

matter.

motion that that was a non-fraudulent transfer.

evidentiary basis, we can just assume for purposes of our

that Mr. Park has talked about that require some further

factual issue to be discussed here.

16

fraudulent transfer, that's why I don't think there's a huge

transfer that took place here, and it didn't involve a

to believe the allegation that there was some legitimate

Lamoreaux's son even if, in fact, Your Honor were inclined

Lamoreaux.

what's been attempted to happen here in this case by Mr.

writ's no good, your sale is no good.

actually secretly transferred it to somebody else, so your

aw, I think you got me on a writ of execution, but I

somebody to be able to do this kind of shell game of saying,

are extinguished.

followed, and the writ process being followed, those rights

things to, by virtue of the execution sale process being

if it's somebody else that he claims that he transferred

son or whether that's no longer the allegation he's making,

fair opportunity to do so.

that's actually mine, you can't sell that, they've got a

third-party wants to come in and say, no, wait a minute,
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And, at the time that we had initially filed our

And that's the only

He

you publish.

That's why

Russel "D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

That's why you give notice, so that if any

against, it's made to apply to everybody else.

15

rules is not only meant to apply to the party being executed

problem is that the execution process that's set out in the

The

He didn't have to make his own offer at the sale.

He didn't have to

He was no longer the owner of the cause of action.

object.

didn't own the cause of action anymore.

well, that doesn't matter with regard to Mr. Lamoreaux.

Now, Mr. Park also makes the argument, though,

procedural flaw that was ever alleged in the opposition.

exhibit to our reply memorandum.

We did supply as an

Subsequent to that time, we did

receive the proof of publication.

The Spectrum Newspaper.

had not yet at that time received proof of publication from

allegation that there had been appropriate publication, we

motion and submitted our memorandum, although we did have an

notice.

concluded, was a claim that there was not publication

regard to how the sale was conducted and the transaction was

in his opposition with regard to how the notice worked with

The only procedural objection that Mr. Park raised

be the plaintiff.

plaintiff, is to address it in that case where it seeks to

a cause of action against itself, and it should be the

Procedurally, the appropriate thing to do if defendant buys
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Well, I'll submit, Your

But it would be a very odd

As we say, there's nothing

And that's, again, it's something that we

So, that's the

But, again, at the

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

separate series of claims in order to expound those issues.

doesn't mean that you have to have a separate lawsuit and a

outset, just the fact that there may be factual issues

sort of address the facts of this.

Mr. Park raises some additional arguments that

14

This category of stuff is subject
to execution and is subject to sale.

black letter legal issue.

memoranda after Mr. Park raised that issue.

argue both in our original and especially in our reply

category of.

intangible personal property, which is this is certainly a

executable property does include intangible property,

And, specifically in furtherance of that,

in fact they didn't intend to include causes of action.

thing to have the rule read the way that it reads today if

that addresses it currently.

There's nothing in any case law.

There's nothing in the legislative history of the change.

Honor, that he's got no legal authority in support of that.

deviation is no longer justified.

the common law and, now, without that express language, the

the old Rule 69 is necessary because you are deviating from

the express language that addresses "Choses in Action" in

this is somehow a sharp practice to do this, and that having

Mr. Park cited in his opposition the notion that
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If you then

So, if you have a rule that says you can execute

If you don't have anything that says "Choses

But the current statute,

It was recodified as

But there's nothing in here that would

And I'll submit and let Mr. Park

So, that's the black letter rule justification for

They are

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

these are exempt from execution.

And there's nothing that says that

You can execute on anything that's not

They are under the old rule.

exempt from execution.

under the new rule.

The answer is yes.

category of our "Choses in Action" subject to execution.

13

why we are able to proceed as a legal matter, is the broader

Action".

give an exemption that says you can't execute on a "Chose in

address this issue.

exempt from execution.

and, again, this is in our memoranda, is 78B5-505, property

part of the split of 78A and 78B.

The statute hasn't really changed.

property and decide if they are or not exempt from seizure.

plain language of the rule that says you can execute on any

in Action" are exempt from seizure, then they fit within the

from seizure.

to find something that says this type of property is exempt

on any property that's not exempt from seizure, you've got

seizure.

means the defendant's property of any type not exempt from

subject to execution, it says Rule 64 (a), the property

turn to Rule 64, where it defines the word property that's

is it something that's available for execution?
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Well, the authority in the

Rather, the operative language

We don't have case law interpreting

And Rule 64E (a) says, "A writ of

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

made there that raises a question is, is this property, and

So, the question there, or the statement that's

or the payment of money."

final judgment or order requiring the delivery of property

or under the control of the defendant following entry of a

execution is available to seize property in the possession

Rule 64 and Rule 64E.

And, specifically, I'll point Your Honor to

when the plain language is as crystal clear as it is.

it, but you don't need to go past the plain language that

version of the rules.

effect as a matter of black letter law under the current

And that's what remains in

That's what was in effect under the old

cases that we have given you.

that's not exempt.

always was and remains that you can execute on any property

says "Choses in Action."

memorandum was not in the magic talismanic language that

first instance from Rule 69 is we cite in our reply

and what is the authority now?

know, what really was the authority in the first instance

you have to step back one degree below that and say, you

But

And that's no longer

They were

the case under the current rules of civil procedure.

expressly included in the language.

sheriff will proceed to sell "Choses in Action."

causes of action, just because it said right in it the

12
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merits.

4

outset, Your Honor, that this is not uncommon.

I would say

is, Mr. Park's going to focus on this, the rule of civil

Rule 69, which was part of the reworking, when all

that that doesn't really change things from plain vanilla,

black letter law issue, that it's appropriate for this to

22

25

24

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

cited as a shorthand for why it's okay to purchase these

And that is because that old rule, Rule 69, was

23 I proceed the way that it did.

merits of our motion and why it is that this, I think, is a

21

20 I at least, not very much, is where we focus on sort of the

19

But the reason I say

this morning's hearing again to see if there's any case law

I'm not aware of and have checked in advance of

18 J addressing the rule since the change.

17

16

15 I with older trials that predate the change of that rule.

14 I 2004, even though these are newer cases, they are dealing

13 I of the writ procedures got all thrown in separately back in

12 I effect.

11 I procedure that is cited in these cases is no longer in

10

vanilla to maybe vanilla bean or French vanilla.

9

And that

but there's one quirk that maybe changes it from plain

8

n

So, I wanted to just sort of establish that at the

7 I it's plain vanilla, that may be going a little bit too far,

6

5

has to —

3

it has to go forward on the judgment of the

though I don't own it anymore, you have to proceed.

2

There

yet, the argument for Mr. Lamoreaux is, you know, even

1
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There's no need for the plaintiff, or what we

For what?

That's
And because of that

No.

For declaratory

The court can just, notwithstanding the fact

That it doesn't

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
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Lamoreauxfs cause of action doesn't want to proceed.

And,

involved, where the party that we believe now owns Mr.

about a case where fundamental different interests are

We are talking

The court can, as a matter of discretion, choose
to leave him in as the plaintiff or not.

matter.

doesn't own the cause of action anymore.

10

that Mr. Lamoreaux, even under his own version of the facts,

discretion.

argue, to say that this is somehow just a matter of

standing element, it doesn't make sense, as Mr. Park will

supposed to be addressed right now.

relief that they own a cause of action?

Lamoreaux or somebody else.

owning the cause of action to have to go and sue Mr.

believe should be the plaintiff, meaning Black Diamond,

trial.

There's no need for a separate

In each of those cases, the dismissal was

done in the same case.

on the merits.

way to get rid of it without having to wait and address it

you know, this is a common way to address a litigation in a

So, I cite all of that at the outset to just say,

defendants."

precluding the execution sale of "chose in action" against

We have found no Utah authority and plaintiff cites none
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But here we have a 2010

And, generally, a defendant can purchase

This one's a 2009 case.

And I show Your Honor

Exactly.

And then cites, if you were to go to

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
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purchasing plaintiff's legal right to pursue this action.

law, defendants attempted to satisfy their money judgment by

page 4, under bracketed paragraph 1075, "Pursuant to Utah

claims anymore.

You didn't have those

And the court of appeals

Question (inaudible) standing.

said, no, there is no standing.

MR. ELMONT:

THE COURT:

unfavorable substantive decision, appealed it.

plaintiff proceeded to finish the case and then have an

after the defendant purchased the cause of action, but the

In other words, here,

But here the additional element that's

brought in is a standing element.

appellate decision.

this one only because here we are talking about a federal

I'm sorry.

Finally, one last case also from 2010. Actually,

then move to dismiss those claims.

claims, i.e., "choses of action" pending against itself and

judgment debtor.

sale to satisfy the judgment that it has against the

creditor can purchase any nonexempt property at a sheriff's

But, as it says, there's a general rule that a judgment

would see a discussion of other cases that address this.

page, to the right-hand column at the top of the column you

If you flipped to the second

Itfs only from 2002.

court of appeals decision.

not old.

9
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There may or may not be factual issues that

And we can

the defendant

And if

it goes on.

Paragraph 17 is a further
It says,

Now, the Applied

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
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Medical Technologies case that I just showed Your Honor is

just to show that this is still going on.

not further substantive explanation of this, but, rather,

The next case that I wanted to show Your Honor is

indeed, causes of action are regularly sold.

explanation talking about the routineness of this.

So,

dismiss those claims.

"chose in action" pending against itself and then move to

it follows that a defendant can purchase claims, i.e.,

"chose in action" are amenable to execution under Rule 69F,

Skipping down again to paragraph 13, given that

state or federal law.

personal property, which is not exempt from execution under

and how it can be used to levy upon a judgment debtor's

citing rule of civil procedure about the writ of execution

the beginning of the court's analysis, you will see it *s

you go down to the next page, in paragraph 11, and that's

case to seek to dismiss those claims against itself.

purchases the plaintiff's claims and then proceeds in that

or excuse me —

But the procedure that's used is that the

plaintiff purchases —

discuss those.

the way the sale was handled or other issues.

are relevant as it comes to the way the sale is noticed or

separate trial.

8
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And that's

And, in this case,

But if you were to turn

And, of course, he

All right.

THE COURT:

—

And if you skip ahead to paragraph 7, you

So, exactly, this scenario that Black Diamond is

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

that we are not talking about procedure here that requires a

So, from the outset, that's the first point, is

here then moved to dismiss those claims.

himself.

see that, the person who purchased the claims against

sale took place.

That

And the service was
followed pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

to satisfy the deficiency judgment.

execution requiring that any nonexempt property be delivered

Black Diamond, in this case, proceeded to obtain a writ of

that was attempting to move forward in the same manner that

You would see there that the party

Exactly.

MR. ELMONT:

MR. ELMONT:

Starting on January 28th?

So, that in the bracket

THE COURT:

citation, paragraph 5.

paragraph 5, meaning, you know, the court's Utah Reporter

to page 2 of the printout, you would see that in

can address them in his response.

And you can see Mr. Park's arguments.

which I wonft spend a lot of time, it's in the memorandum.

Court gives for how this process works.

because this is the best explanation that the Utah Supreme

shorthand justification for what we were doing.

cited in our initial memorandum as sort of just the
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Well, Your Honor, thank you.

So —
And in

After we have gone through a

Thank you.

Okay.

This is —

You bet.
this is the case that we
Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

MR. ELMONT:

THE COURT:

—

MR. ELMONT:

If I can approach, I

even (inaudible).

Sure.

THE COURT:

would be happy to hand off —

MR. ELMONT:

THE COURT:

—
Understood, Your Honor.

But that's
MR. ELMONT:

that happen before.

complete trial, then this thing happened, I have never seen

routine for the court.

THE COURT:

It may be routine, but itfs not

And I think it actually is routine and

explains case law.

of procedure.

from the outset address the sort of routineness of this type

than discussing the mechanics of how that works, and just

I wanted to jump a little bit out of order, rather

vanilla procedure.

against themselves in a lawsuit may not seem all that plain

that somebody is purchasing an interest to be the plaintiff

the first response that someone might have when they hear

experience for you, and in light of the fact that I think

light of the fact that this is a different type of

MR. ELMONT:

we'll go longer than that too.
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—

So —

And, given that, we would want to make

This is a black

THE COURT:

—
No

I don't thiink we have, just as

Or if you want to set the parameters for

If you go longer than that, I guess
THE COURT:

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
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Okay.

MR. ELMONT:

long as we are done by 5 o'clock.

any timing

jump in, I wi 11.

So, if Your Ho nor would like me t(o go ahead and

substitute in •

1 letter law issue, and it fs appropriate for the plaintiff to

J that this is not real.iy a close call.

1 could convince you what I believe is, as a ]natter of law, is

so that I hope by the time that we wou Id be finished we

sure that we, at least, give you amply our version of things

Honor's experience.

morning, is that this is a new type of a proceeding in Your

record except to note my understanding, based on this

intend to make reference to discussions that we had off the

And I don't

I wouldn't want him to have to clock unnecessarily.

Mr. Anderson is the one I would worry

Mr. Olmstead might not have all

I don't know that

Counsel, I have all afternoon.

But we certainly want to have enough time.

about.

MR. ELMONT:

afternoon.

THE COURT:

MR. ELMONT:

THE COURT:

want to budget my initial time in court.

J

I

1

J

J

1

J
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MR. ELMONT:

Thank you.

And just to

Mr. Elmont, is that

That is, Your Honor.

Okay.

And, of course, as we discussed

Hefs here with us as well today.
MR. ELMONT:

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
(435) 668-3796

the chance to reply after Mr. Park is finished, so I would

whatever you decide on the timing, we would like, of course,

The only thing I would say,

Ifm happy to give as much detail
as is helpful to Your Honor.

setting time for an hour.

And, yes, Your Honor, Your Honor had mentioned potentially

I do remember Mr. Anderson.

THE COURT:

Anderson at the trial.

You may or may not remember Mr.

And I111 note, Your Honor, you see Mr.
Lamoreaux all the time.

or can't do that.

in chambers, that's the nub of the issue, is whether we can

order to dismiss the case.

therefore, seeks to substitute itself in as plaintiff in

Lamoreauxfs rights to proceed as plaintiff in this case and,

Black Diamond did purchase, and we would argue, Mr.

fill in the dots that Mr. Park noted, at that public auction

accurate?

THE COURT:

and tell you what his motion is, then I'll respond.

And I suppose we are here today for Mr. Elmont to go forward

objection to that, claiming what I have in my memorandum.

And I filed a memorandum and

And Mr. Elmont filed this motion to substitute

in as a party-plaintiff.

the lawsuit.

told everyone present that Mr. Lamoreaux had no interest in
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The court is going to call David Lee

And Mr. David L.

And because I was in a motion for summary judgment

Gentlemen, there's been some

I wanted to

And he sold —

Russel D. Morgan, CSR
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At that sale, I

he noticed up for sale

Mr. Fisher had a judgment against

Oh, okay.

No.

No?

No, sir.

Mr. Lamoreauxfs interest in this lawsuit.

MR. PARK:

THE COURT:

Mr. Lamoreaux.

MR. PARK:

THE COURT:

MR. PARK:

Is that correct?

relinquished his interest in this case to Mr. Darwin Fisher.

Specifically, Mr. Lamoreaux, apparently, has

decision making process in the case.

developments and how they impact, if at all, the court's

get the parties back before the court to discuss these

took this court under advisement after trial.

agreements that have taken place since the court initially

to come back at 2 o'clock.

which lasted about two and-a-half hours, I requested counsel

10 a.m.

Counsel, this matter was set for this morning at

Elmont appearing on behalf of Black Diamond Holdings, LLC.

appearing on behalf of Mr. Lamoreaux.

The record shall reflect Mr. Michael W. Park

Lamoreaux vs. Black Diamond Holdings, LLC, 080500885.

THE COURT:

P R O C E E D I N G S

3
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